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Abstract           . 
In their Covert Repair Hypothesis (CRH), Postma and Kolk (1993) proposed that 
stuttering-like disfluencies arise, in both normal and stuttered speech, as a consequence of 
speakers‟ attempts to repair phonological-encoding errors before they start to speak. They 
posited that stutterers are particularly disfluent because they make larger numbers of such 
errors compared to normally-fluent speakers. To date, however, experimental research has 
provided little reliable evidence to support or counter this hypothesis.  This thesis constitutes 
a systematic attempt to provide such evidence. Using a tongue-twister paradigm in 
conjunction with manipulations of auditory masking, it first documents (a) the vigilance with 
which normally-fluent speakers monitor for such errors; (b) the relative accuracy with which 
they detect them; and (c) the frequency with which they occur – in both inner and overt 
speech. A second set of experiments then extends the same investigation to a group of 
stutterers and matched controls and explores the relationship between the occurrence of 
participants‟ errors in the experimental paradigm and the frequency of their stuttering-like 
disfluencies in everyday speaking situations. Together, these experiments reveal that, 
compared to controls, participants who stutter monitor their speech with similar levels of 
vigilance; identify phonemic errors with similar degrees of accuracy; and, as predicted by the 
CRH,  produce significantly more errors – in both their inner and overt speech. However, 
contrary to the predictions of the CRH, no relationship was found between the frequency of 
such errors in inner speech and the severity of participants‟ disfluencies.  In a final set of 
experiments, a speech-recognition paradigm is employed to explore an alternative 
hypothesis: that stuttering-like disfluencies can be precipitated, in a speaker, by the mere 
anticipation that his words will result in communication failure. Results revealed that, for 
stutterers, stuttering decreased on words that were consistently followed by feedback 
implying correct recognition, but not on words followed by feedback implying incorrect 
recognition. For normally-fluent speakers, equivalent correlations were not found. The thesis 
iv 
 
concludes that slow or impaired phonological encoding may play a role in the development 
of the disorder. But, once established, the anticipation of communication failure may be a 
more important factor in determining where and when stuttering-like disfluencies actually 
occur.  It then discusses implications of the experimental findings for hypotheses that posit a 
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1. Introduction and Thesis Overview 
1.1. Introduction 
Persistent developmental stuttering is a disorder of fluency that affects approximately 
one percent of adults worldwide. The condition can significantly impair the ability of 
affected individuals to communicate effectively and to participate in society. Although a 
considerable amount is now known about the factors that influence stuttering, the mechanism 
through which episodes of stuttering occur is still not understood.  
In 1993, a hypothesis was proposed by Postma and Kolk that linked stuttering to 
difficulties arising from an underlying impairment of the language production system. 
Specifically, it equated stuttering-like disfluencies in both normal and stuttered speech with 
speakers‟ attempts to repair phonological-encoding errors, covertly, before they start to 
speak; and it posited that stutterers are particularly disfluent because they make larger 
numbers of such errors compared to normally-fluent speakers. This so-called „Covert Repair 
Hypothesis‟ differed from previous hypotheses insofar as it was the first ever to provide a 
detailed account of a possible mechanism through which the repetitions, prolongations and 
blocks that characterise stuttering may arise. To date, however, experimental research has 
provided little reliable evidence to support or counter this hypothesis.  This thesis constitutes 
a systematic attempt to provide such evidence.  
The Covert Repair Hypothesis is predicated on the following underlying presumptions 
about the nature of language production: (a) that speakers are able to monitor their speech 
plans for errors of phonological encoding prior to the onset of overt articulation; and (b) that, 
in stutterers, monitoring functions normally.   
Because these underlying presumptions have been questioned, in this thesis we also 
investigate their validity. In order to do so, we make use of an experimental paradigm, 
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originally developed by Oppenheim and Dell (2008), whereby speakers recite tonguetwisters 
in inner (and overt) speech and self-report their errors. However, the reliability of this 
paradigm has never been adequately established, and it is unclear to what extent speakers are 
able to perceive phonological encoding errors through pre-articulatory monitoring. 
Therefore, in our first three experiments we test the reliability of the paradigm across 
different groups of (normally-fluent) participants, by documenting the types and frequencies 
of inner and overt errors that they self report, and by comparing their (overt) self-reports to 
those of an independent rater. In so doing, these experiments also address some questions 
regarding the architecture of the language-formulation system. 
The remainder of the thesis constitutes an attempt to provide answers to three key 
questions that relate directly to the Covert Repair Hypothesis...  
1. Compared to normally-fluent speakers, do adults who stutter monitor their 
speech with an equal degree of vigilance? 
2. Do adults who stutter make more errors of phonological encoding than normally 
fluent speakers? 
3. Is the likelihood of stuttering on a word increased by stutterers‟ perceptions that 
they need to speak the word more accurately? 
The first two of these questions address two of the central tenets of the Covert Repair 
Hypothesis. The third is highly relevant to the Covert Repair Hypothesis because findings 
from studies that have investigated the moments when stuttering occurs suggest that the 
extent to which a speaker is likely to engage in covert error repair (and/or other related 
behaviours) may be driven more by his perception that he is not being understood, than by 
the presence of actual phonemic (or other) errors in his speech.  
To investigate Questions 1 and 2 above, in our fourth experiment we adapt the 
Oppenheim and Dell tonguetwister paradigm so that it can be used to compare the frequency 
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of phonological-encoding errors in the speech plans of adults who stutter and matched 
normally-fluent controls. As will be seen, this fourth experiment revealed that, compared to 
the normally-fluent controls, the stuttering participants monitored their speech with a similar 
level of vigilance, but self-reported significantly more errors, both in their inner as well as 
their overt speech. However, it also revealed that language-formulation errors are unlikely to 
account for more than a small proportion of the stuttering-like disfluencies that commonly 
occur in their everyday speech.  
The latter of these findings led us to formulate Question 3 (above) and to consider the 
possibility that, rather than resulting from the speaker‟s formulation errors, stuttering may be 
more closely associated with the speaker‟s perceptions of the abilities of the listener  (or 
speech-recognition system), and that perhaps stuttering-like disfluencies are precipitated by 
the speaker‟s anticipation that the words he is about to utter are likely to be misrecognised 
(and thus will fail to fulfil their intended function). In the final set of experiments, we 
developed a new experimental paradigm to test this possibility and, more specifically, to 
answer Question 3. In two experiments, the first involving stutterers and the second 
involving normally-fluent speakers, participants spoke single words into a computer that 
they believed contained speech-recognition software.  The computer then provided (visual) 
feedback consistently indicating its misrecognition of certain words. The results of this final 
set of experiments revealed that, in adults who stutter, feedback suggesting misrecognition of 
previous iterations of a word increased the likelihood of future stuttering on that word. An 
equivalent experiment conducted with normally-fluent participants failed to produce the 
same results. 
In the final chapters of the thesis, the implications of our experimental results for 
theoretical models of stuttering are evaluated within the context of other existing research. 
We propose that the symptoms of stuttering and the moments in which they occur can best 
be accounted for by the modification of currently existing psycholinguistic models such that, 
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in addition to language-production difficulty, they also include the anticipation of 
communication failure as a key factor that disrupts the language-production system, and 
result in the production of stuttering-like disfluencies.  
1.2. Chapter by chapter Overview 
Chapter 2 starts with a discussion of the problems that arise when trying to define what 
stuttering is. It then provides an overview of the symptoms of stuttering and what they might 
tell us about its nature. In so doing, it also highlights key reasons for suspecting that both 
language-production impairment as well as stutterers‟ perceptions of the overall adequacy of 
their speech may be implicated in stuttering.  
Chapter 3 provides a overview of three types (or categories) of hypothesis that have 
attempted to account for the occurrence and quality of stuttering-like disfluencies: (1) 
Hypotheses (including the Covert Repair Hypothesis)that postulate that stuttering stems from 
some form of underlying speech or language-production impairment; (2) Hypotheses that 
associate stuttering purely with abnormal perception or cognition. The chapter then goes on 
to describe a third category of „Anticipatory Struggle‟ hypotheses, which view stuttering as a 
learned response that can be triggered by cues associated with past experiences of disfluency 
or communication failure. All three of these categories of hypothesis motivated experiments 
in this thesis. The chapter then goes on to describe the Covert Repair Hypothesis in detail 
and contains a review of published studies that provide evidence for or against the various 
tenets of the CRH. The main focus is on studies with experimental designs, although 
important correlational and corpus-based evidence is also outlined.  Two alternative 
psycholinguistic hypotheses that have challenged the CRH are also described, together with 
supporting evidence: (a) The „Vicious Circle Hypothesis‟ (Vasić & Wijnen, 2005), which 
attributes the production of stuttering-like disfluencies to excessive covert error repair 
activity resulting from hyper-vigilant error monitoring; and (b) the EXPLAN hypothesis 
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(Howell & Au-Yeung, 2002)  which retains the CRH‟s tenet that stuttering-like disfluencies 
arise as a consequence of slow language formulation, but challenges its assumption that they 
stem from covert repairs of language-formulation errors. The experiments contained in this 
thesis are relevant to both of these hypotheses.   
Chapter 4 discusses how insight into the extent to which speakers employ covert editing 
and repair as a means of reducing errors of phonological encoding can be gleaned from the 
study of the frequency biases that such errors tend to exhibit. It begin with a description of 
two key frequency biases – the phonemic-similarity bias and lexical bias, and two different 
accounts of how these biases may arise.  It then discusses inner speech, and how paradigms 
that investigate inner speech have the potential to reveal much about the extent to which 
speakers engage in covert editing and error repair. They also have the potential to reveal 
differences between stutterers and normally-fluent speakers with respect to the production, 
detection and covert editing of errors of phonological encoding.  
Chapter 5 focuses on methodological considerations. It highlights the problems 
associated with the objective measurement of subjective experiences, including inner speech 
and the subjective components of stuttering and discusses the rationale behind the methods 
of measurement adopted in this thesis. It also provides a rationale for the use of mixed-
effects modelling for the key statistical analyses conducted in each of the experiments. 
Chapters 6 to 8 comprise descriptions of the experiments carried out during the course of 
the PhD.  Specifically, Chapter 6 comprises a description of the first three tongue-twister 
experiments that were designed to investigate the reliability of the Oppenheim and Dell 
paradigm. Specifically, these three experiments measure inner and overt speech error rates 
and monitoring vigilance in groups of normally-fluent speakers.  In addition to confirming 
the reliability of the paradigm as a means of measuring inner-speech errors, these 
experiments also provide some new insights into the architecture of the speech-production 
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mechanisms of normally-fluent speakers. Chapter 7 describes our adaptation of the 
tonguetwister paradigm in which we compare speech errors in adult participants who stutter 
and matched controls. Chapter 8 describes the two experiments that investigate the role of 
anticipation of communication failure in the production of stuttering-like disfluencies both in 
adults who stutter and in normally-fluent speakers.  
Chapter 9 comprises a general discussion of the findings of the three groups of 
experiments and what they tell us about the nature of stuttering and how current 




2. The nature of stuttering 
In this chapter we discuss definitional issues surrounding stuttering and present a broad 
outline of its symptoms and the circumstances in which it occurs. Although the experimental 
studies in this thesis investigate stuttering in adults, to portray the adult condition in a 
meaningful perspective we have also described how the symptoms of stuttering first arise in 
childhood and how they change with age.  
2.1. What is stuttering? 
It would seem reasonable to start a thesis about stuttering with a definition of what it is. 
However, as yet, there is no such universally agreed definition. This reflects the fact that 
researchers have divided opinions with respect to a number of key issues regarding the 
nature of the disorder. In particular there are fundamental disagreements on: (a) what (if 
anything) distinguishes the „stuttered disfluencies‟ produced by people who stutter from the 
„stuttering-like‟ disfluencies that occur in normal speech; and (b) the extent to which 
stuttering really constitutes a disorder that is categorically distinct from the higher end of the 
spectrum of normal disfluency in the child and adult population.  
To a large extent, definitional disagreements reflect differing views among researchers 
regarding the extent to which stutterers‟ own subjective experiences should be taken into 
account. Thus for example, Perkins, Kent, and Curlee  (1991) proposed that the core 
symptom of stuttering is a transient yet recurring experience of loss of control over 
articulation, which prevents the speaker from being able to fluently execute the words he has 
planned. This subjective component of stuttering is also reflected in an early, but 
nevertheless still widely used definition of stuttering, adopted by the World Health 
Organization, which describes the condition as:  
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“Disorders in the rhythm of speech in which the individual knows precisely what he 
wishes to say but at the time is unable to say because of an involuntary repetition, 
prolongation, or cessation of a sound”. (ICD9; World Health Organization, 1977, p. 202) 
More recently, the above definition has fallen out of favour, in part because the 
experience of loss of control is entirely subjective, and is not amenable to independent 
verification, and also because there is there no way of telling whether young children (who 
have not yet acquired enough language to express such experiences) also experience a 
similar loss of control. Indeed, as will be discussed in Section 2.3, there are strong reasons to 
suspect that young children who stutter may not experience the same loss of control. On the 
contrary, there is evidence that their disfluencies may stem from language-formulation 
difficulties whereby they are slow to access appropriate words and/or to construct 
grammatical structures (see Bernstein Ratner, 1997 for a review). 
For purely practical reasons the need for a definition of stuttering based on objectively 
verifiable criteria has led many researchers and clinicians to ignore these uncertainties and to 
base their working definitions of stuttering simply on the severity and frequency of 
„stuttering-like disfluencies‟ in a person‟s speech. Reflecting this change, the World Health 
Organization‟s ICD10 definition focuses entirely on objectively measurable symptoms: 
“Speech that is characterized by frequent repetition or prolongation of sounds or 
syllables or words, or by frequent hesitations or pauses that disrupt the rhythmic flow of 
speech. It should be classified as a disorder only if its severity is such as to markedly disturb 
the fluency of speech” (ICD10; World Health Organization, 1993).  
The reliance of the ICD10 entirely on objectively measurable symptoms leads, however, 
to a dilemma: Whereas, from the perspective of the ICD9 definition of stuttering, stutterers 
and non-stutterers fall into two distinct categories, depending on whether or not they 
experience a loss of control over their ability to articulate words that they wish to say, from 
9 
 
the ICD 10 perspective, there is no such clear dichotomy. Rather, whether or not someone is 
defined as a stutterer is likely to depend on the frequency or severity of their observable 
„stuttering-like disfluencies‟ – a term first coined by Yairi and Ambrose (1992a) and now 
often used to denote the types of disfluencies that are particularly common in the speech of 
people who stutter, including part and whole word repetitions, prolongations and „blocks‟
1
 
(cf. Johnson, 1959; Wingate, 1988, 2001; Yairi & Ambrose, 2005)
2
.  The point beyond 
which a speaker is classified as a stutterer is then, by necessity, arbitrary. Moreover, because 
all speakers produce some stuttering-like disfluencies, yet clearly not all speakers would be 
diagnosed as stutterers or would consider themselves to „have a stutter‟, depending on the 
definition of stuttering that one adopts, stuttering-like disfluencies may or may not be 
symptoms of stuttering.  
The validity of the status of stuttering-like disfluencies as symptoms of stuttering is 
especially relevant in relation to research into stuttering, not least because some individuals 
who consider themselves to be stutterers in fact produce fewer stuttering-like disfluencies 
than individuals who consider themselves to be normally-fluent (i.e. non-stutterers).  
However, „stutterers‟ who do not produce abnormal numbers of stuttering-like disfluencies 
may go to great lengths to avoid people or situations where stuttering-like disfluencies are 




 Yairi and Ambrose‟s (1992) use of the term “stuttering-like disfluency” (SLD) included (a) 
part-word repetition, (b) single-syllable word repetition, (c) disrhythmic phonation (sound 
prolongation and blocks), and (d) tense pause (audible tense vocalization between words). 
2
 These authors disagree on exactly which types of disfluency should be considered „stuttering-
like‟, and in particular whether or not whole-word repetitions and silent pauses should be included in 
this category (see Howell, 2011b, Chapter 3, for a detailed discussion of this issue). 
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likely to occur, and the impact of the condition on their lives may be just as strong as it is on 
the lives of stutterers whose disfluencies are severe (Sheehan, 1953; Wingate, 2001).  
First and foremost, the Covert Repair Hypothesis is a hypothesis that attempts to account 
for the occurrence of stuttering-like disfluencies; both in the speech of stutterers as well as 
normally-fluent speakers. The hypothesis considers stuttering to be simply the severe end of 
a continuum of otherwise normal disfluency and, in this respect, is predicated on the ICD10 
definition cited above.  
The question of the definition (and hence also diagnosis) of stuttering is discussed in 
more depth in Section 3.2.1  in the context of „Diagnosogenic Theory‟ (Johnson, 1942, 1959) 
which posits that the self-perception of oneself as a stutterer can itself lead to the production 
of stuttering-like disfluencies. The working definition of stuttering adopted in this thesis is 
described in Section 5.1.2. 
2.2. The onset of stuttering 
Most commonly, stuttering is first diagnosed between 2 and 6 years of age in response to 
a sudden marked increase in the frequency and severity of stuttering-like disfluencies (Yairi 
& Ambrose, 1992b; Yairi & Lewis, 1984). Before this age, affected children generally 
appear to have been able to speak with an age-appropriate level of fluency. Onset frequently 
coincides with the „grammar burst‟: the point at which time children start to use syntax and 
grammatical morphemes to encode meaning (Bernstein Ratner, 1997),  and this observation 
has led to the proposal that stuttering in young children stems from difficulty with syntactic 
formulation (Bernstein Ratner, 1997; Bloodstein, 2002; see also Anderson & Conture, 2004, 
for experimental evidence in support of this hypothesis).  There are, however, also other 
developmental milestones that occur between 2 and 6 years of age could be implicated in the 
onset of stuttering, including the adoption an incremental form of phonological encoding 
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(Byrd, Conture, & Ohde, 2007), and the development of a more sophisticated use of auditory 
feedback to self-monitor speech  (Yeni-Komshian, Chase, & Mobley, 1968).  
The symptoms of early childhood stuttering differ somewhat from those of persistent 
stuttering. They more frequently include whole-word repetitions, prolongation of continuants 
and the excessive use of fillers such as „um‟ and „er‟. Blocking is rare, although it does 
occur. The use of force is also relatively rare, as are signs of tension, and most young 
children who stutter appear relatively relaxed while stuttering. However, there are exceptions 
(Schwartz, Zebrowski, & Conture, 1990; Yairi, 1983). Between six years of age and 
adolescence, approximately eighty percent of young children who stutter spontaneously 
recover (Andrews & Harris, 1964). In the twenty percent in whom stuttering persists, there is 
generally an increase in signs of conscious awareness of difficulty, tension, concomitant 
movements associated with forcing words out, and a variety of behavioural adaptations, 
including the avoidance of specific sounds, words, topics, speaking situations and people 
(Bloodstein & Bernstein Ratner, 2008). Incipient stuttering is more commonly associated 
with whole-word repetitions, whereas in persistent stuttering blocking and part-word 
repetitions on content words are generally more evident (Howell, Au-Yeung, & Sackin, 
1999). However, whether these differences represent a change in symptoms over time within 
individuals, or whether persistent stutterers always had an underlying tendency to block and 
produce part-word repetitions remains unclear.  
In a minority of children stuttering first starts after six years of age, and teenage onset is 
not unknown (Chang, Synnestvedt, Ostuni, & Ludlow, 2010). A scenario occasionally 
reported by such children is that they first experienced difficulty articulating a word while 
reading out loud in front of a class and have continued to stutter from that point onwards.  In 
these children the condition appears to involve blocking and the use of force right from the 
start (cf. Van Riper, 's 1982 description of 'track III' aetiology).  
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Both incipient stuttering and persistent developmental stuttering are currently idiopathic 
conditions. Nevertheless, the findings from twin studies of concordance rates for stuttering 
ranging from 20 and 90 percent in identical twins, compared to 5 to 19 percent in non-
identical twins (Yairi, Ambrose, & Cox, 1996) are indicative of a strong genetic component 
underlying it. Genetic linkage studies (e.g. Kang et al., 2010; Suresh et al., 2006) also 
support this conclusion.  In a small, but nevertheless significant minority of cases, the onset 
of stuttering can be traced to some form of trauma or injury. Most commonly, such 
„neurogenic‟ stuttering is associated with strokes and closed head injuries, and often co-
occurs with aphasia and/or apraxia of speech. Although neurogenic stuttering is usually 
considered to be an acquired disorder that affects adults, analysis of data from children with 
no family history of the disorder led Alm and Risberg (2007) to propose that onset in young 
children as a result of injury or trauma may not be uncommon.  
Despite being idiopathic, a large amount is known about factors that influence the 
severity of stuttering and the likelihood of stuttering-like disfluencies occurring. These 
factors are summarized in Section 2.4. 
2.3. Primary and secondary symptoms of stuttering 
It is customary to divide the symptoms of stuttering into those that are „primary‟ insofar 
as they are central to the disorder and often present at its onset, and more peripheral 
„secondary‟ symptoms that tend to develop later on, perhaps as adaptation strategies in 
response to the primary symptoms. Thus, for example, prolongations, repetitions and blocks 
have tended to be regarded as primary, whereas the use of force to „get words out‟ and any of 
the „strategies‟ commonly used to avoid the primary symptoms are considered to be 
secondary.  This distinction is, however, problematic, insofar as psycholinguistic studies of 
the occurrence of repetitions and prolongations in normally-fluent speakers suggest that 
these may in fact be learned behaviours that help maintain listeners‟ attention and the 
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speaker‟s conversation turn at times when the speaker, for one reason or another, is not yet 
able to say the next word (Blackmer & Mitton, 1991; Howell & Sackin, 2001). If this latter 
account is accurate, then only blocks should be considered primary symptoms, and 
repetitions and prolongations are secondary to blocks. In young children who stutter, 
however, visible signs of blocking are relatively infrequent, (Johnson, 1959; Yairi & 
Ambrose, 2005), whereas repetitions and prolongations are usually apparent. However, it is 
possible that young children who stutter use repetition and prolongation as strategies to 
maintain their conversation turn and the listener‟s attention while they are trying to formulate 
what they want to say. Thus in young children, prolongations and repetitions may be 
„secondary' to language formulation difficulty, whereas in older children and adults they 
more often appear to be secondary to difficulty initiating overt execution of a phoneme or 
word that has already been formulated (Bernstein Ratner, 1997; Bloodstein, 2001, 2006).  
For many years, the development of early-childhood stuttering into a persistent disorder 
was thought to be associated with the development of secondary symptoms (Johnson, 1942). 
This belief was reflected in the tendency of early researchers to describe early childhood 
stuttering as „primary stuttering‟ and persistent stuttering as „secondary‟ stuttering (Bluemel, 
1932; Froeschels, 1943; Glasner & Vermilyea, 1953). More recently, however, a 
longitudinal study by Yairi, Ambrose, Paden, and Throneburg (1996), which documented the 
appearance of symptoms from around the time of onset, found that, contrary to what had 
previously been thought, the appearance of secondary symptoms did not predict persistence.   
2.3.1. The role of volition 
Brutten  (1970) proposed that the secondary symptoms of stuttering result from operant 
conditioning and are (at least potentially) under the speaker‟s volitional control. This seems 
to accord with clinical experience that stutterers can suppress secondary symptoms if asked 
to do so and fits well with the conceptualization of secondary symptoms as strategies (albeit 
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generally maladaptive ones) perhaps originally adopted as a way of coping with the primary 
symptoms or as a way of maintaining listener attention or „holding the floor‟(Maclay & 
Osgood, 1959). Brutten posited that the primary symptoms, on the other hand, are not under 
volitional control, and that these are classically conditioned.  The picture is, however, blurred 
by the likelihood that, that as time goes on, even symptoms that were originally operantly 
conditioned (and effectively began as volitional strategies) are likely to occur increasingly 
automatically as they become firmly established, and in real-life speaking situations in which 
cognitive demands are relatively high, speakers may no longer experience them to be under 
their conscious and/or volitional control. The question of the extent to which stutterers are 
able to control their stuttering is thus a complicated one. In clinical settings, stutterers often 
give the appearance of being able to speak fluently when making a conscious effort to. 
However, this ability seems to be situation-specific and transient and does not carry over into 
real life.   
2.4. When and where does stuttering occur? 
People who stutter do not do so every time they speak. Rather, the likelihood of 
stuttering-like disfluencies occurring varies widely and has been shown to be influenced by a 
seemingly diverse array of factors, both internal and environmental. Our knowledge of the 
factors that influence stuttering comes from two distinct sources: (1) stutterers‟ own self-
reports, and (2) observations made by researchers and clinicians. As highlighted in Section 
2.1, self-reports tend to document the situations in which stutterers experience of loss of 
control and difficulty speaking fluently, whereas observer reports document the occurrence 
of stuttering-like disfluencies. These two sources of information do not always overlap. 
2.4.1. Evidence from experimental and corpus-based studies 
 Studies that have experimentally varied the propositional content of specific words 
(Eisenson & Horowitz, 1945; Schlesinger, Forte, Fried, & Melkman, 1965) support 
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stutterer‟s own self-reports that stuttering is most likely to occur when trying to convey 
information. An experimental study by Kassin and Bjerkan (1982), similarly found stuttering 
was greater on „critical words‟ - i.e. words that communicated non-trivial, non-redundant 
information than on words with comparable complexity and frequency that were not critical 
in the context in which they were used. However, the finding that stutterers also experience 
significant difficulty speaking (meaningless) nonwords to a listener (Packman, Onslow, 
Coombes, & Goodwin, 2001), further suggests that the difficulty is not confined to 
conveying propositional information, but also arises when trying to convey phonological or 
phonetic information.  
Studies that have investigated the loci of stuttering-like disfluencies have shown that 
they are most likely to occur (or likely to be most severe) at the beginning of words or 
phrases, (although some cases of stuttering characterized by final-phoneme disfluencies have 
been reported; e.g. McAllister & Kingston, 2005) and  on utterances that are linguistically 
complex (Bernstein Ratner, 1995, 1997; Brown, 1937, 1945; Soderberg, 1967).  
Furthermore, in young children, they most commonly occur on the function words preceding 
content words (Howell et al., 1999), whereas in older children and adults they are more 
likely to occur on content words, especially low-frequency (Palen & Peterson, 1982) or low-
predictability ones (Schlesinger et al., 1965), or on the function words immediately 
preceding them (Dworzynski, Howell, Au-Yeung, & Rommel, 2004; Howell & Au-Yeung, 
1995).  
Although the evidence cited above indicates that there is definitely a tendency for the 
loci of stuttering-like disfluencies to coincide with the loci of points of language formulation 
difficulty, other findings suggest that language formulation difficulty is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient causal factor in precipitating instances of stuttering. Particularly relevant in 
this regard is the robust finding that the frequency of stuttering-like disfluencies is greatly 
reduced when white noise prevents people who stutter from hearing the sound of their own 
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voice, or when their auditory feedback is subject to delay or frequency shift (for reviews of 
studies investingating these effects see Kalinowski, Armson, Stuart, & Gracco, 1993; 
Soderberg, 1969; Wingate, 1970). Importantly, the increased fluency under such altered 
auditory feedback conditions can occur without any accompanying reduction in speech rate 
or increase in speech-error rate. 
 
2.4.2. Evidence from stutterers’ self-reports 
There has been relatively little recent systematic investigation of stutterers‟ self-reports 
of the moments when stuttering occurs. Therefore, much of the available data relating to 
self-reports is indirect, coming from clinicians‟ and researchers‟ accumulated experiences of 
interacting with stutterers  (e.g. Sheehan, 1970; Van Riper, 1982). Much of it is also 
somewhat dated and of dubious validity.   Nevertheless, a comprehensive investigation of 
stutterers‟ self-reports of factors that influence their stuttering was conducted by Bloodstein 
(1950a, 1950b), who analysed data from 204 stutterers, each of whom had been 
systematically interviewed and had completed a questionnaire of their experiences of 
stuttering in 115 different speaking situations
3
.  The data from the questionnaires and 
interviews was then further interpreted by Bloodstein (1950a)  as being reducible to six 
underlying factors which lead to a reduction in the likelihood of stuttering, which he 
described as follows:  




 The questionnaire  was based on Bloodstein‟s (1949) literature review of conditions under 
which stuttering is either reduced or absent. 
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 Reduced communicative responsibility;  
 The absence of unfavourable listener reactions;  
 No urgency to create a favourable impression;  
 Changes in accustomed speech pattern;  
 Speech accompanied by bodily activity;  
 The presence of intense and unusual stimulation.  
Bloodstein further suggested that these six conditions themselves can be seen as falling 
into two underlying categories: (a) Situations in which it matters relatively little whether the 
subject stutters or not; and (b) Situations that distract the attention of the speaker away from 
his speech. He further concluded that these two factors themselves both reflect conditions 
where stutterers are least likely to be consciously attempting to avoid nonfluency.   
With respect to the first of Bloodstein‟s 6 conditions, it appears that if nobody is 
listening, or if the person who is listening and/or the message being conveyed is not 
considered to be important, stutterers can generally articulate whatever they wish to say with 
ease. Similarly, they experience little difficulty saying words that were redundant or highly 
predictable in the context even when such utterances are syntactically and motorically 
complex. On the other hand, if a message contains non-redundant information and the 
speaker attaches some importance to it, even if it just consists of simple monosyllabic words 
it can pose major obstacles. Thus, for example, stutterers are unlikely to have difficulty 
saying yes or no if they are simultaneously able to signal these responses by nodding or 
shaking their heads. However, in situations where this is not possible, such as when speaking 
over the telephone, such words can pose major difficulties (James, Brumfitt, & Cudd, 1999). 
Saying names, even high-frequency monosyllabic ones, can be particularly difficult probably 
also because they are generally unpredictable and cannot be substituted. Words are most 
likely to be stuttered on the first time they are used in an utterance or conversation, and once 
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a word has been introduced (by either the stutterer or his conversation partner) the likelihood 
of stuttering-like disfluency occurring on it decreases. Stuttering is more likely to occur 
when the speaker is trying to convey a message to listeners who are likely to have difficulty 
understanding what is said, for example to listeners who are hard of hearing, who are not 
familiar with the speaker‟s language, or who are not paying attention (See Bloodstein & 
Bernstein Ratner, 2008, Chapter 10, for a detailed review).  
Adults who stutter are generally able to predict in advance with a high degree of 
accuracy which words they will stutter on (Knott, Johnson, & Webster, 1937), and many (but 
not all) stutterers have a list of phonemes and words that cause them particular difficulty. 
However, these phonemes and words differ from person to person (Griggs & Still, 1979; 
Hendel & Bloodstein, 1973).  
Stuttering generally occurs at times when the speaker is most conscious of the 
importance of not stuttering, and rarely occurs during utterances made during outbursts of 
extreme anger or when the stutterers‟ attention is strongly focussed on something other than 
his speech or when making casual spontaneous remarks (Bloodstein, 1950a).  Stutterers do 
not self-report stuttering in their inner speech (Netsell, Bakker, & Ashley, 2010).   
2.5. Summary 
In this chapter we considered two contrasting definitions of stuttering: one based on 
subjective experiences; and the other on objective measurement. We discussed how these 
can lead to conflicting interpretations of what stuttering entails and whether or not an 
individual stutters. We then outlined how the symptoms of incipient stuttering in young 
children differ from those of people with persistent developmental stuttering and raised the 
possibility that incipient and persistent stuttering may be two distinct disorders with distinct 
aetiologies: incipient stuttering being more often associated with language-formulation 
difficulties and persistent stuttering with execution difficulties.  
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We then focussed on the moments of stuttering – on when and where it tends to occur, 
and described how accounts of the types of factor that influence the moment of stuttering 
differ quite considerably, depending on whether their source is objective (from experimental 
and clinical studies) or subjective (from stutterers‟ own accounts). When considered 
together, these two sources suggest that stuttering is most likely to occur (a) when the 
message to be conveyed is complex; (b) at loci where a high degree of phonetic accuracy is 
essential for successful communication; (c) when the speaker attaches importance to 






3. Hypotheses that account for the occurrence and 
characteristics of stuttering-like disfluencies. 
Hypotheses that have been proposed to account for the occurrence of stuttering-like 
disfluencies  can usefully be categorised into two major types: (1) Production-impairment 
hypotheses, that attribute their occurrence to the (direct or indirect) consequence of impaired 
language and/or speech production mechanism; and (2) perception-based hypotheses, which 
posit that stuttering-like disfluencies result from inappropriate compensatory behaviours 
initiated in response to the  perception that the quality of speech is too poor to allow it to 
adequately fulfil its function, or the anticipation that its quality will be too poor to allow it to 
do so. Key examples of these two categories of hypothesis are briefly outlined in Sections 
3.1 and 3.2.   
Section 3.3 then focuses in more detail the subset of (perception-based) hypotheses that 
posit that the symptoms of stuttering arise from speakers‟ maladaptive responses to the 
anticipation of some form of upcoming difficulty speaking. Section 3.4 goes on to highlight 
a number of important theoretical themes and issues that arise from the various types of 
hypothesis introduced in this chapter. Then finally, in Sections 3.5 and 3.6, the Covert Repair 
Hypothesis is described in detail, together with two more recent hypotheses that challenge it: 
the Vicious Circle Hypothesis (Vasić & Wijnen, 2005) and EXPLAN (Howell & Au-Yeung, 
2002). 
3.1. Production impairment hypotheses 
The idea that there is some form of underlying structural or functional weakness that 
predisposes some people to stutter has been around in one form or another for many years. In 
the nineteenth century a common view was that stuttering was due to anatomical faults in the 
vocal apparatus, and surgery was sometimes carried to remedy this (Büchel & Sommer, 
2004). More recently stuttering has been associated with impaired speech motor control and 
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impaired language production. Experimental evidence relating to these hypotheses is briefly 
summarized below. 
3.1.1. Impairment of speech motor control 
The first empirical evidence suggesting that stuttering may stem from an underlying 
impairment of speech motor control stems from an observation, by West (1929), that 
stuttering-like disfluencies sometimes appeared in syphilis patients together with a general 
sluggishness of muscle movements, and resolved when the underlying infection was 
successfully treated. This observation led West to conduct a series of experiments comparing 
maximal diadochokinetic rates in stutterers and matched controls. He found that stutterers, as 
a group, were significantly slower than controls with respect to jaw and brow movements 
(West, 1929).  
More recently a number of studies have confirmed that speech-motor movements are 
more variable and/or less well coordinated in both Adults  (Caruso, Abbs, & Gracco, 1988; 
Max, Caruso, & Gracco, 2003; Zimmermann, 1980) and Children (Alpermann & Zückner, 
2008; Riley & Riley, 1986) who stutter. Moreover, there is now robust evidence from studies 
that have investigated finger-tapping and flexion  (Max et al., 2003; Zelaznik, Smith, Franz, 
& Ho, 1997), and clapping (Olander, Smith, & Zelaznik, 2010), that slowness or poor co-
ordination is not restricted to the muscle-movements involved in speech production, thus 
countering the possible argument that stutterers‟ slower articulatory rates are a learned 
response to stuttering.  
3.1.2. Language-production impairment hypotheses 
Since the 1980s, interest in the close association of stuttering-like disfluencies with a 
number of linguistic factors (see Section 2.4.1) has stimulated the development of a number 
of language-production impairment hypotheses (Karniol, 1995; Perkins et al., 1991; Postma 
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& Kolk, 1993; Wingate, 1988) and related research examining the possibility that language-
formulation impairment could play an important and perhaps key role, over and above any 
limitations due to impairment of speech motor control, in limiting the capacity of stutterers 
to produce fluent speech. Currently, most of the evidence suggesting a link between 
language-production impairment and stuttering is correlational (see Sections 2.2 and 2.4.1) 
and does not provide any insights into causality. However, there is also some experimental 
evidence, from priming and rhyme judgement studies, of slow language formulation in 
people who stutter. This evidence is outlined in the literature review of the CRH (see Section 
3.5.2). 
Currently, the most influential psycholinguistic impairment-based hypothesis of 
stuttering is Postma and Kolk‟s Covert Repair Hypothesis (Kolk & Postma, 1997; Postma & 
Kolk, 1993). Its main strength over earlier psycholinguistic hypotheses is that it offers a 
highly-specified account of a potential mechanism that could potentially explain the full 
range of stuttering-like disfluencies (part-word and word repetitions, prolongations of 
continuants, and „blocks‟). The main tenets of the CRH and evidence for and against the 
hypothesis are presented in detail in Section 3.5. One of the main competitors to the CRH, 
The EXPLAN hypothesis (Howell & Au-Yeung, 2002), can also be classified as a language-
production impairment hypothesis, insofar as, like the CRH, it is also predicated on the 
presumption that language formulation is abnormally slow in people who stutter. The 
EXPLAN hypothesis is described in Section 3.6.2.  
3.1.3. The Capacities and Demands Framework 
When considering whether stuttering can be accounted for in terms of an underlying 
language or speech-production impairment, it is important to remember that people who 
stutter do not stutter all of the time. Indeed, the majority of words and phrases spoken by the 
majority of stutterers appear, perceptually at least, to be as fluent as those produced by 
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normally-fluent speakers. This intermittent nature of the symptoms of stuttering suggests 
that, if stuttering is caused by an underlying language or speech-production impairment, the 
impairment itself may be relatively mild, such that in many circumstances it does not cause a 
problem. Reflecting this conclusion, Starkweather (1987) proposed that it is most useful to 
consider stuttering in relation to a „Capacities and Demands‟ framework, whereby stuttering-
like disfluencies arise only when the overall rate or quality of speech production  falls short 
of that which is required by the speaking situation.  In situations where the demands are low, 
nearly everyone can produce fluent speech, whereas when demands are high, such as when 
discussing unfamiliar concepts in an unfamiliar language, nearly everyone will be disfluent.  
The Capacities and Demands framework highlights the possibility that, in different 
individuals, different underlying impairments may be responsible for the breakdown of 
fluency, and that the exact nature of the impairment may not be as important as its net effect 
on the speed or accuracy with which speech can be produced. Thus, with respect to speech-
production ability, people who stutter may fall towards the lower end of the spectrum for any 
of a number of underlying reasons, and may thus relatively frequently find themselves 
confronted by situations where the situational demands exceed their capacities.  
3.2. Perception-based hypotheses  
A number of major theories of stuttering can be classified as perception-based, insofar as 
they are predicated on the notion that the speaker perceives that his speech in some way falls 
short (or will fall short) of the standards required and, as a result, makes unnecessary 
adjustments or changes that result in stuttering. Of these, perhaps the best known and most 
influential has been the Diagnosogenic Theory (Johnson, 1942, 1959), outlined below. 
3.2.1. Diagnosogenic theory 
Analyses by Johnson (1942, 1959) of the frequency and severity of stuttering-like 
disfluencies in speech samples from young children diagnosed as stutterers consistently 
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revealed substantial overlap with equivalent samples from age-matched normally-fluent 
controls. The existence of this overlap prompted Johnson to claim that there is no reliable 
difference between the disfluencies of young children who are diagnosed as stutterers and 
those who are not, and subsequently led to his formulation of the „Diagnosogenic Theory‟. 
According to this theory, stuttering (the condition) starts as a purely cognitive disorder 
characterised by the (false) belief that one‟s disfluencies are unacceptable. Johnson‟s often 
quoted statement that “Stuttering begins not in the child‟s mouth, but in the parent‟s ear” 
(cited in Bloodstein & Bernstein Ratner, 2008, p. 58) refers to this false belief. 
Diagnosogenic theory identifies two stages in the development of the condition: First, the 
parents (or other primary care-givers) perceive the child‟s (normal) disfluencies as in some 
way pathological and react to them accordingly; second, the child‟s repeated experience of 
these negative reactions leads him to attempt to prevent himself producing disfluencies by 
exerting inappropriate effort to control his speech. His efforts to control his speech are 
counterproductive insofar as they result in an increase (rather than a decrease) in 
disfluencies. Diagnosogenic theory in its original form has been largely rejected on the basis 
of evidence that children who stutter produce significantly more disfluencies than normally-
fluent children and that their disfluencies are different in character right from the start 
(Ambrose & Yairi, 1999; Yairi & Lewis, 1984) and the failure of the majority of studies than 
have investigated the relationship between parenting styles and stuttering to find any clear 
evidence that these factors are in any way linked (see Nippold & Rudzinski, 1995 for a 
review).  However, the underlying idea, that trying to avoid, remove, or „repair‟ disfluencies 
increases them, has been retained in a number of more recent hypotheses, the most relevant 
to the current thesis being Vasić and Wijnen‟s (2005) „Vicious Circle Hypothesis‟; a revised 
version of the Covert Repair Hypothesis, which draws from Diagnosogenic theory, insofar as 
it posits that stutterers‟ earlier experiences lead them to monitor hyper-vigilantly and 
perceive and attempt to repair  errors which are, in reality, not present. This hypothesis is 
covered in detail in Section 3.5. 
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3.2.2. Deficits in feedback and feedforward control 
A number of recent studies using minimal movement paradigms have found that 
compared to normally-fluent speakers, stutterers tend to rely more heavily on visual 
feedback for fine motor control. These findings suggest that poorly developed fine motor 
control skills in stutterers may sometimes result from an underlying sensory (kinaesthetic 
and/or proprioceptive) impairment (Loucks & De Nil, 2006a, 2006b; Loucks, De Nil, & 
Sasisekaran, 2007). It has, however, long been recognised that adequate control over the 
coordination of fast and complex muscle movements, including those required for speech, 
cannot be achieved through afferent (sensory) feedback alone  (von Holst & Mittelstaedt, 
1950/1973). This is because such feedback arrives too late to enable effective online 
corrections and adjustments.  
A more plausible account is that motor coordination is achieved largely through 
„feedforward‟ control whereby efference copy from motor commands is used to predict the 
sensory consequences of planned movements before the actual sensory consequences of such 
movements become available (von Holst & Mittelstaedt, 1950/1973). These predicted 
sensory consequences can then be compared with those that would be expected to arise from 
the intended movements, and if discrepancies are found, suitable online adjustments can be 
made. This type of feedforward regulation of muscle movements depends upon the 
availability of accurate internal models of the relationship between centrally generated motor 
commands and the sensory consequences of the resulting movements.  
Max, Guenther, Gracco, Ghosh, and Wallace (2004), have proposed that stutterers have 
difficulty activating and/or maintaining such internal models. As a result they come to rely 
excessively on (slow and inefficient) „closed loop‟ control via afferent (sensory) feedback, 
and as a result, they lack sufficient control over the coordination of the fast muscle 
movements required the production of speech. This (Max et al., 2004) hypothesis fits well 
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with the experimental findings of excessive reliance on visual feedback in the minimal-
movement paradigm experiments cited above. It is also supported by evidence from 
functional imaging studies that have, amongst other things, consistently found evidence of 
over-activation of the vermal region of cerebellum in people who stutter (Brown, Ingham, 
Ingham, Laird, & Fox, 2005), which is the region of the brain believed to be associated with 
the maintenance of internal models (Wolpert, Miall, & Kawato, 1998). Furthermore, 
computer modelling of speech production using the „DIVA‟ model (Guenther, Ghosh, & 
Tourville, 2006) has demonstrated that an increased reliance on afferent feedback, rather 
than feedforward control, results in syllable and phoneme repetitions, and possibly also other 
disfluencies, similar to the stuttering-like disfluencies that characterise stuttered speech 
(Civier, Tasko, & Guenther, 2010). 
Although the findings from motor-control studies are robust, it should be noted that in all 
such studies, some of the stuttering participants fall within the normal range for speed and 
accuracy, whereas some non-stutterers fall short of it. The presence of such group overlap 
implies that sluggish or inaccurate muscle movements may predispose to stuttering but 
cannot be considered a necessary cause (McClean, Tasko, & Runyan, 2004). 
3.3. Anticipatory struggle hypotheses 
The term “Anticipatory Struggle” was first used by Bloodstein (1958) to describe a 
range of hypotheses which share the common idea that stuttering occurs because “stutterers 
interfere in some manner with the way they are talking because of their belief that speaking 
is difficult” (Bloodstein & Ratner 2005, p43). The hypotheses vary in their accounts of how 
such a belief comes about and the details of the mechanisms by which stutterers‟ responses 
to this belief manifest in the symptoms of stuttering. For example, it has been proposed that a 
child may come to believe that speaking is difficult, either because he finds it difficult to 
fulfil the unreasonably high expectations of his parents (Johnson, 1942), or because of a 
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combination of factors, including high parental expectations, underlying language or speech 
impairments and a difficult or competitive speaking environment (Bloodstein, 1958, 1975; 
Johnson, 1959).  
An important strength common to all of the various formulations of anticipatory struggle 
hypotheses is that they provide a parsimonious account for the onset of symptoms of 
stuttering even at times when actual demands do not exceed capacity, insofar as they imply 
that it is the perception of demands exceeding capacity that is important (rather than the 
reality). 
Arguably, a weakness common to all the various formulations of anticipatory struggle 
hypothesis, is that the details of the mechanism by which the anticipation of struggle 
accounts for primary symptoms of stuttering, such as „tension and fragmentation 
(Bloodstein, 1975), the preparatory set (Van Riper, 1971), and conflicting drives (Sheehan, 
1953) are rather vague, and current formulations of the anticipatory struggle hypothesis all 
fail to provide adequate explanations for precisely why the various symptoms of stuttering 
(repetitions, prolongations and blocks) occur in the way that they do. In contrast, the 
psycholinguistic hypotheses outlined in Section 3.1.1, that attribute stuttering to covert error 
repair or strategies to maintain the conversation turn, are far more successful at providing 
plausible, detailed accounts of how these symptoms come about. 
3.4. Further key theoretical issues 
3.4.1. The Continuity Question 
A clinically relevant question that is often posed, and upon which researchers and 
clinicians still disagree, is the extent to which the disfluencies of stuttering arise in the same 
way (and for the same reasons) as do the normal disfluencies in normally-fluent speakers. 
Johnson‟s (1942) Diagnosogenic theory is predicated on the belief that, in young children, 
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stuttering-like disfluencies form a continuum of severity and there is no natural line of 
demarcation between what is and what is not stuttering. According to the theory, stuttering 
becomes a discrete condition when the speaker develops a fear of stuttering and then begins 
to make conscious efforts to avoid it. Diagnosogenic theory thus defines stuttering as a 
discrete condition characterised by the presence of the fear of stuttering. 
An alternative view was proposed by Bloodstein (1975). Like Johnson, Bloodstein also 
proposed that the frequency of stuttering-like disfluencies in young children is best described 
as a continuum. However, Bloodstein did not equate stuttering with the acquisition of the 
fear of stuttering. Instead he suggested stuttering is simply a label used to describe “a more 
extreme degree of certain specific types of disfluency” (Bloodstein 1975, P49) in a similar 
way to how „fat‟ is a label used to describe individuals on the heavy end of a continuum of 
body weight. In support of this „Continuity Hypothesis‟, Bloodstein (1975) noted that, 
qualitatively, the stuttering-like disfluencies of „normally fluent‟ children are not only 
similar to those of stuttering children, insofar as they sound alike and are likely to arise in the 
same places in an utterance, but also, that they too may be accompanied by signs of tension, 
fragmentation and struggle. According to Bloodstein‟s Continuity Hypothesis, everyone 
stutters to some degree, and the identification of some people as stutterers and some as fluent 
speakers involves the imposition of an artificial and arbitrary point of division on what is in 
reality a pure continuum.   
Since Johnson and Associates‟ (1959) publication of their studies of symptoms 
associated with the onset of stuttering, a significant amount of research has been devoted to 
the identification of qualitative differences between the stuttering-like disfluencies of young 
children whose stuttering persists and those whose stuttering resolves. However, so far no 
reliable language or speech-related predictors of persistence have been found (Watkins & 
Yairi, 1997; Yairi & Ambrose, 2005; Yairi, Ambrose, Paden et al., 1996) and so the question 
of whether stuttering in young children constitutes a discrete disorder remains unresolved. 
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With respect to persistent stuttering in older children and adults, there is a more general 
agreement that it is a discrete disorder. This has probably been brought about largely as a 
result of the much clearer dichotomy between people who consider themselves as stutterers 
and those who do not. However, it remains unclear exactly how this dichotomy first arises. It 
may be related to the experience of blocking and the related loss of control, as outlined in 
Section 2.1. Certainly on the basis of stutterers‟ descriptions of the experience of stuttering, 
most researchers would agree that all persistent stutterers block occasionally, or at least 
would block were it not for the tendency to avoid words upon which they feel a block is 
likely to occur.  Whether or not non-stutterers ever experience blocking in the same way is 
less clear. Unfortunately, systematic experimental research into the prevalence of blocking 
among people who do and do not stutter is lacking. 
In recent years, the trend among speech therapists and researchers has been to reject the 
continuity hypothesis completely and to consider stuttering as being a discrete pathological 
condition that can exist in both young children and adults, and which may or may not be 
discernable from the percentage of stuttering-like disfluencies present in the speaker‟s overt 
speech. As a generally accepted rule of thumb, stuttering (the condition) is diagnosed in 
individuals where the percentage of stuttering-like disfluencies is three or above (e.g. Guitar, 
2006; Ward, 2006). There are good pragmatic reasons for this, insofar as perceptually, it is 
approximately at this frequency that speech begins to sound disfluent to listeners (Yairi, 
1981). However, for research which aims to explore the mechanisms behind stuttering-like 
disfluencies there is a strong argument for defining stuttering (the condition) in terms of the 
subjective experience of loss of control over the articulators, irrespective of the frequency of 
stuttering-like disfluencies. This is the operational definition of stuttering that we have 




3.4.2. Vicious circles 
This concept of stuttering being some sort of a vicious circle whereby a normal 
regulatory mechanism breaks down due to being pushed beyond its normal limits is a 
recurrent one.  Johnson‟s Diagnosogenic theory (Johnson, 1942, 1959) in which the 
symptoms of stuttering were themselves the manifestation of a child‟s attempts to avoid 
stuttering implies a type of vicious circle, as does Bloodstein‟s (1958) conceptualization of 
the moment of stuttering as a „tension and fragmentation‟ in which the speaker tries to avoid 
difficulty speaking  by adopting a more difficult strategy to the one he would normally use.  
More recently, Vasić and Wijnen (2005) named their modified version of the CRH, „The 
Vicious Circle Hypothesis‟, because if stutterers attempt to repair timing or prosodic 
irregularities, their repair attempts will themselves create further timing and prosodic 
irregularities, which will then prompt further repair attempts, and so on.   
An important strength of these various vicious-circle hypotheses is their potential ability 
to account for why stuttering may persist beyond the time when any underlying impairment 
that originally caused it may have resolved. Such hypotheses also provide a potential 
resolution to the question of what distinguishes a stutterer from a non-stutterer (i.e. the 
continuity question) insofar as, although there may well be a continuum of frequency of 
stuttering-like disfluencies in individuals, there may well also be a critical frequency, beyond 
which a vicious circle is created, thus explaining how a dichotomy can arise out of 
continuum (cf. Dynamical Systems Theory; Van Lieshout, 2004). 
3.4.3. The differences between incipient and persistent 
stuttering 
A truly comprehensive theory of stuttering should be able to account for why it occurs in 
some people and not in others, why its symptoms manifest in the way they do and why about 
80 percent of young children who stutter recover, whereas 20 percent do not. With respect to 
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the first of these questions, it is clear, from the high concordance rates in identical twins 
compared to non-identical twins, that the majority of persistent stutterers have inherited a 
genetic predisposition to stuttering. This implies the presence, in at least some individuals 
with developmental stuttering, of structural differences that predispose to the condition. Such 
structural differences may be temporary, perhaps amounting to little more than 
developmental delays, and it is not yet possible to say to what extent the structural 
differences found in brain imaging studies of adults who stutter are the result of such 
underlying predispositions, and to what extent they represent changes resulting from a 
lifetime of stuttering. The fact that concordance rates in identical twins are less than 100 
percent implies that environmental factors must also play a key role in determining whether 
or not stuttering manifests in an individual, and whether or not it persists. Such factors could 
include both neurological injuries and learning. The extent to which learning is implicated, 
and whether maladaptive learning may be responsible for the persistence of stuttering after 
any underlying impairments have resolved, remains unclear. Thus although, on the basis of 
current knowledge, it seems unlikely that purely perceptual hypotheses (such as the 
Diagnosogenic theory) can account for the onset of stuttering, it remains possible that 
beliefs, perceptions and associated patterns of behaviour learned in childhood may at least 
sometimes account for the persistence of stuttering after any underlying structural 
impairment has resolved (the 'Gone but not Forgotten Hypothesis'; Conture, Zackheim, 
Anderson, & Pellowski, 2004).  
The dilemma facing the production-impairment hypotheses like the CRH and EXPLAN 
(described in detail in Sections 3.5 & 3.6, below) is that although there is substantial 
evidence of language impairment in young children who stutter, with the exception of a 
small number of individuals whose stuttering results from neurological injury, there is very 
little evidence of any significant degree of language impairment in adults who stutter. 
However, despite this lack of evidence, covert-repair and/or restart mechanisms, both of 
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which are predicated on the notion of impaired language formulation, still provide the most 
highly specified and yet parsimonious explanations for the specific attributes of stuttering-
like disfluencies in adults who stutter.  
3.5. The Covert Repair Hypothesis  
3.5.1. Overview 
The Covert Repair Hypothesis (CRH; Postma & Kolk, 1993) is essentially a language-
production impairment hypothesis, and as noted in Section 3.1.2, its main strength over 
earlier language-production impairment hypothesis is that it offers a highly-specified account 
of a potential mechanism that could potentially explain the full range of stuttering-like 
disfluencies (part-word and word repetitions, prolongations of continuants, and „blocks‟).  It 
is based on Levelt‟s (1983, 1989) model of language production (Levelt‟s model is described 
in detail in Chapter 4, Section 4.2). The CRH equates stuttering-like disfluencies in both 
normal and stuttered speech, with speakers‟ attempts to repair phonological-encoding errors 
before the onset of overt articulation. Central to the CRH are the notions that speakers plan 
their utterances in advance, and that they are able to detect errors in those speech plans while 
they are temporarily stored in an articulatory buffer, awaiting overt execution. Detection of 
such errors is possible because the speaker can inspect these plans through an internal 
monitoring loop (roughly equivalent to inner speech). 
Covert error repair involves a number of steps, including perceiving the error in the plan, 
cancelling the plan, retracing to a suitable point and formulating a new plan. Cancellation 
and reformulation may result in varying degrees of disruption to the forward flow of overt 
speech depending on where in the speech plan the error is located, and how long the speech 
plan is available in the buffer for monitoring before its overt execution commences.  Thus, 
for example, sometimes the first segment or syllable of the plan may have already been 
overtly articulated before it is cancelled and reformulated. If this happens, a segment or 
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syllable repetition or prolongation may occur. Several consecutive repetitions may occur in 
cases where a number of reformulations of the plan are needed before the correction is 
achieved. Repetition of continuants may occur without breaks in between, producing 
symptoms of prolongation rather than repetition. Alternatively, if the plan is cancelled before 
the onset of speech a block may ensue until the reformulated plan becomes available.  In this 
way, the CRH accounts for the three main types of stuttering-like disfluency: repetitions, 
prolongations and blocks.   
Because covert repairs of syntactic and lexical errors are more likely to be associated 
with larger retraces (Nooteboom, 1980), Postma and Kolk (1993) proposed that the part-
word repetitions characteristic of persistent developmental stuttering most likely stem from 
repairs of errors of phonological encoding. However, they did not rule out the possibility that 
covert syntactic or lexical error repairs may also result in the production of stuttering-like 
disfluencies. A summary of how different types of disfluency may arise from different types 
of covert error repair is presented in Table 3-1. 
Postma and Kolk (1993) proposed that the disfluencies that arise in the speech of both 
stutterers and normally-fluent speakers can be accounted for in terms of covert repair 
activity. The difference between stutterers and normally-fluent speakers is simply that 
stutterers make many more errors of phonological encoding and are thus more disfluent. 
Postma and Kolk further proposed that the reason stutterers make greater numbers of errors 
is because their phonological encoding proceeds relatively slowly, and as a result, at normal 
speech rates target phonemes are not sufficiently activated to ensure that they are 
successfully incorporated into the speech plan. This is explained in terms of Dell‟s (1986)  
computer simulation of language production  In Dell‟s model, the activations of units (words 
and phonemes) gradually increase until they exceed those of any competing units. When 
overt speech is initiated, the units that happen to be most highly activated at that point of 
time are selected. Thus, the slower the speed of encoding, the greater are the chances that 
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competing units will be selected in error. (This process is described in more detail in Chapter 
4, Section 4.3). 
The CRH thus rests on two basic tenets: (1) the speech plans of PWS contain abnormally 
high numbers of phonological-encoding errors; and (2) the covert repair of such errors 
accounts for the characteristically high numbers of Stuttering-like disfluencies (SLDs) in 
their utterances.  However, since Postma and Kolk‟s (1993) formulation of the CRH, no 
direct evidence has been produced to confirm these tenets.  
Table 3-1 Disfluencies presumed to result from differing types of covert error repair 
Adapted from Postma and Kolk (1993) 
Internal Error Covert Repair Resulting disfluency 
 Restart strategy  
Semantic/syntactic error Restart the phrase Phrase repetition 
Lexical error Restart previous word Word repetition 
Phonemic error Restart the syllable or phoneme Blocks, prolongations and 
syllable or phoneme repetitions. 
 Postponement strategy  
Semantic/syntactic/lexical 
error 
Hold execution, reformulate Silent pause (>200ms) 
Phonemic error Prolong current sound until 
proper continuation found 
Prolongation of syllable non-
initial sounds 
Phonemic error Hold execution of next sound 
until proper continuation found 
Blocking in the midst of a 
syllable (broken words) 
 
3.5.2. Review of evidence for the CRH 
A weakness endemic to many of the experimental studies that purport to investigate 
language encoding in people who stutter is that the responses they measure are often 
dependent upon motoric as well as linguistic factors, and are therefore confounded.   For 
example, a number of studies have compared the spontaneous utterances of children who 
stutter (CWS) and age-matched controls and have found evidence consistent with an 
interpretation of delayed/disordered phonological development or weaker encoding abilities 
in CWS  (see Nippold, 1990; Nippold, 2001 for reviews). However spontaneous speech 
invariably reflects the combined contributions of a variety of (linguistic and motor) factors, 
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so such studies are unable to pinpoint exactly what it is that gives rise to such performance 
differences. In a similar way, the finding that PWS are often slower than age-matched 
controls at picture naming tasks (e.g. Bernstein Ratner, Newman, & Strekas, 2009; Newman 
& Bernstein Ratner, 2007), may reflect either slower lexical access or slower motor 
responses.  
There are similar difficulties with many of the studies that have focussed on the 
distribution of stuttering events. For example, stuttering is more likely to occur on more 
complex grammatical structures (Bernstein Ratner & Sih, 1987; Kadihanifi & Howell, 1992; 
Logan & Conture, 1997; Melnick & Conture, 2000; Yaruss, 1999); on lower-frequency 
words (Anderson, 2007; Hubbard & Prins, 1994; Newman & Bernstein Ratner, 2007; Palen 
& Peterson, 1982); in association with (non-systematic) errors of phonological encoding 
(Yaruss & Conture, 1996); and on wrongly articulated word-initial consonant clusters (Wolk, 
Blomgren, & Smith, 2000). But since articulatory complexity tends to co-vary with these 
linguistic factors, the causal picture remains unclear.   
The extent of the difficulties associated with distinguishing poor performance due to 
linguistic impairment from poor performance due to impaired speech motor control, has 
meant that there are, in fact, very few studies that can be considered to contribute truly 
reliable evidence of the language encoding abilities of people who stutter. Evidence that 
arguably is relatively reliable comes from a series of priming and phoneme-monitoring 
studies, outlined below, all of which control for any possible influence of articulatory factors 
on response latencies through the use of repeated-measures paradigms in which the motor 
responses required of participants remain identical across all conditions. 
Syntactic encoding 
Two sentence-structure priming studies have produced evidence of slow syntactic 
encoding. In these studies, children (Anderson & Conture, 2004) and adults (Tsiamtsiouris & 
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Cairns, 2009)  described action pictures immediately after hearing tape-recordings of 
utterances containing syntactic structures that were either similar or different to those 
required for their own utterances. In both studies, compared to controls, speech-onset 
latencies of participants who stutter were longer in the absence of priming but the difference 
between the stutterers and controls reduced significantly when syntactically similar primes 
were used, suggesting that syntactic encoding is slower and perhaps less robust in both adults 
and children who stutter.  
Lexical access 
Priming studies comparing the effect of lexical primes on lexical access in stutterers and 
controls have produced mixed results. In one study, Pellowski and Conture  (2005) found 
that when young CWS and age-matched controls performed a picture-naming task in which 
semantically related or unrelated words were auditorily presented just prior to picture 
presentation, mean speech-onset latencies of controls were reduced by semantic primes, 
whereas those of CWS increased. 
However, in a further study, comparing the effects of different types of lexical/semantic 
primes, Hartfield and Conture (2006)  found that, in CWS, primes functionally related to 
target words interfered significantly less than those that were physically related.  Hartfield 
and Conture (2006) concluded that these results, taken together, suggest that preschool CWS 
differ from controls in the speed and nature of lexical retrieval.  
Using a similar picture-naming paradigm, Hennessey Nang and Beilby (2008) compared 
the effects on adults who stutter (AWS) and age-matched controls of a variety of semantic 
and phonological primes, but failed to find any differences between the two participant 
groups: In both, semantically related primes resulted in longer naming-onset latencies. (An 




The findings of a number of dual-task studies suggest that  group differences with 
respect to lexical-semantic encoding may exist, but may only become apparent under 
conditions of high cognitive load. In one such study that involved self-paced silent-reading 
(Bosshardt & Fransen, 1996), participants who stutter and controls read words and 
simultaneously compared them with a probe word  that either rhymed, shared the same 
lexical category, or was identical to the target word. Bosshardt and Fransen (1996) found 
that compared to controls, participants who stutter were equally fast to read words in the 
„identical probe‟ condition, and not significantly different in the rhyme  judgement 
condition, but they took significantly longer, compared to controls in the condition that 
involved identifying lexical-category matches. Bosshardt and Fransen interpreted this as 
indicating that the stutterers were slower than controls to access semantic information   (cf. 
Bosshardt, Ballmer, & De Nil, 2002). 
Phonological encoding 
 Phoneme priming studies that have been carried out on children and adults who stutter 
have consistently found their responses to be slower compared to controls‟ responses. 
However, the actual priming effects have been mixed. Melnick, Conture and Ohde (2003) 
found that both CWS and age-matched controls similarly exhibited shorter picture naming 
latencies when phonologically-related (CV) primes were played prior to picture presentation, 
suggesting that the two groups‟ phonological encoding abilities were comparable. In adults 
who stutter, the results of the phonological manipulation of the Hennessey et al. (2008) study 
mirrored those of Melnick et al. (2003). In a priming study which compared the effect on 
speech-onset latencies of initial consonant (C), and consonant-vowel (CV) primes, Wijnen 
and Boers (1994) found that the two groups differed insofar as AWS only benefited from CV 
primes, whereas controls benefitted from both C and CV primes. However, Burger and 
Wijnen‟s (1999) larger-scale rerun of same paradigm failed to reproduce these findings.   
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Despite the mixed results from phonological priming studies outlined above, some 
evidence of phonological encoding differences between stutterers and controls has been 
found. A Priming study of normally-fluent children by Brooks and MacWhinney (2000) has  
provided evidence that, at an early age, their response latencies are sensitive only to 
„holistic‟ phonological primes (consisting of larger units), whereas by six years of age their 
response latencies are sensitive to primes consisting of single phonemes. These findings have 
been interpreted as indicating a shift from holistic to segmental phonological processing 
between four and six years of age. Byrd, Conture, and Ohde (2007) used the same paradigm 
to investigate the sensitivity of young children who stutter to segmental and holistic primes. 
They found that, at six years of age, CWS continued to be responsive only to holistic primes, 
whereas six-year-old controls were responsive to segmental primes. They interpreted this 
finding as suggesting that CWS are slower to adopt the use of segmental phonology, and 
instead continue to code words holistically. 
In adults who stutter, two well controlled phoneme-monitoring studies (Sasisekaran & 
De Nil, 2006; Sasisekaran, De Nil, Smyth, & Johnson, 2006) found that, compared to 
controls, stuttering participants were significantly slower to identify phonemes in words 
formulated in their inner speech.  Importantly, there were no differences between the two 
groups‟ performances with respect to auditory monitoring (of pure tones); picture naming; 
simple motor responses; or identifying phonemes when listening to tape recordings of the 
same words. These findings thus strongly suggest that the stutterers‟ slower responses on the 
phoneme monitoring task stemmed from impaired phonological encoding and not from any 
general monitoring impairment or slow motor responses.   
Finally, compared to normally fluent speakers, both CWS (Anderson, Wagovich, & Hall, 
2006; Hakim & Bernstein Ratner, 2004) and AWS (Ludlow, Siren, & Zikira, 1997) have 
been found to be poorer at nonword repetition, although the extent to which poor 
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performance on nonword repetition tasks may stem from impairment of phonological 
encoding remains somewhat unclear. 
The frequency of phonological encoding errors in inner speech 
To date, there has only been one study published (Postma & Kolk, 1992) that has 
investigated the frequency of errors in the inner speech of stutterers. In this study, 
participants were instructed to repeat a series of CV and VC strings aloud, both with and 
without auditory masking, and to press a button each time they noticed themselves making 
an error. It was presumed that under conditions of auditory masking, participants would have 
had little choice but to rely on internal monitoring of the speech plan for error detection 
(although the possibility remains that some errors may have been detected through 
monitoring of kinaesthetic or other forms of feedback). In both the normal speech and noise-
masked conditions, although the PWS group reported a numerically higher proportion of 
phonemic errors than the controls, the difference was not statistically significant.  However, 
the PWS group recited the strings more slowly, which may have enabled them to avoid 
errors which would have been manifest at a faster speech rate.  Moreover, participants were 
not required to describe the errors that corresponded to button presses; effectively, the 
experimenter had to guess what errors had been perceived. 
3.5.3. Summary 
The experimental studies outlined above that have investigated the CRH have produced 
evidence to suggest that, compared to matched controls, syntactic encoding is slower in both 
adults and children who stutter. With respect to lexical access and phonological encoding, 
however, the evidence is mixed and somewhat inconclusive. There is no evidence, as yet, of 




3.6. Challenges to the CRH 
Despite its appeal, the Covert Repair Hypothesis does not account well for all of the 
symptoms of stuttering, such as why stutterers frequently have so much difficulty saying 
their own name and why stuttering is so sensitive to the status of the listener (See Section 
2.4.2). Moreover, a particular difficulty with the CRH is that stutterers do not generally 
report being aware of large numbers of errors in their inner speech and do not equate 
stuttering with difficulty formulating words in their inner speech. Howell and Au Yeung 
(2002) criticised the Covert Repair Hypothesis on two counts: firstly, on the basis of 
parsimony, stuttering-like disfluencies can be adequately accounted for simply in terms of 
„fluency failures‟ stemming from slow phonological processing without any need to 
additionally invoke a monitoring and repair process; and secondly, on the basis that  it is 
impossible to test for the presence of covert error repairs, because covert repairs are, by their 
nature „covert‟. 
The lack of evidence of any correlation between phonological encoding errors and 
stuttering-like disfluencies has led to the development of two alternative psycholinguistic 
hypotheses of stuttering: the “Vicious Circle Hypothesis” (Vasić & Wijnen, 2005) and 
EXPLAN  (Howell & Au-Yeung, 2002), both of which are described below.   
3.6.1. The Vicious Circle Hypothesis 
The Vicious Circle Hypothesis (Vasić & Wijnen, 2005) retains the CRH‟s basic tenet 
that SLDs arise as the by-products of covert error repair. However, it proposes that, rather 
than making different numbers of inner-speech errors, the difference between stutterers and 
normally fluent speakers is that stutterers monitor their (inner and overt) speech more 
vigilantly for errors, have a lower threshold for instigating repairs and tend to focus their 
attention excessively on speech timing (cf. Sherrard, 1975, for a similar proposal). Stutterers 
therefore perceive, and attempt to “repair”, many minor timing irregularities that normally-
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fluent speakers would not be concerned about. A further consequence of such hyper-vigilant 
monitoring is that disfluencies resulting from the error-repair process are themselves likely 
to be identified as errors, triggering further (unnecessary) reformulations of the speech-plan 
and leading to a “vicious circle”.  
The Vicious Circle Hypothesis also incorporates elements of Diagnosogenic theory 
(Johnson, 1942), insofar as Vasić and Wijnen (2005) speculated that some stutterers may 
have developed a tendency toward hyper-vigilant monitoring during childhood because 
someone drew their attention to their frequent disfluencies. Alternatively, they suggest that 
abnormal monitoring may have first arisen as a side-effect of imbalances between the 
maturation of their language development and speech production abilities in early childhood. 
A further possibility is that such hyper-vigilance may stem from the repeated experience of 
communication failure, the reasons for which may differ from individual to individual, as 
proposed in Section 3.1.3. Whatever the case,  Vasić and Wijnen‟s  (2005) Vicious Circle 
Hypothesis has the potential to account for a much wider array of symptoms than the Covert 
Repair Hypothesis, particularly if hyper-vigilance is situation specific (although the Vicious 
Circle Hypothesis does not elaborate on this possibility).   
Currently, experimental evidence in support of the Vicious Circle Hypothesis is limited. 
A number of dual-task experiments have investigated the effects of secondary tasks designed 
to distract attention away from monitoring their speech for errors, a procedure that should 
theoretically reduce cognitive resources available for speech-error monitoring and thus 
reduce the amount of covert repair activity speakers engage in. As a result, all other things 
remaining equal, if monitoring was previously hyper-vigilant, speakers‟ disfluency rates 
should reduce and their overt error rates should remain stable, whereas if monitoring was not 
hyper-vigilant, disfluency rates should reduce but overt-error rates should increase.  
Findings, however, have been mixed. Arends, Povel and Kolk (1988) found that a visual-
tracking task decreased disfluencies but only when the speaking task was highly demanding. 
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Two dual-task studies by Bosshardt (1999, 2002), both of which employed secondary 
linguistic task (mental calculation and a word-repetition tasks respectively) both found that 
the secondary tasks increased disfluencies. Vasić and Wijnen  (2005) designed a dual-task 
study that systematically examined the different effects of linguistic and non-linguistic dual 
tasks. They found that stuttering was reduced compared to a baseline condition when 
stutterers‟ attention was distracted away from their speech by performing a concurrent non-
linguistic task: playing „Pong‟, a computer table-tennis game. It was also reduced when the 
focus of their attention was shifted onto a different aspect of speech by a secondary linguistic 
task: monitoring for occurrences of the (Dutch) pronoun „die‟ in their speech. Furthermore, 
analysis of the relative proportions of various types of stuttering-like disfluencies for each of 
these conditions revealed that, compared to baseline, the proportion of „blocks‟ was 
significantly reduced in both the Pong and „die monitoring‟ conditions, with the magnitude 
of the reduction being significantly greater in the „die‟ monitoring task. In contrast, whole-
word and word-string repetitions increased in the die-monitoring condition compared to all 
other conditions.  Vasić and Wijnen interpreted these findings as the net effects of two 
different processes: (1) overall, a reduction in monitoring vigilance, resulting in fewer 
blocks; and (2) in the die-monitoring condition, an increase in task difficulty, resulting in 
more repetitions. It is implied that the reduction in blocking resulted from a reduction in 
maladaptive covert error repairs, whereas the increase in repetitions may have resulted from 
the normal workings of an EXPLAN-like restart mechanism (See Section 3.6.2) in response 
to the increased burden on speech planning. This conclusion was further supported by the 
finding that the Control group also produced a similar increase in repetitions in the die-
monitoring task. Unfortunately, although the dual-task studies outlined above documented 




In a magnitude estimation study, in which both stutterers and normally-fluent controls 
rated recordings of fluent speech that had been produced by stutterers and normally-fluent 
controls,  Lickley, Hartsuiker, Corley, Russell, and Nelson  (2005) found that, compared to 
controls, stutterers rated all recordings as more disfluent, and both stuttering and fluent raters 
rated recordings of stutterers‟ perceptually fluent speech as more disfluent than that of non-
stutterers. These findings led them to propose that, (a) compared to normally-fluent speakers, 
stutterers monitored speech for disfluencies more vigilantly; and (b) that the perceptually-
fluent speech of stutterers is in fact less fluent than that of normally-fluent speakers.  
In a recent study, Arnstein, Lakey, Compton, and Kleinow (2011) used event-related 
potentials (ERPs) to compare error-monitoring in stutterers and normally-fluent controls, 
while performing a number of rhyme-judgement tasks of varying degrees of difficulty that 
were likely to result in differing numbers of errors. Arnstein et al. predicted that, for the 
more difficult tasks, compared to the control group the stuttering group would produce 
disproportionately larger spikes on the two ERP measures investigated (one believed to 
represent fast, automatic error monitoring and the other believed to represent  slower, 
conscious error monitoring).  Compared to controls, the stuttering group in fact produced 
larger spikes on both measures across all conditions, (there were no group by condition 
interactions). Although this could reflect the fact that monitoring by PWS was hyper-vigilant 
across all conditions and led to an increased perception of errors across all conditions, there 
was also some doubt as to whether the size of the effects really represented error-monitoring 
activity, or whether they simply reflected the amount of effort required for the tasks, in 
which case the results could also be interpreted in terms of the stuttering group simply 
making more effort to attend to the task. With regard to this, it is noteworthy that the mean 
age of the PWS group was 10 years older than that of the control group.  So, the difference 
may have been a result of their age rather than their stuttering. Unfortunately, participants 
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didn't give feedback on whether or not they had actually perceived the errors they made as 
errors.  
3.6.2. EXPLAN 
The EXPLAN hypothesis (Howell, 2011a; Howell & Au-Yeung, 2002) also attempts to 
account for researchers‟ failure to find firm evidence of abnormally high numbers of 
phonological encoding errors in the speech plans of PWS. It posits that stuttering-like 
disfluencies arise when speech planning proceeds at a slower rate than its execution and the 
speaker has effectively run out of speech plan to articulate. At such moments, speakers tend 
to repeatedly execute whatever speech plan is already available to them until more becomes 
available for execution. Because, according to EXPLAN, the words of a phrase are planned 
in parallel, shorter, more frequent, function words tend to become fully activated faster than 
the content words associated with them. Stuttering-like disfluencies arise as a result of either 
of two forms of response to the lack of an available complete plan: „Stalling‟ and 
„Advancing‟. Stalling involves repetition of the function word prior to a problematic content 
word. It occurs when the activation level of the function word remains higher than that of the 
following (incompletely encoded) content word at the time when the content word should be 
articulated. As a result, the function word is repeated in place of the content word. Such 
function-word repetition may continue until the activation level of the content word rises 
above that of the function word.   Advancing occurs when the speaker begins to articulate a 
word despite it not yet being completely encoded. Howell (2011) proposes that this occurs 
when the activation level of the initial phoneme(s) of the word are higher than those of any 
other word, despite (later) parts of it being incompletely encoded.  
Howell and AuYeung (2002) posited that both young children who stutter as well as 
normally-fluent older children and adults generally exhibit Stalling behaviours whereby, if a 
required word is not ready for articulation, they repeat the entire word that precedes it, 
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(usually a monosyllabic function word), whereas in speakers in whom stuttering becomes 
persistent, the tendency is to exhibit Advancing behaviours.  
 Advancing results in the production of rapid part-word repetitions and blocks, both of 
which are more disruptive to speech prosody. In normally fluent speakers, when Advancings 
occur, they trigger alert signals which are sent to a timekeeper (believed to be associated 
with the cerebellum) which responds by reducing the rate of utterance execution. However, 
in persistent stutterers, the speaker becomes desensitised to these alerts which consequently 
become ineffective. As a result, rather than slowing the rate of execution, the speaker 
continues to produce large numbers of Advancing disfluencies. During the course of a 
child‟s development, desensitization to these alerts may result in a gradual shift from a 
pattern of disfluent speech containing many (whole) function word repetitions, to one that 
contains large numbers of part-word repetitions. Desensitization to timing alerts is thus 
considered a key factor that differentiates persistent stutterers from normally fluent speakers 
(Howell et al., 1999).  
An important difference between the EXPLAN hypothesis and hypotheses that invoke 
covert-repair mechanisms to explain the occurrence of stuttering-like disfluencies is that 
EXPLAN account does not involve speech-error monitoring and does not equate stuttering-
like disfluencies with encoding errors. Hence, unlike the CRH, EXPLAN predicts that 
stutterers should not be aware of large numbers of encoding errors in their inner speech, and 
that a reduction in monitoring will not result in the production of large numbers of overt 
speech errors.  
Experimental evidence that function-word repetitions constitute a stalling mechanism 
comes from a priming study by Savage and Howell (2008) involving picture naming. In the 
study, twelve children (all under nine years old) first heard an auditory prime and then saw 
an action picture that they had to describe. Required responses took the form of two function 
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words followed by a content word, such as „he is swimming‟ and „she is running‟. The 
auditory primes were either the same two function words or the content word that the child 
was subsequently prompted (by the picture) to speak. It was hypothesized that because 
priming speeded the speech-onset latencies of the primed words, priming the function words 
would have the net effect of reducing the amount of time available for planning the content 
word, thus increasing the likelihood that the content word‟s planning would not be complete 
when the time for when its execution arrived. Thus, because children under nine years of age 
produce mainly stalling disfluencies, when function words are primed, the children should 
produce more function-word disfluencies than when they are not primed. Priming a content 
word, on the other hand, should reduce the time needed for it to become completely 
activated, thus leading to a reduction in disfluencies on the content word. This was indeed 
the result they found. Importantly, the CRH would predict that priming of any word should 
reduce the likelihood of stuttering on it. Thus, the increase in function-word disfluencies in 
the function-word priming condition also constitutes evidence against the CRH. 
A study by Howell and Sackin (2001) provided some evidence suggesting that stalling 
may serve to help speakers avoid silent pauses at times when language-formulation is slow. 
In the study, four normally-fluent speakers told a series of short stories. In the third trial, they 
were informed that they would receive feedback from a light bulb, which would light up 
whenever the quality of their performance was „poor‟. In reality, the bulb was activated by 
silent pauses of more than 600ms. The presence of the light bulb did not increase the rate at 
which they told the story, but it did increase participants‟ production of function-word 
repetitions and reduced the occurrence of silent pauses.  
Exactly why some speakers begin to produce excessive numbers of advancing 
disfluencies is unclear. However, findings from a study by Howell and Sackin (2000) 
suggest that it is related to the experience of pressure to speak quickly.    In Howell and 
Sackin‟s Experiment 1, twelve normally-fluent participants were asked to produce a running 
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commentary to a silent cartoon. When the sequence of events in the cartoon moved more 
rapidly the proportion of advancing disfluencies (part-word repetitions on content words) 
increased, suggesting that the increased time pressure caused speakers to attempt to execute 
content words before the plans for those words were fully formulated.  
3.7. Summary 
This chapter began by differentiating two broad classes of theories that have been put 
forward to explain stuttering: (1) Production-impairment hypotheses, such as the CRH, that 
attribute their occurrence to the (direct or indirect) consequence of impaired language and/or 
speech production mechanism; and (2) pure perception-based hypotheses, such as 
Diagnosogenic theory (Johnson, 1942), which posit that there is no underlying impairment. 
We highlighted the significance of the observation that, in people who stutter, stuttering-like 
disfluencies do not occur all of the time, and on the basis of this suggest that if there is some 
form of underlying impairment, it is most probably relatively mild. We then described how 
the pattern of their occurrence of stuttering-like disfluencies can, at least partially, be 
accounted for in terms of a „capacities and demands‟ framework (Starkweather, 1987), 
whereby stuttering is most likely to occur when cognitive demands outstrip capacities.  
We then discussed Diagnosogenic theory (Johnson, 1942) as an early example of a pure 
perception-based hypothesis, and how, although more recent evidence suggests that this type 
of hypothesis cannot account for the onset of stuttering, more recent variants of it, such as 
the Vicious Circle Hypothesis (Vasić & Wijnen, 2005) may nevertheless provide a 
parsimonious account of why it may persist into adulthood even when any signs of 
underlying production impairment have long since disappeared. In relation to this possibility 
we then outline a third broad class of hypotheses, described by Bloodstein (1958) as 
„anticipatory struggle hypotheses‟ which posit that stuttering-like disfluencies occur at times 
when the speaker expects, on the basis of past experiences, that speaking (or communicating) 
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will be difficult, and responds in a maladaptive way. The strength such hypotheses is that 
they provide a parsimonious account for the continued occurrence of symptoms of stuttering 
even when actual demands no longer exceed capacity.  
We then discussed the unresolved issue „continuity‟: whether or not stuttered 
disfluencies are categorically distinct from the stuttering-like disfluencies that occur in the 
speech of normally-fluent speakers. We suggest that the answer to this question may differ 
depending on whether the diagnosis of stuttering is based on objectively observable 
phenomena such as stuttering-like disfluencies (in which case there would appear to be a 
continuum) or on speakers‟ own internal experiences of loss of control (in which case there 
would appear to be a dichotomy). We highlighted how the concept of a vicious circle crops 
up in a number of the hypotheses already discussed in the chapter, and how vicious-circle 
formation appears to be related to some form of inappropriate compensatory behaviour of 
one kind or another.  
We briefly discussed the differences between incipient and persistent stuttering and the 
need for hypotheses of stuttering to address these differences. Then finally, the chapter 
provided more detailed descriptions of the CRH and its two main competitors: EXPLAN 
(Howell & Au-Yeung, 2002) and the Vicious Circle Hypothesis (Vasić & Wijnen, 2005), 






4. Error biases and Language production 
Chapter 3 highlighted the need for two key issues to be investigated in order to 
distinguish between the CRH and EXPLAN hypothesis: (a) the extent to which errors of 
phonological encoding occur in speakers‟ speech plans prior to overt articulation; and (b) the 
extent to which speakers engage in covert editing of those errors. Here in Chapter 4 we 
consider how these issues may be investigated. We discuss how insight into the extent to 
which speakers employ covert editing and repair as a means of reducing errors of 
phonological encoding can be gleaned from the study of the frequency biases that such errors 
tend to exhibit.  We begin with a description of two key frequency biases – the phonemic-
similarity bias and lexical bias, and two different accounts of how these biases may arise: 
one of which attributes them to the effects of activation-feedback within the production 
system, and the other to perceptually-mediated processes of monitoring, covert editing and 
repair.  We then turn our attention to inner speech, and consider how paradigms that 
investigate inner speech, and that enable a comparison to be made between phonemic-error 
rates and biases in inner speech and those that can be observed in overt speech, have the 
potential to reveal much about the extent to which speakers engage in covert editing and 
error repair. Such paradigms also have the potential to reveal differences between stutterers 
and normally-fluent speakers with respect to the production, detection and covert editing of 
errors of phonological encoding.  
4.1. Error biases in overt speech 
Lexical bias is the tendency for phoneme substitution errors to result in the production of 
real words (rather than non-words) at a rate above chance. It has been consistently found in 
experimental studies designed to prime participants to produce real and non-word errors in 
equal numbers (e.g. Baars, Motley, & MacKay, 1975; Dell, 1986; Hartsuiker, Corley, & 
Martensen, 2005; Nooteboom, 2005a), and has also been found in some studies of naturally-
occurring slips of the tongue (e.g. Dell & Reich, 1981; Nooteboom, 2005b). However, a 
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small number of corpus studies have failed to show this effect (e.g. Del Viso, Igoa, & 
García-Albea, 1991; Garrett, 1976).  
The phonemic-similarity bias is the tendency for errors involving similar-phoneme 
substitutions to occur more commonly than those involving dissimilar-phoneme substitutions 
(where „similarity‟ is measured in terms of the number of features shared by the phonemes 
involved in the substitution). This bias has also been found consistently in experimental 
studies designed to show it (e.g. Nooteboom, 2005a; Nooteboom & Quené, 2008; 
Oppenheim & Dell, 2008; Wilshire, 1999) as well as in some corpus studies (e.g. Dell & 




There are two different accounts of why these biases are found in overt speech. One is 
that they arise during the process of phonological encoding, in which case they should 
already be present in speech plans entering the articulatory buffer. A second is that they arise 
later, after phonological encoding is complete, as a result of pre-articulatory monitoring and 
editing of the speech plans while they are stored in the articulatory buffer. According to this 
second account, the biases arise because errors involving similar-phonemes and errors that 
constitute real-words are less salient and hence less likely to be perceived by the monitor and 
less likely to be edited out of the speech plan. As a consequence, they are more likely to be 
overtly articulated.  




 Note that the phonemic similarity bias is not the same as the „phonological similarity effect‟ that 




4.1.1. The SLIP task 
The experimental study of error biases began in a systematic way in the early 1970s with 
a series of studies investigating semantic (Motley & Baars, 1976), syntactic (Motley, Baars, 
& Camden, 1981), and lexical biases (Baars et al., 1975) using an experimental paradigm 
known as the SLIP task. In this task, participants read silently a number of biasing word 
pairs, such as ball dome, each of which shares the same order of onset phonemes (in this case  
/b/, /d/). Then, occasionally a word pair is presented to be read aloud. The onset phonemes of 
such word pairs are sometimes manipulated so they occur in the opposite order to those of 
the biasing word pairs (such as darn bore). In such cases, priming from the biasing pairs, 
may cause the speaker to make onset substitution errors. Thus, in the above example, he may 
say barn door instead of darn bore. Importantly, in the paradigm, half of the errors that are 
primed-for in this way constitute real words and half constitute non-words. Therefore, if the 
proportion of primed-for errors actually made by participants is significantly more than half, 
this constitutes evidence of lexical bias.  
The Baars, Motley and Mackay (1975) study (that focussed on lexical bias) contained 
two experiments. The key finding of the first experiment was that, in a SLIP task in which all 
the words to be read aloud and all the biasing pairs were real words, the proportion of onset 
errors that resulted in the production of real words was significantly higher than the 
proportion that constituted non-words. This confirmed, experimentally, the presence of 
lexical bias in a real-word context – analogous to that of everyday life. The second 
experiment investigated lexical bias in non-word and mixed contexts. In the non-word 
context, in which all the targets to be read aloud and all the biasing pairs were non-words, 
the proportion of onset errors that resulted in the production of non-words was not 
significantly different from the proportion that constituted words. However, when exactly the 
same non-word targets were read aloud, but the biasing pairs were real words (i.e. a mixed 
context), the lexical bias returned.  
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This finding from their second experiment, that error biases are modulated by the context 
in which they occur, was interpreted by Baars et al. (1975) as evidence for pre-articulatory 
monitoring and editing. More specifically, they proposed that before uttering a word aloud, 
speakers are able to check whether or not it conforms to certain simple criteria, such as the 
criterion „is this a word?‟ and cancel execution of the plan if it does not. Importantly, 
however, they proposed that in contexts where the criterion is of no use, such as in the all 
non-word context, this form of monitoring can be turned off, in which case the lexical bias 
disappears.   
Since Baars et al. (1975) performed these slip tasks, the monitoring account has been 
further elaborated by Levelt and colleagues and incorporated into their model of language 
production (Levelt, 1983, 1989; Levelt, Roelofs, & Meyer, 1999). As the CRH is to a large 
extent predicated upon Levelt‟s model, we describe it in some detail below.  
4.2. Levelt’s ‘Feed-forward’ model of language 
production 
In this model (Levelt, 1983, 1989; Levelt et al., 1999), language production is 
conceptualised as a multi-level process in which information moves in a top-down (feed-
forward) manner from higher to lower levels of processing. First, in a „Conceptualizer‟, the 
concept behind a message is generated. Then, in a „Formulator‟, a linguistic formulation of 
the message is generated (formulation is itself a multi-level process involving lexical 
selection, the building of a syntactic tree and the elaboration of the tree with phonological 
information). Having been formulated, messages may then be stored in an articulatory buffer 
until they are released to the „Articulator‟ for overt articulation. The Formulator and 
Articulator are modular in nature and function independently of each other and in parallel. 
Thus, while one utterance is being articulated, the next utterance is already being planned 
and further utterances may already be undergoing conceptualization. Alongside this 
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production system a comprehension system also operates which, in many ways, mirrors the 
production system, except that it works in the reverse direction (See Figure 4-1).  
4.2.1. The perception of errors in the speech plan 
Speech errors can arise at any of the three levels described above: During 
conceptualization, „appropriateness errors‟ occur in which the wrong message is generated; 
during formulation, lexical, syntactic or phonological encoding errors can occur; and during 
motor execution, articulatory errors can occur.  Phonological encoding errors generally stem 
from failures in the assignment of phonemes to the correct „slot‟ in the syntactic frame. This 
may happen due to timing difficulties and background „noise‟, both of which may result in 
interference from other words being encoded. Thus sometimes more than one phoneme is 
available to fill a slot in the syntactic frame, and the wrong phoneme is selected.
 





The model also contains three monitoring loops through which such errors can be 
detected: a „conceptual loop‟, situated within the conceptualizer, which monitors the 
appropriacy of messages being generated; an „inner loop‟ that allows monitoring of the 
speech plan stored in the articulatory buffer prior to their release for overt execution; and an 
„outer loop‟ through which speakers can listen to their utterances in the same way as they 
can listen to those of other speakers.  Both the inner and outer loops convey formulated 
messages to the comprehension system where they are parsed (i.e. converted back into 
phonological, syntactic and semantic representations). Each parsed message is then 
transferred back to the conceptualizer where it can be evaluated.   
Two key features of this „perceptual monitoring‟ are that it is (at least partially) 
accessible to conscious awareness, and it is flexible.  Thus, once a parsed message has 
reached the conceptualizer, it can be evaluated against any of a number of general criteria, 
including “deviant sound form, deviant morphology and deviant syntax” (Levelt, 1989, p. 
470), or alternatively, its meaning can be compared with the concept from which it was 
originally derived. However, perceptual monitoring is also attention-dependent and capacity-
limited, and, because of this, some errors may be harder to perceive than others.  
The existence of the inner monitoring loop in Levelt‟s model allows for the possibility of 
covert error repair because incorrect messages can be detected, cancelled and reformulated 
before they are released from the articulatory buffer for overt execution. This process is 
achieved through a process described as being roughly equivalent to inner speech, although 
the details of how such inner speech is generated from the speech plan have never been 
specified.  
Monitoring via the inner loop, together with the covert editing and reformulation of 
errors, is the mechanism posited by the CRH to result in the production of stuttering-like 
disfluencies. Importantly, because error-detection is conceptualised as a perceptually-driven 
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process, dependent on available cognitive resources and mediated by attention, it potentially 
provides a parsimonious explanation for why stuttering-like disfluencies are so strongly 
influenced by the context in which an utterance is spoken.  However, a weakness of the 
model is that, because error detection via the inner loop involves parsing via the 
comprehension system, and error repair requires reformulation of the speech plan, it 
questionable whether all this can be accomplished fast enough to account for disfluencies 
characterised by the very rapid syllable repetitions that frequently occur in stuttering, or for 
that matter in normal speech (Blackmer & Mitton, 1991).  
This potential weakness of Levelt‟s model is due to its conceptualisation of the flow of 
activation within the formulator as entirely uni-dimensional. Thus, the only form of 
„feedback‟ available through which encoding errors can be detected is that which occurs via 
the comprehension system. An alternative possibility that might allow for much faster 
„repair‟ of errors is that activation flow within the formulator is bi-directional. This 
possibility has been elaborated most in Dell‟s (1986) „interactive‟ model of language 
production, described below. 
4.3. Dell’s ‘Interactive’ model of language production 
Dell‟s  (1986, 1988) model of language production is the best-known exemplar of a 
number of „interactive‟ (or spreading activation) models (see also MacKay, 1982; 
Stemberger, 1985), characterised by the bi-directional flow of activation between processing 
levels. Interactive models offer a different explanation for why lexical bias and phonemic 
similarity may occur; one that in some respects is more parsimonious than that offered by 
Levelt‟s model, insofar as it does not invoke separate monitoring, editing and self-repair 
mechanisms.  Like Levelt‟s, Dells‟ model contains a number of processing levels (semantic, 
lexical, phonological and featural), and each level consists of a large number of nodes that 
are permanently available in long-term memory. However, unlike Levelt‟s model, activation 
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can flow not only from higher to lower levels but also in the reverse direction, in which case 
it is often described as „activation feedback‟. Thus nodes become primed through the 
spreading of activation throughout the entire network.  
As with Levelt‟s model, encoding errors may occur because the language-production 
system is noisy. This means that, during the early stages of formulation of an utterance, 
competing elements (e.g. words and phonemes) may have higher levels of activation than the 
correct, target elements, especially if they were used in recent utterances.  However, in 
Dell‟s (1986) model, activation of target elements is able to reverberate between different 
processing levels. This means that the activation level of target elements is maintained over 
time, whereas activation of competitor elements decays (See Subsection 4.5.1: „Activation-
feedback accounts‟ for more details). A consequence of this tendency for activation of target 
elements to reverberate between levels is that, if overt execution is delayed long enough, the 
activation of the target word or phoneme will eventually exceed that of its competitors, and 
errors will effectively repair themselves automatically. This tendency for the activation 
levels of target phonemes to gradually become reliably higher than those of competing 
phonemes is a key feature of interactive models.  
The EXPLAN hypothesis is predicated on a spreading-activation mechanism of the sort 
proposed by Dell (1986) in conjunction with an additional autonomous restart mechanism 
(as described in Section 3.6.2). Postma and Kolk‟s (1993) Covert Repair Hypothesis also 
draws from Dell‟s model, insofar as it posits that the likelihood of errors being found in the 
speech plan at the point of time when it is selected for execution is a function of (a) how 
efficiently activation accumulates, and (b) the amount of time that passes between the onset 
of planning and the selection of the plan for execution. According to the Covert Repair 
Hypothesis, activation accumulates less efficiently in stutterers compared to normally-fluent 
speakers, with the result that, at the time of selection of the plan for execution, competitor 
phonemes are more likely to have activation levels comparable to those of the target 
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phonemes. There is thus, in stutterers, a much higher probability of competitor phonemes 
being selected in error (see Figure 4-2).  
 
Figure 4-2 Phonological node activation and selection  
Comparing a normal versus a slow build-up of activation and demonstrating the 
impact of phoneme selection at three time points: s– (an abnormally fast speech rate), 
s (a normal speech rate) and s+ (a slowed speech rate).  
Adapted from Kolk & Postma, 1997. 
 
The CRH‟s tenet that slow phonological encoding leads to higher error rates thus 
presupposes an at least partially interactive speech production system, whereas its tenet that 
stuttering-like disfluencies result from a process of covert error repair is predicated on 
perceptual monitoring, which has been developed most fully in the context of a purely feed-
forward language production system.  The CRH is thus actually predicated on a hybrid 
model that incorporates both bi-directional spreading of activation as well as monitoring. 
Although such a hybrid model has not been computationally instantiated, it is nevertheless a 
plausible possibility (Goldrick, 2006; Hartsuiker et al., 2005; Rapp & Goldrick, 2000).  In 
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contrast, the EXPLAN hypothesis, which does not implicate monitoring in the production of 
disfluencies, is predicated entirely on Dell‟s interactive model of language production.  
It should be noted that a number of  „Production monitoring‟ models have also been 
developed (e.g. Laver, 1973, 1980) that can potentially also better account for fast rates of 
error detection and repair. Unlike Levelt‟s perceptual monitoring account, these models posit 
that error monitoring is intrinsic to the language production system itself and that monitoring 
of the various stages of language formulation within the formulator can occur. As a result, 
the monitor may have the potential to detect errors at a much faster rate, in which case 
editing and repair may operate independently of consciousness. However, these accounts 
have been criticised (e.g. Levelt, 1989) as being unparsimonious insofar as they require the 
duplication of knowledge. 
As a further alternative, Postma and Kolk (1993) considered the possibility that covert 
detection and editing of errors may occur within the speech-production mechanism as a 
consequence of bi-directional spreading of activation. They suggested that this could be 
achieved through a mechanism that compares the relative strengths of activation output from 
a node to that which is fed back to it from the level below 
5
. This „monitoring‟ would be 
sensitive to unexpected differences in these strengths and would respond to such differences 
by signalling the need to cancel and reformulate the utterance. This process has much in 
common with the production monitoring proposed by Laver (1980). For example, it would 
operate fast and efficiently, and potentially without the speaker being consciously aware of 
it. However, unlike Laver‟s model, it does not require an external agent (homunculus) to 




 A similar mechanism has also been proposed by Mackay (1987). 
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perform the monitoring and does not require reduplication of knowledge. It is thus more 
parsimonious, but may be less flexible and adaptive. As far as we know, there is, as yet, no 
experimental evidence to support the existence of this type of mechanism.  (See Postma, 
2000 for a detailed review of alternative monitoring mechanisms that have been postulated). 
4.4. The nature and roles of inner speech  
An underlying assumption implicit in Levelt‟s and Dell‟s models of language production 
is that speech plans that are formulated may not always be executed overtly. If they are not 
executed overtly, speakers may nevertheless be aware of them through their inner speech, 
and the plans themselves may nevertheless still fulfil a number of important functions, 
insofar as they may form the basis of the production of writing, personal thought, reasoning 
and memorization (e.g. Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Ellis, 1988; Sokolov, 1972; Vygotsky, 
1986).  
Subjective accounts of individuals' experiences of inner-speech suggest that it frequently 
resembles overt speech, in that it appears to be acoustically-based and can vary in tempo, 
pitch and rhythm (MacKay, 1992). However, it has also been suggested (e.g. Vygotsky, 
1986) that, compared to overt-speech, inner-speech is often attenuated, both syntactically, 
lexically and phonologically, and that the completeness with which inner speech is 
formulated may depend upon the purpose for which it is intended. Thus, for example, when 
it is being used purely for internal operations such as thought or analysis, there is no need to 
use the (first-person) personal pronouns „I‟ and „we‟ (cf. prodrop in 'diary style' writing; 
Haegeman & Ihsane, 2001). Furthermore, if there is no intention to speak out loud, then 
there would appear to be no real need to specify speech-plans below the phonological level. 
Indeed, leaving phonetic and/or articulatory details unspecified may bring a number of 
benefits, including a reduction in processing load and the possibility that internal speech may 
proceed at a significantly faster rate than the rate at which overt speech can be articulated. 
62 
 
Although there is evidence, from clinical and experimental studies, indicating that 
articulatory activity is not necessary for inner-speech (see MacKay, 1992; Sokolov, 1972, for 
detailed reviews), and there is also some experimental evidence suggestive of under-
specification of speech-plans for inner-speech of normally-fluent speakers (Oppenheim & 
Dell, 2008, 2010; Wheeldon & Levelt, 1995), this area is relatively under-researched. 
Evidence of under-specification of speech plans is, however, particularly relevant to the 
current thesis because it has the potential to provide insights into what exactly speakers 
habitually monitor in order to detect errors in their inner speech. Thus, for example, findings 
from an inner-speech phoneme-monitoring study by Wheeldon and Levelt (1995) suggest 
that normally-fluent speakers at least sometimes monitor abstract (timeless) syllabified 
phonological representations, and it is possible that the use of this type of monitoring in such 
tasks may reflect the wider tendency (of normally-fluent speakers) to under-specify speech 
plans for inner speech. On the other hand, Vasić and Wijnen‟s (2005) proposal (in their 
Vicious Circle Hypothesis) that stutterers are excessively aware of subtle timing 
irregularities in speech plans, suggests that stutterers may have a stronger tendency to fully 
specify speech plans, irrespective of whether or not they are intended for overt speech
6
. Such 
group differences should be empirically testable, insofar as Dell‟s model of language 
production predicts that under-specification of speech plans at articulatory levels should 
result in a reduction in the strength of the phonemic-similarity bias in phonemic errors in 
inner-speech (See Section 4.5.3 below, for a full explanation of this).  Thus, the finding of a 




 For example, in line with the „Levels of Processing argument (Craik & Lockhart, 1972), people 




stronger similarity bias in the inner-speech errors of stutterers compared to those of 
normally-fluent speakers would constitute evidence in favour of the Vicious Circle 
Hypothesis.  
4.5. Error rates and biases: Predictions of language-
production models 
An important difference between Levelt‟s  and Dell‟s  models of language production is 
that they lead to differing predictions regarding the relative frequencies with which speakers 
are likely to make some types of errors of phonological encoding. This is in part because 
some errors are more salient than others and thus more likely to be missed by a perceptual 
monitor, and in part because some are „encouraged‟ by the presence of activation-feedback 
(Hartsuiker, 2006). In the following subsections we focus on how these two language-
production models predict the presence of lexical and phonemic-similarity biases in over 
speech.  
4.5.1. Phonemic-similarity and lexical biases in overt speech   
Monitoring and editing accounts 
Levelt‟s model (Levelt, 1983, 1989; Levelt et al., 1999) accounts for lexical bias in overt 
speech as the result of an increased tendency (in real-word environments) to covertly edit-out 
and repair phonological-encoding errors that result in the production of non-words compared 
to errors that result in real words. As a result, proportionately more errors that result in real 
words are released for overt execution.    
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A similar process is likely to occur with respect to phonemically-similar errors:  Because 
they are perceptually less salient than phonemically-dissimilar errors, they are less subject to 
covert editing and repair. In fact Levelt never explicitly stated whether the similarity bias in 
overt speech can also be accounted for in this way. However, as the monitor has access to 
word forms in the lexicon, it seems plausible that it can
7
.  The net effect of this diminished 
salience is that (all other things being equal) more phonemic errors with similar onsets 
should slip through the covert editing process and be uttered in overt speech than phonemic 
errors with dissimilar onsets.  
Activation-feedback accounts 
Interactive models, in which activation is able to flow bi-directionally, such as Dell‟s 
(1986, 1988), also predict lexical bias and phonological similarity effects in overt speech. 
According to Dell‟s model, the two error biases result from the reverberation of activation 
between levels of language encoding: The lexical bias due to reverberation between lexical 
and phoneme levels; and the phonemic similarity bias due to reverberation between phoneme 
and feature levels.  




 A potential mechanism through which this could occur is as follows: A word form accessed 
during speech formulation will still be relatively highly activated in the lexicon at the point of time 
when the comprehension system parses the corresponding input via the inner loop. Thus, if, for some 
reason, phonological encoding has gone wrong and an incorrect onset phoneme has been incorporated 
into the speech plan of that word, when it is monitored via the inner loop, the comprehension system 
will immediately detect a discrepancy between it and the most highly activated word-form in the 
lexicon (i.e. the intended word form). However, the above explanation presumes a single lexicon for 
comprehension and production, the existence of which remains an open question. See also Nooteboom 
(2005b) for an alternative monitoring account of lexical bias.  
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For example, if a speaker intends to say dog, he is more likely to accidentally say log 
than pog. The competing onset phoneme /l/ (which would result in erroneous production of 
the word log) is more likely to be erroneously selected than the competing onset phoneme/p/ 
(which would result in erroneous production of the nonword pog) because feedback from /l/ 
will activate (and reverberate with) the lexical entry for log, and will thus be sustained to 
some extent despite the fact that the /l/ phoneme is erroneous. Conversely, because there is 
no lexical entry for the nonword pog, there will be no reverberation of activation between the 
/p/ phoneme and any corresponding lexical entry. So activation for the /p/ phoneme will 
quickly die away.  
A similar mechanism is also postulated for why, all other things being equal, phoneme-
substitution errors are more likely to occur between similar sounding phonemes: Activation 
normally reverberates between a phoneme and the (sub-phonemic) features associated with 
it. The presence of such reverberation of activation between phoneme and feature levels 
means that competing phonemes that share some of the same features as the target phoneme 
will also receive some activation when the target phoneme becomes activated.  The more 
features a competing phoneme shares with the target phoneme, the more activation it will 
receive and the more likely it is to be selected in error, especially if that competing phoneme 
already has some residual activation as a result of having recently been spoken (or heard). 
For example the target phoneme /p/ (bilabial, plosive, unvoiced) is more likely to be 
substituted by a phoneme with which it shares two features, such as /b/ (bilabial, plosive, 
voiced) than by a phoneme with which it shares only one feature, such as /d/ (alveolar, 
plosive, voiced).  
Models incorporating both monitoring & feedback 
Although Dell (1986) did not specify how his model interacts with the comprehension 
system, it is quite possible (indeed likely) that if the human speech production system is 
interactive in the way Dell described, perceptual monitoring via the comprehension system 
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could nevertheless still be used for pre-articulatory detection and editing of errors. If this is 
the case, then it is possible that the error biases found in overt speech may be the net result of 
the combined influences of both monitoring and feedback. 
Some experimental evidence in support of this combined monitoring and feedback 
account of lexical bias has been provided by Hartsuiker et al. (2005) who set out to replicate 
the Baars et al.‟s (1975) SLIP task experiment, using a more tightly controlled design. 
Analysis of the raw numbers of errors obtained by Hartsuiker et al. (2005) in the various 
conditions best fitted an account whereby in the non-word context, the underlying influence 
of activation feedback, although still present, was masked by the (opposite) effect of pre-
articulatory monitoring for errors that constituted real-words – which were successfully 
removed before articulation. Hartsuiker et al. (2005) concluded from their findings, that (a) 
the focus of monitoring can be adapted to the needs of the context; and (b) both activation 
feedback and monitoring can take place simultaneously and in some conditions can 
effectively cancel each other out.  
4.5.2. Error Biases in self-reports of overt speech 
All corpus studies and by far the majority of experimental studies that have documented 
the similarity and lexical biases that occur in speech have relied on transcriptions and 
codings made by independent raters.  However, if speakers themselves are asked to provide 
online self-reports of the errors they make in their overt speech, their self-reports may differ 
from the off-line reports made by an independent rater. The extent of these differences will 
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depend on how vigilant speakers are at perceiving and self-reporting their errors, and also on 
what exactly it is that they are self-reporting.  
If a speaker‟s perception of his errors is less than perfect, then it could result in a 
„reporting bias‟ whereby less salient errors are under-reported
8
. However, this tendency to 
under-report the less salient errors may occur together with the tendency to make more of 
them, because less salient errors are less likely to be noticed and therefore are less subject to 
pre-articulatory editing, Thus, insofar as the phonological-similarity and lexical biases stem 
from differing degrees of salience of the various kinds of error they involve, the overt error 
biases and the self-reporting biases will be in the opposite direction to each other and will 
tend to cancel each other out.  
 If, on the other hand, overt error biases stem purely from differing degrees of 
reverberation of activation feedback within the language production system itself, and 
monitoring is equally effective (or ineffective) for all types of error (i.e. a pure feedback 
account), then participants‟ own self-reports should be faithfully reflect the biases 
perceptible to an independent-rater in terms of their magnitude and direction, although the 
numbers may be slightly lower overall depending on how vigilant the self-reporter is.  
It is noteworthy that the findings of three tongue-twister studies  (Lackner & Tuller, 
1979; Postma & Kolk, 1992; Postma & Noordanus, 1996) that have investigated the 




 Strictly speaking the reporting bias may be influenced by two factors: (a) whether an error is 
perceived; and (b) whether the speaker bothers to report it.  For the sake of simplicity of explanation, 
we will presume here that speakers are cooperative insofar as, if asked to do so,  they report all the 
errors they perceive. 
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vigilance of online self-reporting (by asking participants to self-report their phonemic errors 
as they make them) all suggest that, when speakers are able to clearly hear what they have 
said (i.e. when they are able to monitor through the „external‟ loop), although they do tend to 
somewhat under-report the numbers of errors they make, the extent of their under-reporting 
is not affected by the similarity of the error they are reporting to its original target. Similar, 
(although indirect) evidence that errors that do and do not result in the production of real 
words are equally likely to be perceived in overt speech has also been provided by a study by 
Nooteboom (2005b), that found that speakers were equally likely to self-repair their overt 
errors, irrespective of whether those errors constituted words or non-words. Together these 
findings suggest that, although self-monitoring of overt speech is not perfect, the extent to 
which errors are perceived when the outer loop is available is not influenced by the similarity 
of their onset phonemes to the original targets or by the lexical status of their outcomes.  
The above findings may not, however, reveal the whole story. Implicit in Levelt‟s (1989) 
account of pre-articulatory editing is the notion that, in speaking situations where a speaker 
attempts to perform pre-articulatory editing, the speaker may actually focus more on 
monitoring his inner speech (through the inner loop) than his overt speech, despite the fact 
that he is speaking aloud and feedback via the auditory loop is available. With this 
possibility in mind, it is noteworthy that the three studies mentioned above (Lackner & 
Tuller, 1979; Postma & Kolk, 1992; Postma & Noordanus, 1996) did not emphasise the need 
for accuracy and therefore did not encourage pre-articulatory editing. Moreover, they only 
failed to find any evidence of different degrees of salience of different types of phonemic 
error in overt speech when participants were able to clearly hear (and attend to) what they 
had said. In contrast, when their overt speech was masked by white noise (which prevented 
participants using the „external loop‟ to monitor the sound of the strings they uttered), these 
studies found that speakers were less successful at self-reporting voicing errors compared to 
other types of errors.  
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These findings suggest that although voicing errors are comparably salient to other kinds 
of errors in overt speech, they may be less salient in inner speech. If this is the case, then 
speakers self-reports of errors are likely to be differentially biased depending on which 
monitoring channel the self-reporter has been using.  
4.5.3. Error Biases in self-reports of silent (non-articulated) 
speech errors 
Comparisons of detection rates of errors involving similar phoneme substitutions in the 
masked and unmasked overt speech conditions in the three studies outlined above (Lackner 
& Tuller, 1979; Postma & Kolk, 1992; Postma & Noordanus, 1996) provided some 
preliminary evidence that phonemically-similar errors may be less salient in inner speech 
than in overt speech. However, the inner speech that participants attended to in the masked 
overt conditions of these experiments may have differed from inner speech produced in the 
complete absence of any articulation. This is because, as explained in Section 4.4, speech 
plans produced in the absence of any intention to overtly articulate may lack sub-phonemic 
specification, and thus may not be influenced by activation-feedback from feature to 
phoneme levels of encoding. As a consequence, errors occurring in such speech plans may 
lack the similarity bias that may have otherwise been present, had the plan been intended for 
overt articulation. To date, the three studies that have investigated whether or not this is the 
case have provided conflicting findings: The comparison of self-reports of inner speech 
errors in the articulated an unarticulated conditions in Postma and Noordanus‟ (1996) study 
failed to find any differences, whereas comparable comparisons in two studies by 
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Oppenheim and Dell (2008, 2010) both found reduced similarity biases in self-reports of 
unarticulated inner speech
9
.    
The differences between Postma and Noordanus‟ and Oppenheim and Dell‟s findings 
with respect to the phonemic similarity effect in inner speech may have arisen due to 
differences in the details of how the experiments were conducted (the paradigms employed 
different tongue-twisters, different speech rates, different instructions, and were carried out 
in different labs), and it is quite possible that these differences in experimental design may 
have resulted in significant differences in the degree to which speech plans were specified 
and in how vigilant participants were in self-reporting their errors. Whatever the case, such 
differences highlight the need for extensive testing of a paradigm before using it to compare 
the performances of different participant groups. In recognition of this need, before 
comparing the performance of stutterers and controls with respect to error rates and biases, 
we therefore first performed three experiments that investigate the reliability and validity of 
the paradigm employed.  
 




 In contrast to the similarity bias, Oppenheim and Dell (2008, 2010) found no evidence of a 
reduced lexical bias in inner speech: Specifically, Oppenheim and Dell (2008) found that the self-
reported lexical biases in unarticulated inner speech and overt speech were of comparable magnitude 
and in the same direction, and the subsequent study by Oppenheim and Dell (2010) which used the 
same paradigm to compare inner speech with silent articulated speech found similar magnitudes of 





4.6. Summary of Chapter 4 
In Chapter 4 we set out to clarify why studies comparing phonemic error rates and error 
biases in inner and overt speech have the potential to inform us about how the human 
speech-production system functions and why errors of phonological processing may occur. 
We first outlined evidence from corpus studies and experiments that led to the identification 
of the lexical and phonological-similarity biases. We then described two different speech-
production models that account for these biases in overt speech in two different ways – as 
the result of activation feedback or as the result of monitoring and editing. We then 
described how Dell‟s (1986) model, which incorporates activation-feedback, predicts a 
reduced phonemic-similarity bias in inner speech (in the absence of any overt articulation). 
We then distinguished between the biases actually present in overt speech and those present 
in speakers‟ self-reports of their errors, and explained how the two language-production 
models make different predictions regarding the relative strengths and directions of the 
biases when speakers are required to self-report their errors.   
We concluded by cited the findings of a number of tongue-twister experiments that have 
investigated participants‟ self-reports of their errors in a variety of inner and overt speech 
conditions, including three that allow comparisons of errors in inner speech with and without 
accompanying articulation conflict. Of these, two (Oppenheim & Dell, 2008, 2010) found 
that the strength of the similarity bias in onset errors occurring in the tonguetwisters was 
reduced in the absence of articulation, whereas the third (Postma & Noordanus, 1996) found 
that the presence or absence of articulation had no effect. This difference in findings 
highlights the need to establish the reliability of the Oppenheim and Dell paradigm across 
populations before using it to compare the performance of stutterers and normally-fluent 
speakers.  
Before continuing on to describe our own experiments (in Chapter 6), we first outline the 






5. Reporting and statistical methods used in this 
thesis 
5.1. The use of self-reported data 
This thesis is largely concerned with the experience of inner speech, the errors that occur 
in inner speech, and the extent to which speakers experience difficulty speaking fluently.  
Because inner speech and the experience of difficulty are not amenable to any direct or 
reliable forms of objective measurement, in our experiments we have relied on participants‟ 
own self-reports of these experiences.  In experimental conditions that involved overt 
speech, digital recordings were taken and an experienced coder (Paul Brocklehurst: referred 
to in the thesis as the „independent rater‟ or „experimenter‟) coded these recordings offline. 
During offline coding, recordings were replayed as often as necessary arrive at as accurate a 
judgement as possible. In Experiment 4 (in which stutterers and matched controls recited 
tongue-twisters) a random sample of ten percent of the tongue-twister recordings were also 
re-coded (by the experimenter) at a later date in order to enable a check of intra-rater 
reliability (See Section 7.2.4). In the overt speech conditions, the independent-rater codings 
of speech errors have been considered to constitute a stable baseline against which self-
ratings can be judged. Although clearly they cannot be considered to be „correct‟ in any 
ultimate sense, for operational purposes we have treated them as if they are correct. The 
justification for considering the independent-rater ratings in this way is a relative one, insofar 
as they were made carefully, offline under optimal conditions without time pressure, whereas 
in comparison, participants‟ self-ratings were made „on the fly‟.   
5.1.1. Method of self-reporting of inner and overt speech 
errors 
In the four tongue-twister experiments, participants were asked to provide verbal online 
self-reports of errors that had occurred in their inner speech and overt speech.  Although this 
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is the method of self-reporting used by Oppenheim and Dell (2008, 2010) in two 
experiments designed to investigate errors in inner speech, experience gleaned from 
experimenting with spoken and written (typed) modalities of self-reporting, together with the 
need for a mode of self-reporting that was not more difficult for participants who stutter,  led 
to the adoption in subsequent experiments of typing as the sole modality of self-reporting. 
This eliminated any potential for error when transcribing participants‟ self-reports.  It may 
also have influenced the accuracy with which participants made their self-reports and/or the 
likelihood that they would bother to make self-reports at the appropriate times. Because of 
these potential confounds, self-reporting modality is controlled for statistically in the 
combined analyses that involve both self-reporting modalities.   
5.1.2. Criteria for classifying participants as People who 
stutter 
In the experiments which involved both stuttering and normally-fluent participants, the 
criteria we adopted for participants to be allotted to the stuttering group, were as follows: (a) 
participants must consider themselves to be people who stutter (more precisely, people with 
persistent developmental stuttering); and (b) they must also have been diagnosed (at some 
point in the past) as such by a speech therapist or speech pathologist.  The assignment of 
participants to groups in the above manner is in line with the ICD9 categorical definition of 
stuttering as “Disorders in the rhythm of speech in which the individual knows precisely 
what he wishes to say but at the time is unable to say because of an involuntary repetition, 
prolongation, or cessation of a sound” (ICD9; World Health Organization, 1977, p. 202).  
Measures of the percentage of syllables containing stuttering-like disfluencies were 
recorded for all participants (both for spontaneous conversation as well as reading). 
Composite stuttering-severity scores (SSI4 ; Riley, 2009), which include a variety of 
measures of both primary and secondary symptoms of stuttering, were also collected for 
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stuttering participants.  Self-ratings of difficulty communicating and of difficulty speaking 
fluently were also collected for all participants. In Experiments five and six we also used 
participants‟ self-reports to determine whether or not they had stuttered on individual words. 
Participants provided these self-reports immediately after uttering each single word.  These 
latter four measures were used for statistical analyses but not for diagnostic purposes.  
5.2. The use of mixed-effects modelling 
In all our experiments, we were interested in quantifying the size and direction of the 
relationship between a variety of (dichotomous and continuous) independent variables and 
each dependent variable. Regression analyses are ideally suited for this type of analysis.  
Unlike fixed input variables, such as gender, in which all possible levels are represented, the 
levels of a number of the variables, such as the experimental subjects and items  (all 
experiments involved repeated-measures designs), constitute a small (and by assumption, 
random)  selection  of a much larger potential population.  To reflect this, mixed effects 
regression analyses were used whereby the baseline error-probability of random effects like 
subjects and items were treated as normally distributed and thus the variance of each random 
effect could be determined by the model. Mixed-effects modelling thus enabled us to build 
models that better accounted for such variance.  More specifically, linear mixed-effects 
modelling was used for tests with continuous dependent variables and logistic mixed effects 
modelling was used for tests with dichotomous outcomes.  
Around the time of writing-up the final two experiments, there was a change in 
recognised best practice with respect to mixed-effects modelling of psycholinguistic data of 
the type used in the thesis. Extensive testing of a number of approaches by Scheepers and 
Barr (2011), including ANCOVA and a number of mixed-effects modelling approaches, on 
simulated data suggest that optimally-low Type I and Type II error rates can be achieved by 
using mixed effects analyses that include additional random effects to quantify (between-
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participant) inequalities of variance across levels of fixed predictors. Therefore, in the 
analyses of our final two experiments, random effects to capture variance in both intercepts 
and slopes of predictors have been incorporated into the regression models. Our earlier 
experiments were analysed using mixed-effects modelling with random intercepts only. 
Where the results of these earlier analyses have already appeared in journal articles, we have 
not changed them in the main body of the thesis. However, where appropriate
10
, equivalent 
models with random slopes have been provided and can be found in Appendix B.  Notes 
alerting the reader to the existence of these alternative analyses have been added to the 
relevant table captions in the main body of the text.  
Importantly, where it was possible to add random slopes to the models, their addition did 
not result in any substantive changes to the magnitude or direction of the coefficients or to 
the conclusions that could be drawn from them.   The only instances where it was not 
possible to add random slopes to the models were the two analyses of ‟Accuracy of self-
reporting‟  (See Table 6-12 &Table 7-4). This was due to failure to achieve convergence, due 
to insufficient data for the number of degrees of freedom.   
  




 For the first three experiments error numbers were low and there was insufficient power for the 
extra degrees of freedom that would have been added by random slopes. Therefore we only carried 
out analyses with random slopes on the combined analyses of these experiments.  
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6. Experiments 1 to 3: Assessing the reliability and 
validity of a paradigm to measure phonemic errors 
in inner speech. 
6.1. Introduction 
A central tenet of the Covert Repair Hypothesis (Postma and Kolk, 1993) is that, in 
stutterers, impaired flow of activation in the neural pathways responsible for language 
encoding results in the production of abnormally high numbers of phonological encoding 
errors. Postma and Kolk never specified exactly in what ways activation flow may be 
impaired, which is not surprising, because there are still ongoing uncertainties among 
researchers regarding how activation flows in such neural pathways in normally-fluent 
speakers. In particular it remains unclear whether flow is uni or bi-directional (as 
exemplified by the language production models discussed in Sections 4.2 and 4.3), and to 
what extent reverberation of feedback between encoding levels may play a role in reducing 
noise and minimizing the likelihood of encoding errors appearing in the speech plan.   
Despite these ongoing uncertainties regarding the precise details of the functioning of the 
language-production mechanism, it may nevertheless be possible to determine whether 
language production in stutterers differs from that of normally-fluent speakers. This is 
because differences in the build-up and flow of activation in the system are likely to be 
reflected in differences in the relative frequencies with which stutterers and normally-fluent 
speakers produce various types of phonological-encoding errors. Such differences are likely 
to manifest most clearly in the relative strengths of the lexical and phonemic-similarity 
biases in the errors they make. Experiment 4 (Described in Chapter 0) investigates these 
differences using the Oppenheim and Dell (2008, 2010) tonguetwister paradigm. 
The Oppenheim and Dell paradigm provides a systematic method for measuring: (a) 
phonological-encoding error-rates in inner and overt speech; (b) the relative magnitudes of 
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the phonemic-similarity biases in inner and overt speech; and (c) the relative magnitude of 
the lexical biases in inner and overt speech. However, because it relies entirely on self-
reports to document errors in inner speech, we first need to confirm that the data it provides 
are valid and reliable.  Therefore, in the three experiments described in the current chapter 
we first attempt to replicate Oppenheim and Dell‟s (2008) original findings, using the 
paradigm on three different but highly similar groups of normally-fluent undergraduate 
students in our own lab in Edinburgh, UK. Having established its reliability and validity in 
this way, we then go on (in Experiment 4) to use it to compare the performances of a group 
of stutterers and (age, gender and education) matched controls.  
In their experiments, Oppenheim and Dell (2008, 2010) only analysed data from 
participants‟ own self-reports.  However, in our experiments, because stuttering has been 
equated with hyper-vigilant monitoring (Kamhi & McOsker, 1982; Vasić & Wijnen, 2005), 
we additionally compare participants‟ own self-reports of their overt errors to offline ratings 
(from digital recordings of the same utterances) made by the experimenter. This extra set of 
comparisons enables us to compare the vigilance and accuracy with which the different 
participant groups identify the (overt) errors they make; the presumption being that the 
vigilance and accuracy with which participants monitor their inner speech will, at least to a 
certain extent, impact upon the vigilance and/or accuracy with which they self-report their 
speech errors when speaking overtly, especially under noise-masked conditions.   
6.1.1. The Oppenheim and Dell 2008 tongue-twister 
paradigm 
As detailed in Section 4.4, there are a number of reasons to suspect that, in the absence 
of any intention to articulate overtly, speech-plans for inner speech may be underspecified at 
articulatory (featural) levels, and there is some experimental evidence from a study by 
Wheeldon and Levelt (1995) to support this hypothesis.  Converging evidence for such 
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under-specification comes from computer instantiations of Dell‟s (1986) spreading-
activation model in which the featural level of the model is not activated. Such instantiations 
show that without featural activation, the phonemic-similarity bias disappears from onset-
phoneme substitution errors but the lexical bias remains unaffected (Oppenheim and Dell, 
2008).   
To test whether a similar pattern is observed in real-life inner speech, Oppenheim and 
Dell (2008) performed an experiment in which participants were required to repeat a series 
of four-word tongue-twisters and to immediately stop and self-report each error that they 
made. The tongue-twisters were manipulated such that they intrinsically primed the speaker 
to make onset-substitution errors (henceforth referred to as „primed-for errors‟), half of 
which would result in real words and half nonwords. In addition to this outcome-lexicality 
manipulation, half of the tongue-twisters were marked for silent repetition (in inner speech, 
without articulation), whereas the other half were to be recited out loud (overt speech).   
In both the inner and overt speech conditions, participants‟ self-reports of their onset 
errors revealed a lexical bias effect. In contrast, a phonemic-similarity bias was only found in 
their self-reports of their overt speech. Oppenheim and Dell (2008) interpreted the lack of a 
similarity bias in the inner-speech condition as providing support for the „Surface 
Impoverished Hypothesis‟: that, in the absence of any intention to articulate, inner speech is 
underspecified at the feature level. One possible consequence of featural under-specification 
is that there is no feedback of activation from feature to phoneme levels of representation, no 
bottom-up activation of competitor phonemes and therefore no phonemic similarity bias. 
Oppenheim and Dell (2010) subsequently extended their (2008) findings using the same 
paradigm, this time comparing silent inner speech with silent articulated speech (mimed 
speech). The findings from their 2010 study confirmed the lack of any similarity bias in the 
inner speech only condition, but revealed a similarity bias in mimed speech that was similar 
to that found in the overt speech condition of their 2008 experiment. 
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As previously mentioned, because Oppenheim and Dell‟s paradigm provides a tightly-
controlled experimental method for measuring the absolute and relative frequencies of the 
types of onset errors under consideration, it is ideally suited to testing Postma and Kolk 
(1993) hypothesis that stutterers make more phonological encoding errors than normally-
fluent speakers. By quantifying the size of error biases, the paradigm also has the potential to 
highlight whether impaired flow of activation-feedback may account for any differences that 
may exist in stutterers‟ and normally-fluent speakers‟ speech error rates. However, two 
issues raised by Oppenheim and Dell‟s (2008, 2010) findings need further investigation 
before attempting to run the paradigm on participants who stutter: The first issue is that, as 
Oppenheim and Dell (2008) acknowledged, a plausible alternative account of the differences 
between their inner and overt speech conditions is that participants under-reported single-
feature substitution errors in inner speech and, as a result, their  self-reports of inner-speech 
errors failed to reveal the true extent to which such errors were present in their speech plans. 
This alternative account is supported by the study by Postma and Noordanus (1996), which 
found that a greater proportion of voicing errors were self-reported in overt-unmasked 
speech than in overt-masked speech. Their finding suggests that single-feature errors may be 
particularly susceptible to underreporting because there is no auditory or motor feedback to 
confirm that an error has been made (see also Borden, 1979; Lackner & Tuller, 1979; Postma 
& Kolk, 1992). On this interpretation, inner speech could be routinely fully specified at a 
featural level, irrespective of whether or not there is an intention to articulate it overtly.  
The second issue is that Oppenheim and Dell‟s (2008) conclusions do not take into 
account the possibility that, in the overt condition, participants may have monitored their 
speech plans prior to articulation and edited out some errors that would otherwise have been 
produced overtly. They may also have engaged in covert error repair.  
In our first three experiments, we therefore assess the relative extents to which under-
reporting and covert editing are likely to occur in the paradigm, by comparing (normally-
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fluent) participants‟ own online self-reports of errors with independent-rater reports based on 
careful listening to recordings of the participants‟ overt iterations.  
Furthermore, in Experiment 1, we also manipulate the ability of speakers to hear what 
they say, by employing auditory masking on half of the tongue-twisters. The intention 
behind this manipulation is to determine whether disproportionately fewer similar onset 
errors are self-reported when participants are unable to hear the words they say. Experiment 
2 replicated the results of Experiment 1 using the tongue-twisters originally used by 
Oppenheim and Dell (2010). Experiment 3 investigated whether Oppenheim and Dell‟s use 
of an acoustic metronome (compared to our use of a visible metronome) may have caused 
their participants to self-report more errors. Then finally Experiment 4 (described in Section 
0) uses the paradigm to compare the error phonemic rates and biases of a group of stutterers 
to a group of age, gender and education matched controls.  
6.2. Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was closely modelled on Oppenheim and Dell‟s (2008) study. Participants 
produced a series of four-word tongue-twisters, designed in such a way that the onsets of 
words 1 and 4 primed participants to make onset errors on words 2 and 3. In addition, the 
codas of Word 3 were varied systematically to ensure that the primed-for errors on that word 
consisted of equal numbers of real words and non-words. We anticipated that, in line with 
Oppenheim and Dell (2008), our participants would report more primed-for onset-
substitution errors on Word 3 that resulted in real words (compared to non-words) and also 
more that involved substitution of similar phonemes (compared to dissimilar phonemes). In 
an inner-speech condition, we expected the lexical bias to remain but similarity bias to 
disappear. Furthermore, with respect to overt speech, if, as Oppenheim and Dell (2008) 
concluded, the lexical and phonemic-similarity biases stem from activation feedback, we 
would expect the magnitude of these biases in participants‟ self-reports to resemble their 
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magnitude in independent-rater reports. If on the other hand the biases stem in part from 
differential rates of under self-reporting of less salient errors, they should be less strong in 
self-reports compared to independent-rater reports. 
As an extra manipulation, participants produced half of the tongue-twisters under 
conditions of auditory masking. If, as Oppenheim and Dell (2008) claimed, the differences 
between overt and silent conditions were because inner speech remains underspecified when 
there is no intention to speak aloud, we would expect the magnitude of the phonemic-
similarity bias in participants‟ self-reported errors to be equal in the overt masked and overt 
unmasked conditions. If, on the other hand, the lack of a similarity bias in inner speech could 
be attributed to the difficulty of detecting single-feature errors in the absence of auditory 
feedback, the similarity bias would be expected to be smaller in overt speech under 
conditions of auditory masking. 
6.2.1. Method 
Participants  
Thirty-two native speakers of English were recruited from the University of Edinburgh 
(Edinburgh, Scotland) student population for course credit. Ages ranged from 18 to 32 years 
old  (median=18). In this and in the following two experiments, participants reported no 
speech, language, hearing, or visual impairments. 
Materials.  
Forty-eight matched sets of four-word tonguetwister sequences were generated 
following Oppenheim and Dell (2008) (See Appendix A). Candidate sequences were 
generated automatically from lists of CVC(C) (consonant–vowel– consonant[– consonant]) 
words with CELEX frequencies greater than 1 per million (Baayen, Piepenbrock, & 
Gulikers, 1995). Pronunciations were checked using the British English Example 
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Pronunciation Dictionary (Robinson, 1997), and also by hand. Words with ambiguous 
pronunciations were not used. 
Each set comprised four sequences. To induce onset-phoneme substitution errors, the 
onset consonants of each sequence followed an ABBA pattern; however, the onsets of 
Words 1 and 4 (the A words) varied in each set, whereas those of Words 2 and 3 did not 
change. In two of the four sequences, the onsets of the A words were phonologically similar 
to those of the B words, differing by a single feature. In the other two, they were dissimilar, 
differing by two or more features. 
In addition to the phonological similarity manipulation, the tongue-twister sequences 
were also manipulated within each set to vary the lexicality of error outcomes. This was 
achieved by varying the coda of Word 3 (traditionally, the most susceptible to onset 
substitutions in ABBA tongue-twisters; e.g. Wilshire, 1999), such that, if the onset of Word 
3 was substituted with an A onset, the outcome would either be a word or a nonword. 
Table 6-1: A matched set of tongue-twister sequences from Experiment 1 
Outcome  Similar onsets  Dissimilar onsets 
Word pat  cap  catch  pad   bat  cap  catch  bad 
Nonword pat  cap  cab  pad   bat  cap  cab  bad 
 
A sample set of four tongue-twister sequences is shown in Table 6-1. In this example, /k/ 
differs from /p/ by one feature but from /b/ by two; substituting the onset of Word 3 with that 
of Word 4 would yield patch or batch in the word outcome conditions but pab or bab for 
nonword outcomes. Words in Position 3 were frequency matched across the experiment: 
Mean log frequency for the word outcome conditions was 0.97 and, for nonword outcome 
conditions, 0.97, t(47)= 0.001, p= .99. We also matched the frequencies of the primed-for 
real word outcomes (e.g. patch and batch) across similar and dissimilar conditions: Mean log 
frequency for the similar conditions was 1.14 and, for dissimilar conditions, also 1.14, t(47) 
=0.00, p =1. 
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Four lists were drawn up from the 48 matched sets of word sequences. Each list 
contained a different sequence from each of the 48 sets, arranged such that there were equal 
numbers of sequences in each condition in each list. Within each list, half of the sequences 
were assigned to the auditory-masking condition. Auditory masking was blocked, and four 
versions of each original list were drawn up such that all sequences appeared in masked and 
unmasked and in masking-first and masking-last conditions. Finally, each sequence in each 
of the resultant 16 lists was marked for either overt or silent recitation, such that there were 
equal numbers of each across other experimental conditions. This pattern was reversed to 
create an additional 16 lists, resulting in 32 lists of experimental items in a fully 
counterbalanced design. 
Auditory masking was achieved using computer-generated pink noise, delivered through 
a set of Panasonic RP-HT225 stereo headphones. Participants‟ responses were captured on a 
Zoom H2 digital recorder and analyzed using Praat software (Boersma & Weenink, 2009). 
Procedure.  
The procedure was closely modelled on that of Oppenheim and Dell (2008), with three 
differences: (a) We used visual timing cues (white dashes on the screen) instead of an 
acoustic metronome to pace participants‟ repetitions of the word sequences (necessary 
because a metronome would not have been audible in conditions with auditory masking), (b) 
the tonguetwister sequence was not visible on the screen during experimental recitations (to 
eliminate potential orthographic interference), and (c) the timing cues stopped automatically 
after each recitation to ensure there were no distractions when participants reported errors. 
Prior to beginning the experiment, participants underwent a computer-led tutorial and 
practice session, which included full instructions concerning the inner speech and overt 
speech procedures. To prevent a possible effect of silent articulation (cf. Oppenheim & Dell, 
2010), the tutorial strongly emphasised the importance of not attempting to mouth sequences 
85 
 
silently in the inner speech condition. At the beginning of each masked block, participants 
were instructed to adjust the fit and volume of the headphones to ensure that the loudness of 
the pink noise prevented them from hearing the sound of their own voice.  
Tongue-twister sequences were presented in a random order on a 17-in. computer 
monitor. For each sequence, participants underwent a familiarization phase followed by a 
performance phase  (See  
Figure 6-1). In the familiarization phase, the tongue-twister sequence appeared in the 
centre of the screen, above an icon prompting participants to speak overtly (a mouth). Three 
seconds later, a series of four dashes appeared (one every second), acting as a visual 
metronome for the repetition of the words in the sequence. In the masked condition, pink 
noise began as the first dash appeared and lasted until the last of the four dashes disappeared. 
The dashes and mouth icon were then replaced by a single dot, which remained onscreen for 
an additional second before the mouth icon reappeared and the dash sequence started again. 
The dash sequence was repeated so that participants repeated each sequence aloud four times 
before the performance phase began. 
During familiarization, participants were not aware whether repetition of the sequence 
during the subsequent performance phase would be silent or out loud. Once familiarization 
had ended, the sequence was moved to the top of the screen, and required activity was 
indicated centre-screen by means of the mouth icon (as used in familiarization) or a face icon 
representing silent repetition. At the same time, the words press ENTER to continue 
appeared below the icon. Pressing ENTER caused all text to disappear from the screen, 
leaving only the mouth or face icon visible. After 200 ms, a four-dash sequence began at a 
rate of one dash every 500 ms, acting as a visual metronome for the (overt or silent) 
repetition of the tongue-twister sequence, and (in the blocks with auditory masking) pink 
noise started to play over the participant‟s headphones. Five hundred ms after the appearance 
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of the fourth dash, the dashes disappeared, the pink noise (if any) ended, and the tongue-
twister sequence reappeared at the top of the screen, together with the instruction report any 
errors and then press ENTER to continue at the bottom. Participants were instructed to report 
each error aloud, as fully as possible, saying, for example, “I said pat cap patch pad” (where 
pad cap catch pad was required). Once errors, if any, had been reported, pressing ENTER 
started the next four-dash sequence. Each performance phase included four repetitions of the 





Figure 6-1. Experiment 1: Visual cues for familiarization and performance phases. 
The figure depicts screen-shots of one familiarization and one performance iteration. Participants were required to speak a new word with 
the appearance of each new dash. In total, for each tongue-twister, participants produced four consecutive familiarization and four 
consecutive performance iterations before moving on to the next tongue-twister.
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Transcriptions were made of participants‟ self-reports of their inner and overt speech 
errors. Additionally, the transcriber independently identified errors in the overt speech 
condition offline from digital recordings using PRAAT software (Boersma & Weenink, 
2009). Errors were coded as primed-for onset substitutions, correct pronunciations, or other 
errors. To be considered as a primed-for onset substitution, an error had to consist of the 
substitution of the onset of a B word with that of an A word, with no concomitant change in 
the coda.  
 For example, in the tongue-twister “pat cap catch pad” → “pat cap patch cad” was 
considered to be a primed-for onset substitution, but“pat cap catch pad” → pat cap pad 
catch” was not (in practice, most of the latter type of error (in which both onset and coda 
changed) were indistinguishable from word-order errors. In cases where an error was 
followed by an overt self-repair, only the original error was coded for analysis. 
Analyses.  
Analyses were carried out using logistic mixed-effects regression modelling  (Breslow & 
Clayton, 1993; DebRoy & Bates, 2004) using the lme4 package (Bates & Maechler, 2009) in 
R (R Development Core R Development Core Team, 2009). This approach allowed us to 
investigate the independent contributions of a variety of “predictor” variables (both naturally 
occurring and experimentally manipulated) to the (log) likelihood of making onset 
substitution errors relative to correct pronunciations (other errors were discarded from all 
analyses).  
For each dependent variable of interest, we generated a base model that included an 
intercept, as well as random by-participant and by-item intercept variation. We then 
proceeded to add predictors stepwise to the model. Selection of models was based on two 
criteria. First, using χ
2
 tests to compare model likelihood ratios, we assessed whether the fit 
of the model to the data was improved (as indicated by a significant increase in the absolute 
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value of the model likelihood ratio) by the addition of each predictor. Predictors were 
retained if the model was improved but were removed from consideration if they did not 
improve the current best model. Second, where two or more predictors each significantly 
improved the current model, we selected the model that had the smallest log-likelihood. 
Once predictors representing the experimental manipulations and their relevant interactions 
had been exhaustively explored, the resulting model represented the best fit to the data, being 
a model that could not be improved by the addition of further predictors
11
. 
Each model includes coefficients representing the intercept and any effects of predictors. 
Where models were selected, the Wald statistic, calculated from each estimated coefficient 
and its standard error, was used to determine whether the coefficients differed significantly 
from zero (see Agresti, 2002). 
Vigilance of self-reporting. Our first analysis evaluated the vigilance with which 
participants reported their own errors in overt speech. More specifically, it compared the 
likelihood of primed-for errors being reported in overt speech by the independent rater to the 
likelihood of them being reported in overt speech by the participants themselves. The 
independent rater‟s ratings were based on careful offline analysis of digital recordings of the 
tongue-twisters recited by participants and thus could be considered to constitute a stable 
baseline, whereas the participants‟ own ratings were made online. If participants self-




 To maintain consistency with data from these experiments already published (Corley, 
Brocklehurst, & Moat, 2011) random slopes have not been included in the models described in this 
chapter (See Section 5.2). However, for the combined analyses, equivalent models containing random 




reported fewer errors than the independent rater, this could constitute evidence of hypo-
vigilant monitoring, whereas if they self-reported more errors, then this could constitute 
evidence of hyper-vigilant monitoring. In addition to estimating overall vigilance, we also 
checked whether vigilance was affected by the addition of (a) masking; (b) similarity of 
onset phonemes: and (c) lexical status of the reported error (i.e. whether or not it constituted 
a real word). 
Self-reports: Having quantified the vigilance of self-reporting of overt errors, we then 
carried out two further statistical analyses which focussed entirely on self-reports:  
1. Inner vs. overt speech - focused on primed-for errors on Word 3 and compares the 
size of the (self-reported) phonemic similarity bias on primed-for errors in inner 
versus overt speech and also compares the size of the (self-reported) lexical bias in 
inner versus overt speech. 
2. Inner speech in isolation - focused on primed for errors on Word 3 in inner speech 
alone and double-checks for the presence of phonemic similarity and lexical biases 
in inner speech. 
6.2.2. Results 
Out of a total of 6,144 experimental recitations (48 tongue-twisters, each repeated four 
times by 32 participants), 632 errors of any type were transcribed by the independent rater 
from recordings of participants‟ overt speech, whereas participants self-reported 510 errors 
in overt and 341 in inner speech.  
Primed-for errors.  Forty-one of the errors transcribed by the independent rater from 
recordings of participants‟ overt speech were unambiguous onset-phoneme substitution 
errors (cases in which the onset of Word 3 was substituted with that of an A word yet the 
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coda remained unchanged). Participants self-reported 40 such errors in overt speech, and 37 
in inner speech
12
13. Table 6-2 gives a breakdown of errors by experimental condition. 
Table 6-2 Experiment 1: Onset Substitutions on Word 3 
  Similar onsets  Dissimilar onsets 
Error outcome  Unmasked Masked (Total)  Unmasked Masked (Total) 
Independent 
rater 
















































Vigilance of self-reporting. We tested the following binomial (fixed) predictors and 
interactions in the order shown below. For each predictor a value of zero indicates „no‟, one 
indicates „yes‟:  
 similarity (whether the substituted phonemes differed by just one feature) 
 lexicality (whether an onset substitution would result in a word) 
 masking (whether or not there was auditory masking),  
 rater-type (whether or not the rating was made by the participant) 
o rater by similarity interaction 
o rater by lexicality interaction 
o rater by masking interaction 
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The best fitting model included the predictors: rater, lexicality and similarity: 




. Addition of the rater by 
similarity, or rater by lexicality interactions did not improve the model fit: both ps≥.880, nor 
did addition of the lexicality by similarity interaction, χ
2
(1)= 0.03, p=.852.  
Coefficients for predictors in the best-fit model (including rater) are given in Table 6-3. 
They reveal that after accounting for random variance, and irrespective of experimental 
condition, participants were only 0.65 times as likely to self-report (overt) errors compared 
to the independent rater. Irrespective of who was doing the rating, errors with lexical 
outcomes and those involving the substitutions of onset phonemes that differed by single 
features were reported in significantly greater numbers in overt speech.  However, the lack 
of any rater by lexicality, and rater by similarity interactions indicates that the magnitude of 
the lexicality and similarity biases as calculated on the basis of the independent-rater‟s 
ratings, were not significantly different to their magnitude as calculated on the basis of the 
participants‟ self-ratings. Neither masking (as a main effect) nor the rater by masking 
interaction improved the model, suggesting that the ability to hear their own voices did not 
affect the number of primed-for errors made, nor did it affect the number self-reported. (for 
interactions, all ps≥.880). 




 The corresponding analyses presented in the Corley, Brocklehurst & Moat (2011) article 
included errors occurring on Words 2 ( for which lexicality of outcome had not been determined). In 
contrast, the mixed-effects analysis presented in this thesis (Table 6-3, page 93) is based on Word 3 
errors alone. As a result of this change, the addition of the „rater‟ predictor only marginally improves 
the model, although the coefficient is nevertheless still reliable and so has been included here in the 
best-fit model. All other values remain substantially unchanged. 
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Table 6-3 Experiment 1: Vigilance of self-reporting. Model Coefficients and 






(coefficient = 0) 
Overt speech (participants vs. independent rater), Word 3 onset errors 
(Intercept) nonword outcome, 
dissimilar onsets, 
 independent-rater 
-5.57 0.36 <.001 *** 
Lexicality real-word outcome 0.64 0.23 .004 ** 
Similarity similar onsets 0.93 0.24 <.001 *** 
Rater  self rating -0.43 0.22 <.050 * 
 
Self-reports: Comparisons of inner and overt speech. The analyses of self-reported 
errors in inner and overt speech involved the following binomial predictors and interactions:  
 lexicality (whether an onset substitution would result in a real word) 
 similarity (whether the substituted phonemes differed by one feature or more)  
o lexicality by similarity interaction 
 overtness (whether or not participants were speaking aloud),  
o overtness by lexicality interaction 
o overtness by similarity interaction 
As in the previous analysis, the best fit model of self-reported primed-for errors on Word 
3 included effects of lexicality and similarity. It was not improved by including their 
interaction: χ
2
(1)= 2.12, p=.15, overtness: χ
2
(1)= 0.22, p=.64, or the overtness by lexicality 
interaction χ
2
(2)=0.78, p=.68, and surprisingly, (in contrast to Oppenheim & Dell, 2008) 
there was no similarity by overtness interaction χ
2
(2)=0.48, p=.79.   
Table 6-4 gives the coefficients of the best-fitting model and the probabilities that they 
differ from zero. These coefficients show that, once random variance was accounted for, 
participants were approximately 2.3 (e
0.85
) times as likely to report errors when the outcome 
was a word and 2.2 times as likely when the substituted phoneme differed by a single 




Table 6-4 Experiment 1: Predictors of self-reported errors. Model Coefficients and 








Inner vs. overt speech, Word 3 onset errors 
(Intercept) nonword outcome, 
dissimilar onsets 
-5.59 0.31 <.001 *** 
Lexicality  real-word outcome 0.85 0.26 <.001 *** 
Similarity similar onsets 0.79 0.26 .002 * 
 





-7.10 1.10 <.001 *** 
Lexicality real-word outcome 2.53 1.12 .025 * 
Similarity similar onsets 2.24 1.14 .049 * 
Lexicality X Similarity  real word & similar -1.94 1.21 .110 
 
Because of the unexpected lack of a similarity by overtness interaction, we ran an 
additional analysis, exploring inner speech in isolation (Word 3 only). In this analysis of 
inner speech in isolation, the best fitting model for errors on Word 3 included lexicality, 
similarity and their interaction (Improvement due to the addition of their interaction, 
χ
2
(1)=4.13, p=.04. The coefficients (see Table 6-4) reveal that when the error-outcomes were 
non-words, single feature onset-errors were 9.4 (e
2.24
) times more likely to be reported than 
multiple-feature errors. In contrast, when the error-outcomes were real-words, although the 
trend was in the same direction, the magnitude of the similarity bias was not reliable.  
6.2.3. Discussion 
In Experiment 1, although, overall, participants tended to under-report the overt, primed-
for errors they made, the lack of any rater-by-lexicality or rater-by-similarity interactions 
suggests that, at least in overt speech, such under-reporting occurred approximately to the 
same extent irrespective of how salient the errors were. This is in line with earlier findings 
by Nooteboom (2005b), that self-monitoring of overt speech is not sensitive to the lexical 
95 
 
status of errors or to the phonetic distance between error and target. The finding that auditory 
masking did not affect the likelihood of primed-for errors being either self-reported or 
reported by the independent rater further suggests that the vigilance of self-reporting was not 
affected by the ability of participants to hear what they said. In this respect the current 
findings differ from those of Postma and Noordanus (2006).  
In Experiment 1, both a phonemic similarity bias and a lexical bias were found in both 
overt and inner speech conditions, although in inner speech, the similarity bias was only 
reliable for errors that resulted in the production of non-words. The finding that the lexicality 
and similarity biases self-reported in inner-speech were in the same direction as those 
reported in overt speech (both by participants themselves as well as by the independent rater) 
fully supports an activation feedback account in which feedback of activation occurs not 
only from the phoneme to the lexical level of encoding but also from the feature to the 
phoneme level of encoding. This latter finding appears incompatible with Oppenheim and 
Dell‟s (2008) finding that there was no similarity bias in participants‟ inner-speech self-
reports, although it is not incompatible with Oppenheim and Dell‟s (2010) finding that the 
similarity effect in inner speech is weaker than in overt speech, as there was a numeric trend 
in that direction.  
These findings are potentially compatible with an activation-feedback account or with a 
mixed account, such as proposed by Hartsuiker et al. (2005) in which the biases are 
influenced by both feedback and editing effects. Whatever the case, they do not seem to be 
compatible with an account that attributes the biases entirely to poorer editing (and under-
reporting) of less salient errors, because such an account would predict self-reporting biases 
in the opposite direction to the similarity and lexical biases that were found (see Section 
4.5.2 & 4.5.3). 
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Overall, the numbers of errors self-reported in the experiment were substantially lower 
than the numbers reported by participants in the Oppenheim and Dell (2008) experiment
13
 . 
It is not clear why they were lower, and it is possible that with higher error rates, different 
results may have emerged. Because of the difference, with respect to the phonemic-similarity 
bias, between the current findings and those of Oppenheim and Dell (2008), a primary 
motivation for Experiment 2 was to see if our findings (especially with respect to the 
phonological similarity effect in inner speech) could be replicated using Oppenheim and 
Dell‟s own set of materials.  
6.3. Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was a replication of Experiment 1, using the same tongue-twisters that 
were used by Oppenheim and Dell (2010). Because there were fewer tongue-twisters than in 
our previous experiments, we used a larger number of participants (48) to maintain 
equivalent power. To enable a more direct comparison with Oppenheim and Dell (2008), we 
did not manipulate masking in this experiment. In all other respects, Experiment 2 was 
identical to Experiment 1. 
6.3.1. Method 
Participants  
Forty-eight native speakers of English were recruited from the University of Edinburgh 
student population for course credit. Ages ranged from 18 to 23 years old (median=18). 




 For comparison, Oppenheim & Dell‟s (2008) participants self-reported 1217 overt errors of any 




We used the 32 matched sets of four-word tonguetwister sequences originally used by 
Oppenheim and Dell (2010); 31 of these were identical to those used by Oppenheim & Dell 
(2008). All sequences used real words, with onsets arranged in an ABBA pattern; as in 
Experiment 1, the onsets of the A words were manipulated such that they were either 
phonemically similar or dissimilar to the B onsets, and the coda of Word 3 was manipulated 
such that the substitution of the onset of Word 3 with an A onset would result in either a 
word or a nonword. Counterbalancing proceeded as in Experiment 1. Since there was no 
manipulating of auditory masking in the present experiment, the counterbalancing procedure 
resulted in eight experimental lists. 
Procedure.  
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1, with the exception that participants 
were not required to wear headphones since all tongue twisters were recited without auditory 
masking. 
Analyses.  
As in Experiment 1, we carried out mixed-effects analyses of reporting vigilance in overt 
speech (participants vs. independent rater), analyses of primed-for errors in inner versus 
overt speech (Word 3), and inner speech only (Word 3).  
6.3.2. Results 
Out of a total of 6,144 experimental recitations, Four hundred and thirteen errors were 
transcribed by the independent rater from recordings of participants‟ overt speech, whereas 
participants self-reported 361 in overt and 225 in inner speech.  
Primed-for errors.  Fifty five of the errors transcribed by the independent rater from 
recordings of participants‟ overt speech were unambiguous onset-phoneme substitution 
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errors (cases in which the onset of Word 3 was substituted with that of an A word yet the 
coda remained unchanged). Participants self-reported 44 such errors in overt speech, and 31 
in inner speech. Table 6-5 gives a breakdown of errors by experimental condition. 






































Vigilance of self-reporting.  As in Experiment 1, we ran a set of analyses comparing 
participants‟ self-reported errors to those transcribed from the recordings by an independent 
rater. This time, once random variance was accounted for, the best fitting model included 
lexicality, similarity and also the lexicality by similarity interaction: Improvement due to 
adding the lexicality by similarity interaction: χ
2
(1)=7.07,  p<.008.  
Although participants self-reported lower numbers of primed-for errors than were 
recorded by the independent rater, adding rater as an additional predictor did not further 
improve the model fit:  χ
2
(1)=1.23,  p=.267. As in Experiment 1, neither the „rater by 
lexicality‟ or‟ rater by similarity‟ interactions improved the model further: all χ
2
(2)≤ 1.38, 
ps≥.501, indicating that the magnitudes of the lexicality and similarity biases as calculated 
on the basis of the independent rater‟s ratings, were not significantly different to their 
magnitudes as calculated on the basis of the participants‟ ratings.  
Coefficients for the predictors are given in Table 6-6. As in Experiment 1 they reveal 
significant phonemic similarity and lexical biases. In contrast to Experiment 1, they also 
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additionally reveal an (overt) lexicality by similarity interaction. Specifically, after taking 
participant and item variance into account, irrespective of who is doing the rating, compared 
to „dissimilar‟ onset-errors, „similar‟ onset-errors were 10.3 (e
2.33
) times as likely to be 
reported if they had non-word outcomes, or 1.6 (e
0.49
) times as likely to be reported if they 
had real-word outcomes. Both ratios were reliably different from 1.  
Table 6-6. Experiment 2: Vigilance of self-reporting. Model Coefficients and 









Overt speech (participants vs. independent 
rater), Word 3 onset errors 
(Intercept) nonword outcome, 
dissimilar onsets,  
-8.57 0.94 <.001 *** 
Lexicality real-word outcome 2.85 0.93 .002 ** 
Similarity similar onsets 2.33 0.82 .005 ** 
Lexicality by similarity interaction  -1.84 0.87 .035 * 
 
Self-reported errors: Comparisons of inner and overt speech. As in Experiment 1, 
we performed two separate analyses of participants‟ self-reported errors (on Word 3 inner & 
overt speech combined, and on Word 3 inner speech in isolation). Together these analyses 
tested the effects of overtness, lexicality, and similarity and relevant interactions on the 
likelihood of participants self-reporting primed-for errors. Coefficients for each model and 
the probabilities that they differ from zero are given in Table 6-7.  
In the analysis of primed-for errors in inner & overt speech combined, once random 
variance was accounted for, the best fit model included factors of lexicality and similarity 
but was not significantly improved by including their interaction, χ
2
(1)= 2.60, p=.11. Adding 
overtness marginally improved the model, χ
2
(1)=  3.14, p=.08, reflecting the fact that fewer 
errors were reported in inner speech. Importantly, overtness did not interact with either 
lexicality or phonemic similarity: both ps ≥.78. The coefficients for the best-fitting model 
reveal that, regardless of overtness and taking random effects into account, participants were 
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approximately 2.7 (= e0.99) times as likely to report errors when the outcome was a word and 
2.7 times as likely when the substituted phoneme differed by a single feature. 
When inner speech was analyzed in isolation, the best fit model of primed-for errors (on 
Word 3) included effects of lexicality: χ
2
(1)= 5.78, p= .02, and similarity: χ2(1)= 5.53, p=.02, 
but not their interaction: χ
2
(1)= 0.07, p= .793. The coefficients of the best-fitting model 
reveal that participants were 2.9 times as likely to report errors resulting in words and 2.5 
times as likely to report the substitutions of similar phonemes.  
Table 6-7. Experiment 2:  Predictors of self-reported errors. Model Coefficients and 







(coefficient = 0) 
 
Inner vs. overt speech, Word 3 onset errors 
(Intercept) nonword outcome, 
dissimilar onsets 
-6.43 0.39 <.001 *** 
Lexicality real word outcome 0.99 0.27 <.001 *** 
Similarity similar onsets 0.99 0.27 <.001 *** 
 





-6.24 0.54 <.001 *** 
Lexicality real word outcome 1.08 0.49 .027 * 
Similarity similar onsets 0.90 0.43 .038 * 
 
6.3.3. Discussion 
In Experiment 2, although overall, participants once again self-reported numerically 
fewer primed-for errors than the independent rater, the difference was not reliable. In 
common with Experiment 1, the lack of any rater-by-lexicality or rater-by-similarity 
interactions suggests that, even if under-reporting of primed-for errors did occur, it occurred 
to a similar extent irrespective of how salient the errors were. However, some caution needs 
to be exercised in arriving at such a conclusion because the overall number of errors 
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involved was again low and there may not have been sufficient power to reveal such 
interactions. 
Consistent with Experiment 1 and with Oppenheim and Dell (2008, 2010), we found a 
lexical bias in both overt and inner speech conditions. However once again, unlike 
Oppenheim and Dell (2008, 2010), there was not a significant interaction of phonemic 
similarity with overtness. In the current experiment, we found a lexicality by similarity 
interaction in overt speech (although in post-hoc analyses of independent-rater and self 
reports in isolation, the interaction was not reliable: independent-rater p=.073, self-ratings 
p=.133). This interaction was similar to in Experiment 1, in that the similarity effect was 
stronger on errors with non-lexical outcomes, but unlike Experiment 1 it was not found in 
inner speech.  
As in Experiment 1,  the overall numbers of errors reported were low, indeed, somewhat 
lower than Experiment 1 and significantly lower than Oppenheim and Dell‟s (2008, 2010) 
experiments (despite using their tongue-twisters). Importantly, overall, as in Experiment 1, 
there was a high degree of correspondence between participants‟ own self-ratings and the 
independent rater‟s ratings with regards to the strength of the (overt) similarity and lexical 
biases, suggesting that, at least in overt speech, participants were not disproportionately 
underreporting the less salient errors. However, these findings differ substantially from those 
of Oppenheim and Dell (2008) insofar as, in the inner-speech condition of their experiment, 
the phonemic similarity bias was entirely absent.  
Having ruled out the possibility that the differences in the findings of our two labs 
resulted from our use of different tongue-twisters, Experiment 3 investigates the possibility 
that the differences may stem from the different types of metronomes used by the two labs: 
visual in our lab, and acoustic in the Oppenheim and Dell‟s lab. Experiment 3 thus replicated 
the procedure from our Experiment 1, using an acoustic metronome. A further motivation for 
102 
 
performing this extra experiment was to provide extra data for a subsequent combined 
analysis, to investigate the reliability of the paradigm across participant groups and to 
determine whether our failure to find the same similarity by overtness interaction as 
Oppenheim and Dell (2008, 2010) is related to a lack of power due to the relatively low 
numbers of primed-for errors elicited in our experiments.  
6.4. Experiment 3  
Experiment 3
14
 was a replication of Experiment 1, except that (a) we used an acoustic 
(instead of a visual) metronome to pace participants‟ iterations of the tongue-twisters; (b) the 
auditory-masking condition was not included; and (c) participants self-reported their errors 
by typing them directly into the computer (instead of stating them verbally). 
6.5. Method 
Participants  
Thirty-two native speakers of English were recruited from the University of Edinburgh 
student population for course credit. Ages ranged from 17 to 45 years old (median=18). 
Materials 
We used the same 48 matched sets of four-word tonguetwister sequences as originally 
used in Experiment 1 (See Appendix A). Since there was no manipulation of auditory 
masking in the present experiment, the counterbalancing procedure resulted in eight 
experimental lists (as in Oppenheim and Dell, 2008). 









The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1, except for the following: (a) 
participants did not wear headphones (these were unnecessary as all tongue twisters were 
recited without auditory masking); (b) instead of speaking in time to dashes as they appeared 
on the screen, participants spoke in time to a digital recording of an acoustic metronome beat 
delivered through the computer speaker; (c) participants self-reported their errors by typing 
instead of speaking. The change in the self-reporting mode brought it into line with the 
tongue-twister Experiment 4 which compared speech-errors in people who stutter and 
normally-fluent controls.   
During both the familiarisation and testing phases, the acoustic metronome was activated 
in an identical way to the visible metronome in the previous experiments. The required 
speech rates were also identical to those of the previous experiments. During the testing 
phase, 500 ms after the onset of the final beat of each of the four tongue-twister recitations, 
the tonguetwister sequence reappeared at the top of the screen, together with an instruction to 
“type any errors and then press ENTER to continue” at the bottom. Participants were 
instructed to type, as fully as possible, what they had actually said, for example “rag lap rash 
rap” (when they should have said “rag lap lash rap”; the /r/ in rash being an anticipation of 
the /r/ in rap). They were instructed to type one or more question-marks in the relevant 
places if they could not remember what they had said for a word or „X‟s if they had 
completely omitted all or part of a word. Once errors, if any, had been reported, pressing 
ENTER started the next four-dash sequence. 
Analyses.  
As in the previous experiments, we carried out mixed-effects analyses of primed-for 
errors in overt speech only (participants vs. independent rater); inner versus overt speech, 




Out of a total of 6,144 experimental recitations, nine hundred and seventy nine errors 
were transcribed by the independent rater from recordings of participants‟ overt speech, 
whereas participants self-reported 725 in overt and 483 in inner speech.  
Primed-for errors.  Eighty of the errors transcribed by the independent rater from 
recordings of participants‟ overt speech were unambiguous onset-phoneme substitution 
errors (cases in which the onset of Word 3 was substituted with that of an A word yet the 
coda remained unchanged). Participants self-reported 46 such errors in overt speech, and 45 
in inner speech. Table 6-8 gives a breakdown of errors by experimental condition. 






































Vigilance of self-reporting.  As in the previous experiments, we ran a set of analyses 
comparing participants‟ self-reported errors to those transcribed from the recordings by an 
independent rater. This time, once random variance was accounted for, the best fitting model 
included rater, and also lexicality, similarity, the lexicality by similarity interaction. 
Improvement due to adding rater: χ
2
(1)= 6.01, p<.014 (coefficients are given in Table 6-9). 
The coefficient for rater revealed that, irrespective of lexicality and similarity, and after 
accounting for random variance, participants were only 0.54 times as likely to report primed-
for errors compared to the independent rater. As in the previous experiments, neither the 





0.41, ps≥.520., indicating that the magnitudes of the lexicality and similarity biases as 
calculated on the basis of the independent rater‟s ratings, were not significantly different to 
their magnitudes as calculated on the basis of the participants‟ ratings. 
Table 6-9. Experiment 3: Vigilance of self reporting. Model Coefficients and 
Probabilities for Best Fitting Model. 






(coefficient = 0) 
Overt speech (participants vs. independent rater),  
Word 3 onset errors 
(Intercept) nonword outcome, 
dissimilar onsets,  
independent-rater 
-5.96 0.48 <.001 *** 
Lexicality real word outcome 1.79 0.44 <.001 *** 
Similarity similar onsets 1.74 0.44 <.001 *** 
Lexicality by similarity interaction  -1.23 0.50 .015 * 
Rater self rating -0.62 0.20 .002 ** 
 
The coefficients for lexicality, similarity and their interaction reveal that irrespective of 
who was doing the rating, compared to „dissimilar‟ onset-errors, „similar‟ onset-errors were 
either 5.7 (e
1.74
) times as likely to be reported if they had non-word outcomes, or 1.7 (e
0.51
) 
times as likely to be reported if they had real-word outcomes. Both odds ratios were reliably 
different from 1.  
  
Self-reported errors: Comparisons of inner and overt speech. As in the previous 
experiments, we performed two separate analyses of participants‟ self-reported errors (on 
Word 3 inner & overt speech combined, and on Word 3 inner speech in isolation). Together 
these analyses tested the effects of overtness, lexicality, and similarity and relevant 
interactions on the likelihood of participants self-reporting primed-for errors. Coefficients for 
each model and the probabilities that they differ from zero are given in Table 6-10.  
In the analysis of primed-for errors in inner & overt speech combined, once random 
variance was accounted for, the best fit model included factors of lexicality and similarity 
(improvement due to adding the similarity predictor: χ
2
(1)= 10.305 p<.001), but was not 
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improved by the addition of the lexicality by similarity interaction: χ
2
(1)= 2.26, p=.133,  or 
by addition of the overtness predictor: χ
2
(1)= 0.34, p=.562. As in the previous experiments, 
overtness did not interact with either lexicality or similarity: both χ
2
(2) ≤ 1.08, ps ≥.583. The 
coefficients reveal that, regardless of overtness and taking random effects into account, 
participants were approximately 3.25 (= e1.18) times as likely to report errors when the 
outcome was a word and 2.0 times as likely when the substituted phoneme differed by a 
single feature.            
When inner speech was analyzed in isolation, the best fit model included effects of 
lexicality, and similarity (improvement due to adding the similarity predictor: χ
2
(1)= 6.20 
p=.013). Adding the lexicality by similarity interaction did not further improve the model: 
χ
2
(1)= 0.74, . p=.389. The coefficients reveal that participants were 4.1 times as likely to 
report errors resulting in words and 2.2 times as likely to report the substitutions of similar 
phonemes.  
Table 6-10. Experiment 3: Self reported errors. Model Coefficients and Probabilities for 






(coefficient = 0) 
 
Inner vs. overt speech, Word 3 onset errors 
(Intercept) nonword outcome, 
dissimilar onsets 
-5.69 0.33 <.001 *** 
Lexicality real word outcome 1.18 0.26 <.001 *** 
Similarity similar onsets 0.71 0.23 .002 ** 
 





-6.00 0.47 <.001 *** 
Lexicality real word outcome 1.42 0.39 <.001 *** 
Similarity similar onsets 0.78 0.33 .020 * 
            
6.5.2. Discussion 
In Experiment 3, the overall numbers of primed-for rater-reported as well as self-
reported error rates were marginally higher than in our previous two experiments (see the 
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marginal effect of metronome in the combined analysis in 6.6.1, for confirmation of this) 
although there were still fewer error reports than in Oppenheim and Dell‟s (2008) 
experiment
13
. The increased numbers of errors may have been related to the adoption of an 
acoustic metronome similar to that used in Oppenheim and Dell‟s experiment
15
. Once again, 
participants under-reported their overt primed-for errors, and this time the difference reached 
significance. As in our previous experiments, the lack of any rater-by-lexicality or rater-by-
similarity interactions suggests that under-reporting of overt primed-for errors occurred 
approximately to the same extent irrespective of how salient the errors were.  
 Consistent with our previous experiments and with Oppenheim and Dell (2008, 2010), 
we found a lexical bias in both overt and inner speech conditions. However once again, in 
contrast to Oppenheim and Dell (2008, 2010) but in common with our previous two 
experiments, there was no interaction of phonemic similarity with overtness. Indeed this 
time, numerically, the similarity bias was slightly larger in inner speech than in overt speech. 
As with our Experiment 2, a significant lexicality by similarity interaction was found in overt 
but not in inner speech.  
Before considering the implications of our findings further, we present three sets of 
combined analyses of the combined data from the Experiments described above.  




 The fact that there were also a higher number of independent-rater reports in this experiment 
appears to rule out the possibility that the typed self-reporting mode accounted for the higher numbers 
of errors. This conclusion is further supported by the finding of relatively low error rates in the 
„controls‟ experiment of the next set of experiments described in Chapter 0, which used a visual 
metronome together with typed self-reports. 
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6.6. Analyses of data from Experiments 1, 2 and 3 
combined 
Because the number of primed-for errors that occurred in each of our individual 
experiments was relatively low, it is possible a lack of power may have contributed to our 
failure to find the overtness by similarity interaction found by Oppenheim and Dell (2008; 
2010). Lack of power may also have meant that differences in the relative size of error biases 
across reporters and conditions may have been missed.   Therefore, to check whether this 
was the case, and to determine whether the use of different groups of participants and/or any 
of the between-experiment manipulations made a significant difference to reporting 
vigilance or to the relative magnitude of the error biases, we report the findings of a series of 
combined analyses in which the results of the three experiments reported above are 
considered together.  
6.6.1. Vigilance of self-reporting.  
As with the individual experiments, this combined analysis of vigilance of self-reporting 
is based on Word 3 data from self and independent-rater reports of primed-for errors. We 
tested the same predictors as were used in the equivalent analyses of the individual 
experiments: i.e. similarity, lexicality and rater. In addition to these, we also tested two 
further factorial predictors: experiment (with 3 levels, one for each experiment) to test for 
gross differences between the experiments; and metronome (with 2 levels: visual and 
acoustic) to determine what (if any) effect the type of metronome had on the vigilance with 
which participants self-reported primed-for errors.  
Results 
The best fitting model for the combined analysis of vigilance of self-reporting included 
rater, lexicality, similarity, and the lexicality by similarity interaction. Improvement to the 
model as a result of adding rater: χ
2
(1)= 6.97, p<.001.   
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The coefficients of the predictors in the best-fit model (see Table 6-11) reveal that 
(irrespective of experiment) participants were only 0.64 times as likely to self-report errors 
as was the independent rater. The failure of the rater by lexicality and rater by similarity 
interactions to improve the model further (both ps≥.983), confirmed that the vigilance of 
participants‟ self reporting of (overt) errors was not influenced to a different extent by how 
phonemically similar their errors were to the intended targets and did not depend on whether 
or not those errors constituted real words. 
The coefficients also reveal that the similarity and lexical biases in participants‟ own 
self-reports were not significantly different to those found in the independent rater‟s reports. 
Specifically, after taking subject and item variance into account and irrespective of who was 
doing the rating, compared to „dissimilar‟ onset-errors, „similar‟ onset-errors were 4.7 (e
1.55
) 
times as likely to be reported if they had non-word outcomes, or 1.8 (e
0.61
) times as likely to 
be reported if they had real-word outcomes. Both ratios were reliable. (See Figure 6-3 b and 
c for graphical comparison of equivalent separate models for overt self and independent-rater 
ratings) 
It is noteworthy that the addition of „metronome‟ as a predictor marginally further 
improved the model, χ
2
(1)= 3.07, p=.079, its coefficient (e
0.54
  p=.076) suggesting that the 
use of an auditory metronome in Experiment 3 may have resulted in higher speech error rates 
in that experiment (compared to the other two experiments combined). Adding the 
metronome by rater interaction did not improve the model χ
2
(2)= 4.40, p=.111, indicating 
that any increase in error rates that may have occurred due to the use of an acoustic 
metronome affected self-reports and independent-rater reports to a roughly similar extent and 
thus did not result in a loss of monitoring vigilance.  
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Table 6-11 Combined analysis Experiments 1, 3 & 4. Monitoring Vigilance. 
Model Coefficients and Probabilities for Best Fitting Model (see Appendix B Section 








Overt speech (participants vs. independent rater), Word 3 onset errors 
(Intercept) nonword outcomes, 
dissimilar onsets,  
independent rater 
-6.24 0.31 <.001 *** 
Lexicality real word outcomes 1.51 0.27 <.001 *** 
Similarity similar onsets 1.54 0.27 <.001 *** 
Lexicality by similarity interaction  -0.94 0.31 .002 ** 
Rater self-rating -0.44 0.13 <.001 *** 
                      
Discussion  
This combined analysis of self- and independent-rater reports of primed-for errors in 
overt speech clearly shows that participants in all three experiments tended to under-report 
the primed-for errors they made. However, it also shows that the extent of under-reporting 
did not differ significantly across experiments or across conditions. Thus, in line with the 
analyses of the individual experiments in isolation, it did not reveal any evidence to suggest 
that the extent of participants‟ under-reporting was influenced by the lexical status of the 
error outcome (i.e. whether or not it constituted a real word) or its phonemic similarity to the 
original target word. The analysis also found that monitoring vigilance was not affected by 
the tonguetwisters used; the presence of auditory masking; or the type of metronome used 
(see Figure 6-3(b) & (c) on page 118 for graphical representations of the fitted models).   
6.6.2. Accuracy of self-reporting 
Although the combined analysis of vigilance of self-reporting (described above) revealed 
that participants self-reported fewer overt primed-for errors than the independent rater, it 
does not provide any insight into how accurate their self-ratings were. It is thus possible that 
occasions may have arisen where both the self rater and also the participant identified a word 
as containing an error, yet the description of that error provided by the participant may have 
differed from that provided by the independent rater. It is also possible that the degree of 
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self-reporting accuracy may have been different in the different experimental conditions, 
despite the overall level of self-reporting vigilance being the same. To explore this 
possibility, we present below, an additional (combined) analysis which focuses specifically 
on the accuracy with which primed-for errors were self-reported.  
This accuracy combined analysis is predicated on the presumption that the independent 
rater‟s reports can be considered to form a stable baseline against which self-reports can be 
judged for (relative) accuracy. This approach, which was also used in a comparable analysis 
of accuracy by Postma and Noordanus (1996), can be justified insofar as the independent-
rater‟s reports were based on careful offline analyses of digital recordings whereby tokens 
were replayed as often as necessary in order to arrive at as reliable a judgment as possible. 
Unlike the combined analysis of vigilance, this analysis included only words containing 
primed-for onset errors (as identified by the independent-rater). Self-ratings of these same 
words were then classified as „accurate‟ or „inaccurate‟ according to whether or not they 
exactly matched the independent rater‟s rating. The dependent variable was thus the ratio of 
accurate to inaccurate self-ratings.  
In the combined analysis of accuracy, there were fewer eligible self-reported primed-for 
errors on Word 3 compared to the combined analysis of vigilance (118 compared to 244)
16
, 
so to compensate for this, we decided to additionally include primed-for errors on Words 2. 




 The meta-analysis of vigilance contained 126 self-reported primed-for errors that were not 
coded as primed-for errors by the independent rater, and were thus not eligible for the accuracy 
analysis. The majority of these were errors in which the independent rater had identified both the 
onset and rime as different to the target word, but had been self-reported by the participant as only 
differing on the onset.  
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This provided an extra 22 self-reported and 41 rater-reported errors and so helped increase 
its power. However, it meant that the influence of the lexical status of error-outcomes on 
error likelihood could not be tested (because lexicality of error outcomes was not controlled 
for on Word 2). In addition to the predictors tested in the corresponding combined analysis 
of vigilance, an additional predictor for „total errors‟ (the total number of independent-rater 
reported errors across the four iterations of the tongue-twister sequence in which the primed-
for error occurred) was also tested. This extra predictor, the value of which could range from 
zero to sixteen, was added to test whether participants found it more difficult to accurately 
recall their errors when the overall density of errors on a tongue-twister was higher.  
Results 
Once random variance was accounted for, the best-fit model predicting the accuracy of 
self-reporting included the following predictors: total rater-reported errors; similarity; 
metronome; and the similarity by metronome interaction (improvement due to adding the 
similarity by metronome interaction: χ
2
(1)= 7.16 p=.007. Masking did not significantly 
improve the model: χ
2
(1)= 3.31 p=.69. Although addition of the masking by similarity 
interaction did further improve the model χ
2
(2)= 6.09 p=.048, the coefficient for the 
interaction was not reliable: p=.132, so masking and its interaction with similarity have been 
left out of the model cited below. 
The coefficients for the best-fit model are shown in Table 6-12.  The coefficient for total 
errors reveals that primed-for errors were less accurately self-reported by participants when 
they occurred in tongue-twister sequences that contained more (rater-reported) errors overall. 
On average, there were three rater-reported errors (of any kind in any position) across the 
four iterations of each tongue-twister sequence included in the analysis. After taking random 
effects into account, for each extra (rater-reported) error that occurred, participants were only 
0.8 (e-0.22) times as likely to accurately self-report the error.   
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Independently of the effect of the total number of errors, the coefficients for similarity, 
metronome, and their interaction further revealed that the accuracy of self-reporting was also 
influenced by the similarity of the onset-phonemes in a tonguetwister, and that the size of 
this effect differed depending on the type of metronome used.  With an acoustic metronome, 
errors in tongue-twisters with similar onsets were 0.3 (e 
-1.20
) times as likely to be correctly 
recognised compared to those with dissimilar onsets, whereas with a visual metronome the 
likelihood of similar onset errors being correctly recognised was not reliably different to the 
likelihood of dissimilar onset errors being correctly recognised (p=.134).  
Table 6-12. Combined analysis Experiments 1-3. Accuracy of Self Reporting. 







(coefficient = 0) 
Overt speech: accuracy of self-reporting primed-for errors    
Intercept 3 rater-reported errors*,  
dissimilar onsets,  
acoustic metronome, 
0.83 0.46 .069 
Total errors reported by Independent 
rater 
+1 -0.22 0.09 .013 * 
similarity similar onsets -1.20 0.51 .019 * 
Metronome (visual) visual metronome -0.68 0.61 .264 
Similarity by metronome (visual)  1.86 0.68 .006 ** 
*For ease of interpretation, the predictor for total errors is centred on its mean (of 3). 
                          
Discussion 
The above combined analysis of participants‟ self-reporting accuracy reveals, 
unsurprisingly, that self-reporting accuracy declines as overall error-density increases, 
suggesting that participants had more difficulty recalling the details of the primed-for errors 
they made on the tongue-twisters in which they made more errors overall. Of particular 
interest is the finding that when an acoustic metronome was used, self-reporting accuracy of 
primed-for errors involving similar onset phonemes was significantly lower than self-
reporting accuracy of errors involving dissimilar onset phonemes, whereas when a visual 
metronome was used, the difference between similar and dissimilar conditions was not 
significant.  Figure 6-2, below, shows a graphical representation of the fitted model for 
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accuracy in the four conditions (in terms of percentages of errors correctly recognised) for 
tongue-twisters containing an average number of rater-reported errors.    
There were also signs of a similar (although not significant) trend suggesting a reduction 
in self-reporting accuracy for tongue-twisters with similar onsets under conditions of 
auditory masking. These findings provide some preliminary evidence to suggest that similar-
phoneme substitution errors may be somewhat harder for speakers to accurately identify than 
dissimilar-phoneme substitution errors when auditory feedback is prevented or when the 
participant‟s attention is distracted by a secondary acoustic signal (such as an acoustic 
metronome).   
 
Figure 6-2. Experiments 1 to 3: The accuracy of self-reporting of primed-for errors on 
Words 2 and 3. 
Influence of metronome type and the similarity of onset-phonemes. Fitted values are 
from the model presented in Table 6-12. The columns show percentages for an 
average tonguetwister sequence containing 3 rater-reported errors (of any kind) 





















































Taken together with the findings from the previous combined analysis (of self-reporting 
vigilance) these findings show that even when participants did identify errors they had made, 
they frequently failed to accurately report them. It is noteworthy that the reduction in 
accuracy of self-reporting was not accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the size of 
the self-reported phonemic-similarity bias (in either overt or inner speech).    This suggests 
that participants were aware of the ABBA alternating pattern of the tongue-twister word 
onsets, and may have tended to use a situation-specific monitoring criterion: „did I get the 
onsets mixed up?‟. It could be that they only monitored for exact matches of words if and 
when auditory monitoring was unimpeded (i.e. no masking and no distracting metronome 
beat). Such an approach to monitoring is broadly in line with the (Hartsuiker et al., 2005) 
„smart monitor‟ account of self-monitoring (see also Nooteboom, 2005b). 
6.6.3. Self-reported errors: Lexical bias and Phonemic 
similarity. 
As with the individual experiments, we performed two separate combined analyses of 
participants‟ self-reported errors: on Word 3 inner & overt speech combined; on Word 3 
inner speech in isolation. Together these meta- analyses tested the effects of overtness, 
lexicality, and similarity and relevant interactions on the likelihood of participants self-
reporting primed-for errors.  We also tested a further factorial predictor: metronome (with 2 
levels: visual and acoustic) to determine what (if any) effect the type of metronome had on 
the likelihood of participants self-reporting primed-for errors.  
Results 
In the combined analysis of primed-for errors on Word 3 (inner & overt speech 
combined), once random variance was accounted for, the best-fit model included predictors 
of lexicality and similarity and the lexicality by similarity interaction (improvement due to 
adding the lexicality by similarity interaction: χ
2
(1)= 7.18 p=.007, The model was not 
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significantly improved by the addition of experiment  or by its interactions with lexicality or 
similarity (all χ
2
(4)≤ 2.46, ps≥.651); nor was it improved by the addition of overtness: χ
2
(1)= 
2.62 p=.106, or by the overtness by similarity interaction: χ
2
(2)= 2.63, p=.269. Nor was it 
significantly improved by addition of metronome or any other two or three-way interaction 
(all ps≥.128).  
The model coefficients (see Table 6-13) show that, regardless of overtness and masking, 
and taking random effects into account, errors resulting in real-word outcomes were more 
likely to be self-reported, and errors involving substitutions of similar onset phonemes were 
also more likely to be self-reported. More specifically, for errors with non-word outcomes, 
those involving substitutions of similar onset phonemes were 4.7 (= e1.55) times as likely to be 
self-reported than those involving substitutions of dissimilar onset phonemes, whereas for 
errors with real-word outcomes, those involving substitutions of similar onset phonemes 
were 1.9 times (= e0.62) as likely to be self-reported than those involving substitutions of 
dissimilar onset phonemes.  
When inner speech was analyzed in isolation, the best fit model included effects of 
lexicality, and similarity (improvement due to adding the similarity predictor: χ
2
(1)= 15.54 
p<.001). Addition of the lexicality by similarity interaction only marginally further improved 
the model, χ
2
(1)= 3.31 p=.069. Addition of experiment did not improve the model: χ
2
(2)= 
1.55 p=.461. The coefficients of the best-fitting model are shown in Table 6-13. They show 
that participants were 4.1 times as likely to report errors resulting in words and 2.2 times as 
likely to report the substitutions of similar phonemes. See Figure 6-3(a) for a graphical 
representation self-reported errors in inner speech derived from the fitted model. (for 
comparison, Figure 6-3(b) & (c) on page 118 show the equivalent fitted models for overt self 
reported errors in isolation and for overt independent-rater reported errors in isolation) 
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Table 6-13. Combined analyses of Experiments 1-3. Predictors of self-reported errors: 
Model Coefficients and Probabilities for Best Fitting Models.  








Inner vs. overt speech, Word 3 onset errors 
(Intercept) nonword outcome, 
dissimilar onsets 
-6.33 0.25 <.001 *** 
Lexicality real word outcomes 1.59 0.23 <.001 *** 
Similarity similar onsets 1.55 0.23 <.001 *** 
Lexicality by similarity interaction  -0.93 0.26 .013 * 
 
Inner speech only, Word 3 onset errors 
    
(Intercept) nonword, dissimilar, -6.04 0.28 <.001 *** 
Lexicality real word outcomes 1.24 0.25 <.001 *** 
Similarity similar onsets 0.78 0.22 <.001 *** 
 
Combined analyses: summary of key findings 
Taken together, the results from the three combined analyses show the following: (a) 
Across experiments and conditions, participants‟ vigilance of self-reporting remained stable; 
(b) Compared to a visual metronome, use of an acoustic metronome resulted in a significant 
reduction in accuracy of self-reporting of primed-for errors, but only when such errors 
involved the substitution of similar onset phonemes. It also led to a marginal increase in 
speech-error rates; (c) Significant similarity and lexical biases were present in both inner and 




Figure 6-3. Primed for errors on Word 3: (a) inner speech (self-
reports); (b) overt self-reports; and (c) overt independent rater 
reports.  
Columns show the percentage of utterances (of Word 3) that 
were rated as containing primed-for errors, after adjusting for 
random participant and item variance. Fitted values are from the 
model presented in Table 6-11 and, to enable a direct 
comparison, from a model of inner speech that includes the 























































6.7. Experiments 1 to 3: General discussion 
In these first three experiments we set out to determine; (a) whether the Oppenheim and 
Dell paradigm provides a reliable means of investigating the inner speech of people who 
stutter; (b) whether (or to what extent) participants under-report their errors when reciting 
tongue-twisters in the paradigm;  and (c) whether under-reporting of errors occurs to similar 
extents across different conditions.  
6.7.1. Monitoring vigilance and the under-reporting of errors 
We performed three comparable experiments, with three separate (but similar) groups of 
first-year psychology students. In all three experiments, participants self-reported fewer 
overt primed-for errors than were reported by the independent rater. This was reflected most 
clearly by the strong main effect of rater in the corresponding combined analysis. The 
absence of any interactions between predictors for rater and experiment in that combined 
analysis further confirmed that under-reporting occurred to a similar extent in all three 
experiments, whereas the lack of any other interactions involving rater in the individual 
analyses further suggested that the extent of under-reporting of overt errors was also 
remarkably stable across conditions within experiments.  
Furthermore, the complete lack, in any of the analyses or combined analyses, of 
interactions of rater or masking with either similarity or lexicality, strongly suggests that 
under-reporting of overt primed-for errors did not impact upon the relative frequency with 
which different types of errors were reported in overt speech. Taken together, these results 
indicate that, if participants‟ under-reporting of overt primed-for errors in these experiments 
stemmed from the reduced salience of the errors they made, it must have involved 
dimensions of salience that were not manipulated in the current set of experiments.  
The negative effects of an acoustic metronome on the accuracy of self-reporting suggest 
that participants are more likely to pay attention to the precise details of errors made when 
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there are no other auditory stimuli to distract them, whereas when distracted by an auditory 
metronome, participants were particularly likely to misreport the codas of errors with 
phonemically-similar onsets, despite still correctly identifying their onsets.  
6.7.2. Error biases in overt and inner speech 
In all three experiments lexical biases and phonemic-similarity biases were present in 
both inner and overt speech.  Although in Experiment 1 the similarity bias in inner speech 
was not reliable for errors with real-word outcomes, in the combined analysis of inner speech 
data from Experiments 1, 2 and 3 it was reliable, suggesting that Experiment 1 may have 
lacked sufficient power due to the small numbers of errors elicited. 
Although the findings of each of the three experiments described here are consistent with 
each other, they differ substantially from the findings of Oppenheim and Dell (2008) with 
respect to the similarity bias: Oppenheim and Dell (2008) only found a significant phonemic-
similarity bias in overt speech. The findings of our three experiments are, however, 
somewhat more similar to those of the subsequent study by Oppenheim and Dell (2010), 
which found a phonemic-similarity bias in inner speech. However, unlike our studies, the 
Oppenheim and Dell (2010) study also found a similarity by overtness interaction (the inner-
speech similarity bias was significantly weaker than the overt similarity bias).  
Our use of Oppenheim and Dell‟s own set of tongue-twisters (in Experiment 2), seems to 
rule out the possibility that the differences in the findings of our two labs were related to the 
tongue-twisters used. Our finding that an acoustic metronome resulted in a reduction in self-
reporting accuracy and a marginal increase in errors suggests that the differences in our labs 
findings may have been related to the type of metronome used. However, in the absence of 
any fully satisfactory explanations for this difference, it seems that further empirical studies 
are needed before this issue can be resolved.  
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6.7.3. Evidence of interactivity and under-specification in the 
speech plan 
Irrespective of the differences between our own experimental findings (outlined in this 
chapter) and those of Oppenheim and Dell (2008), the overall finding of error biases in inner 
speech that resemble those found in overt speech (rather than being in the opposite direction) 
arguably best fits a model of speech production that attributes the biases (in both the self 
reports and independent-rater reports) directly to the functioning of the speech-production 
mechanism rather than to the results of under-reporting and covert error repair. That is not to 
say that participants didn‟t under-report their onset-substitution errors. On the contrary, the 
relatively lower numbers of self-reports of those errors compared to rater reports clearly 
shows that they did. Rather, the stability of the error biases across conditions and rater-type 
indicates that the extent of this under-reporting was not significantly affected by the salience 
of those errors.  
The phonemic similarity bias in participants‟ (self-reports of) inner-speech errors 
constitutes the clearest evidence of the presence in the speech plan of a preponderance of 
phonological-encoding errors involving similar-phoneme substitutions. The findings of the 
current experiments thus strongly suggest that inner speech is specified at a featural level, 
even when there is no intention to articulate it overtly.  
Whether or not inner speech is fully specified at sub-phonemic levels when there is no 
intention to articulate it overtly, remains an open question. In this regard, it is quite possible 
that more than one sub-phonemic level of encoding may exist. For example, there may be an 
acoustic and an articulatory level of features and, conceivably, the similarity bias may result 
from activation of (and/or) feedback from only the acoustic level, whereas articulatory 




The presence of robust lexical biases in self-reports of both inner and overt speech is 
fully in line with the findings of Oppenheim and Dell (2008, 2010). Finding a lexical bias in 
inner-speech strongly suggests that inner speech contains a predominance of phonological 
encoding errors that result in the production of real words (compared to non-words). The 
lexical bias found in onset errors in inner speech can only be explained (parsimoniously) by 
a feedback account as outlined in Section 4.5.3.  
6.7.4. Covert editing and error repair 
If covert editing and/or error repair had occurred to a significant extent in Experiments 1 
to 3, we would have expected relatively more similar-phoneme substitution errors and errors 
resulting in the production of real words to have been self-reported in overt speech compared 
to in inner speech (in other words both the lexical and similarity biases should have been 
stronger in overt than in inner speech). This is because, in the inner-speech condition, 
participants would have self-reported whatever inner speech errors they perceived, whereas 
in the overt speech condition they would have only self-reported the ones that were not 
successfully edited-out prior to articulation.  The above pattern was, however, not what we 
found. The most probable reason for the absence of any signs of covert editing or error repair 
is that participants simply did not engage in it to a significant extent in this paradigm. Their 
failure to do so may have been due to the time-pressure exerted by the need to speak in time 
to the metronome beat.  
6.8. Experiments 1 to 3: Conclusions 
Across three experiments, phonemic similarity and lexical biases were found in errors 
reported in both inner and overt speech. With respect to overt speech, the magnitude of these 
biases was similar in both self-reports and independent-rater reports, although overall, the 
independent rater consistently reported more errors than did the participants themselves.  
Together, these findings best fit a model of speech production that incorporates activation 
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feedback between feature and phoneme levels as well as between phoneme and lexical levels 
of encoding, with the presence of such feedback being independent of the intention to 
articulate. The findings also suggest that under-reporting of errors by participants was 
consistently evident in participants‟ overt speech. The extent of under-reporting was not, 
however, influenced by the mode of reporting (written or typed), by the type of metronome 
used (acoustic or visual), by the presence or absence of auditory masking, by the tongue-
twisters used, by the similarity of their onset-phonemes or by the lexicality of the primed-for 
error outcomes.    
Having established that our adaptation of the Oppenheim and Dell paradigm produces 
consistent results across comparable groups of participants, and in particular that the patterns 
of onset errors self-reported by participants in their inner speech remain stable (provided the 
experiments are conducted „within lab‟); we are able to conclude that the paradigm 
constitutes a reliable experimental procedure for investigating phonemic errors that occur in 
inner speech. In the next experiment we therefore employ the procedure on a group of 







7. Experiment 4: Comparing encoding errors of 
stutterers and normally-fluent controls. 
7.1. Introduction 
In the three experiments described in Chapter 6, we tested the reliability and validity of 
the Oppenheim and Dell (2008) tongue-twister paradigm as a means of investigating the 
frequency with which errors of phonological encoding arise in the speech plans of normally-
fluent speakers, and the extent to which speakers are aware of these errors prior to the onset 
of overt articulation. Using our own adaptation of the paradigm we, were able to demonstrate 
that the performances of three closely matched groups of normally-fluent participants did not 
differ significantly from one another with respect to: (a) the likelihood of phonemic errors 
occurring in their overt speech; (b) the likelihood of them self-reporting phonemic errors (in 
inner and overt speech); and (c) the magnitude of the phonemic-similarity and lexical biases 
in those errors and self-reports.  
Having established in our own lab that the paradigm produces similar results across 
similar participant groups, in the current experiment (Experiment 4) we made use of the 
same paradigm to compare the performance of a group of people who stutter, with that of a 
group of matched, normally-fluent controls. The primary aim of Experiment 4 was to test the 
first tenet of the Covert Repair Hypothesis (Postma & Kolk, 1993): that stutterers make 
abnormally large numbers of errors of phonological encoding. However, it also investigated 
whether they also make abnormally large numbers of word-order errors, and whether there is 
a relationship between the rate at which they make encoding errors and how disfluent they 
are in everyday speech (as would be predicted if stuttering-like disfluencies stem from covert 
repairs of encoding errors). In order to ensure that our comparisons of the two groups‟ inner-
speech error rates were valid, as in Experiments 1 to 3, we also investigated the two groups‟ 
monitoring vigilance and accuracy. 
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As in Experiments 1 to 3, in Experiment 4 we first investigated the vigilance (and 
accuracy) with which participants detected and self-reported their overt errors, and then 
compared the biases in their inner and overt self-reports. However, in the present 
experiment, our particular intention was to compare the performances of the two participant 
groups on these measures. In Experiment 4 we also performed three additional analyses. In 
the first, to maximize the chances of detecting between-group differences in onset-error rates 
we included all onset errors (both primed-for and non-contextual) that occurred – not only on 
Word 3 of the tongue-twisters, but also on Word 2. In the second, we analysed non-
contextual errors in isolation. This was to follow up an empirical observation that between-
group differences in error rates appeared to be strongest of all with respect to non-contextual 
onset errors. Then, in the third additional analysis we investigated whether the likelihood of 
making word-order errors (including word anticipations, perseverations and exchanges) also 
differed between the two groups. These additional analyses allowed us respectively: (a) to 
maximize our chances of finding evidence that participants who stutter have impaired 
phonological encoding compared to normally-fluent speakers; (b) to investigate a proposal 
originally made by Bosshardt (2006), that poor or incomplete modularization of the language 
formulator renders phonological encoding in stutterers vulnerable to noise from processes 
beyond encoding of the current word; and (c)  to investigate whether language encoding in 
stutterers may be impaired in ways other than just phonological encoding.   
Finally, in addition to these main analyses, we also conducted a post-hoc analysis that 
examined whether a correlation could be found between (a) the frequency with which 
individual participants who stutter self-reported onset errors in their inner speech; and (b) the 
frequency of their stuttering-like disfluencies in a variety of every-day speaking tasks. This 
post-hoc analysis was motivated by the second tenet of the CRH: that stuttering-like 
disfluencies stem directly from covert repairs of errors of phonological encoding. If this tenet 
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is correct, we would expect to find a positive correlation between inner-speech errors and the 
frequency of stuttering-like disfluencies. 
In Experiment 4, as in the previous three experiments, participants recited tonguetwisters 
both overtly and in inner speech, and immediately reported any errors they perceived 
themselves making in either condition.  In order to determine whether the two participant 
groups differed in the extent to which they relied on auditory feedback for error detection, 
half of all tonguetwisters were spoken under conditions of auditory masking (following the 
same procedure that was used in Experiment 1 for non-stutterers). The use of auditory 
masking also necessitated the use of a visual (rather than an acoustic) metronome, which was 
therefore adopted throughout. Because participants who stutter may experience difficulty 
with verbal self-reporting of errors, all self-reporting of errors was done by typing, rather 
than speaking.  
To determine monitoring vigilance and the possibility that stutterers differ from 
normally-fluent speakers with respect to monitoring vigilance, participants‟ overt recitations 
were also transcribed and coded by the experimenter. We also took forward digitspan 
measurements for all participants, in order to control for differences in the two participant 
groups‟ abilities to remember the tonguetwisters and to remember (and thus accurately self-
report) their errors.  
7.2. Method 
7.2.1. Participants 
Thirty-two participants who stutter (eight male) and thirty-two controls (nine male) 
matched for age, and education took part in the experiment. Participants were recruited 
through the University of Edinburgh student employment service and experimental subject-
pool. Participants who stutter were additionally recruited through stuttering self-help groups, 
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and some controls were recruited through an internet employment website.  All participants 
were native speakers of English.  PWS had a mean age of 38 (range 18 to 71); for PNS, the 
mean was 39 (range 18 to 68).  Mean education level (on a scale where 1 corresponds to 
General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) or equivalent, and 5 indicates a 
postgraduate degree) was 3.00 for stutterers and 2.97 for controls. Twelve participants from 
each of the groups were university students; four of the stuttering and five of the control 
group were retired. There was a marginal difference between the two groups in forward digit 
span: mean digit span for stutterers was 6.6, and for controls, 7.2 (t 62 = 1.67; p =.061).  
All participants completed Section 3a of the Overall Assessment of the Speaker‟s 
Experience of Stuttering  (OASES; Yaruss & Quesal, 2006), in which respondents rate their 
current difficulty in communicating verbally on a five-point scale in each of 10 commonly 
occurring situations.  These include, for example, talking with another person one to one, 
initiating conversations, speaking to strangers, and continuing to speak regardless of how 
your listener responds to you. Mean scores for the OASES section 3a (communication 
difficulty) were: stutterers = 27.6; controls = 19.7 (t (62) = 4.62 p <.001).  In addition to 
these ten OASES 3a questions relating to general communication difficulty, participants 
additionally provided ratings of “fluency difficulty” in the same ten situations. Specifically, 
for each situation, they were asked to rate how difficult it is to speak fluently, without 
stuttering and without avoiding words. Mean scores for fluency difficulty ratings were: 
stutterers = 31.9; controls = 18.0 (t (62) = 8.65 p <.001) 
For all participants who stutter, full SSI4 (Riley, 2009) stuttering severity measures were 
derived from video recordings of samples of their spontaneous conversation and reading out 
loud. Mean SSI4 score was 20.7; range 8 to 36. Control participants only completed the 
reading portion of the above assessment.  Mean number of SLDs per hundred syllables on 
the reading task was: stutterers 6.08 range 1.3 to 24; controls 0.43 range 0 to 1.85; (t (62) = 
4.15 p <.001). 
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Apart from stuttering, participants reported no other speech, language, hearing or visual 
impairments.  
7.2.2. Materials  
 The experimental materials were identical to those used in Experiment 1 (See  
Appendix A).  They consisted of four-word tonguetwister sequences. The onsets of each 
tonguetwister sequence followed an „ABBA‟ pattern to induce onset-phoneme substitution 
errors, e.g. pink bid bit pick. As in Experiment 1, to enable additional analyses of phonemic 
and lexical influences on speech errors, we created four variants of each tonguetwister 
sequence, and divided these between four lists, each list containing 48 tonguetwisters. Each 
participant recited tonguetwisters from just one of these lists (i.e. each participant recited 48 
tonguetwisters). Every tonguetwister sequence was recited an equal number of times under 
identical conditions by (an equal number of) participants from both groups.  
  As in Experiment 1, within each list, half of the tonguetwisters were assigned to the 
auditory masking condition. Because auditory masking was blocked, four versions of each 
list were drawn up such that, in the experiment as a whole, all tonguetwisters appeared 
equally in masked and unmasked, and masking-first and masking-last conditions. Finally, 
two versions of each of the resultant 16 lists were created. In both versions, half of the 
tonguetwisters were marked for overt recitation and the other half for silent (inner-speech) 
recitation. Those that were marked for overt recitation in one version were marked for silent 
(inner speech) recitation in the other. This resulted in 32 lists of experimental items in a fully 
counterbalanced design.  
 Auditory masking was achieved using computer-generated pink noise, delivered 
through a set of Panasonic RP-HT225 stereo headphones. Participants‟ overt recitations of 
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the tonguetwisters were captured on a Zoom H2 digital recorder and analyzed using Praat 
software  (Boersma & Weenink, 2009). 
7.2.3. Procedure.  
The procedure was the same as the procedure in Experiment 1, with the exception that 
participants typed, rather than verbally reported, the details of any errors they perceived 
themselves to have made.  Self-reporting through typing followed the same procedure as in 
Experiment 3 (See Section 6.5). The primary reason for adopting typing as the method of 
self-reporting was to remove the possibility that stuttering (or fear of stuttering) while 
verbally self-reporting may have led stuttering participants to under-report their errors. 
Moreover, difficulty providing verbal self-reports may reduce the accuracy with which 
stuttering participants self-reported their errors.  
Prior to beginning the experiment, participants underwent a computer-led tutorial and 
practice session, which included full instructions concerning the inner speech and overt 
speech procedures. In all conditions, participants were instructed to place highest priority on 
speaking in time to the (visual) metronome, not to worry about making mistakes, and simply 
to skip words they felt likely to stutter on.  For the inner-speech recitations, to prevent them 
from attempting to mouth sequences silently, participants were instructed not to move their 
mouths or any muscles associated with speech and, if possible, to keep their mouths 
completely closed.   
At the beginning of each masked block, participants were instructed to adjust the 
headphones to ensure that the loudness of the pink noise prevented them from hearing the 
sound of their own voice. It was emphasized that participants should speak the overt 
tonguetwisters as quietly as possible throughout the masked block. The experimenter 
observed participants throughout the experiment and reminded them, where necessary, to 
adhere to the above instructions.   
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Tonguetwister sequences were presented in the same way as in Experiment 1 (See 
Section 6.2.1). However, after the (visual) metronome prompts for each of the four testing-
phase recitations of each tongue-twister ended (i.e. 500 ms after the appearance of the fourth 
dash), the prompt disappeared, the pink noise (if any) ended, and the tonguetwister sequence 
reappeared at the top of the screen, together with an instruction to “type any errors and then 
press ENTER to continue” at the bottom. If participants perceived themselves to have made 
an error during a particular recitation, they were instructed to type, as fully as possible, what 
they had actually said, for example “rag lap rash rap” (when they should have said “rag lap 
lash rap”). They were instructed to type one or more question-marks in the relevant places if 
they could not remember what they had said for a word or „X‟s if they had completely 
omitted all or part of a word. Once errors, if any, had been reported, pressing ENTER started 
the next four-dash sequence. Each performance phase included four repetitions of the four 
dashes, before the familiarization phase for the next word sequence began. (This self-
reporting procedure was identical to the procedure adopted in Experiment 3) 
As in the previous experiments, in addition to participants' self-reports of their inner and 
overt speech errors, the experimenter independently identified and transcribed errors in the 
overt speech condition (this was done online and then double-checked from recordings). 
Recordings from a random sample of five PWS and five PNS were transcribed a second time 
by the experimenter prior to analysis to enable intra-rater reliability to be calculated.  
7.2.4. Coding 
Errors were coded into four categories: (1) primed-for onset errors; (2) non-contextual 
onset errors; (3) word-order errors; and (4) other/ambiguous errors. Errors were only 
ascribed to one of the first three categories if they were not in any way ambiguous. Thus, for 
example, the primed-for onset-error category only included instances where a „B‟ word onset 
(i.e. the onset of words 2 or 3) was substituted by an „A‟ word onset but the coda remained 
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unchanged. The non-contextual onset-error category only included instances where a „B‟ 
word onset was substituted by a non-contextual onset phoneme but the coda remained 
unchanged. Instances where the onset error resulted in production of one of the „A‟ words 
(e.g. „dock dock notch dodge‟ instead of „dock knock notch dodge‟) were excluded, although 
such instances were rare because, in all but a few tonguetwisters, the codas of each of the 
four words differed. 
As in the previous experiments, since the majority of errors occurred on words 2 and 3 
(the „B‟ words), counts of onset errors only included these words. This ensured that onset-
exchange errors were only counted once. Counts of word-order errors included all four word 
positions, where one of the four words in the tonguetwister was either uttered twice, or 
exchanged positions with one of the other four words. Instances where the position change 
could potentially be accounted for as a result of a word omission (e.g. „rag lap rack xxxx‟ 
instead of „rag lap lash rack‟) and instances where the order-error could potentially have 
been a coda exchange (e.g. „rag lash lap rack‟ instead of „rag lap lash rack‟) were excluded 
from the counts. In cases where an error was followed by an overt self-repair, only the 
original error was coded for analysis. 
7.2.5. Analyses.  
In total, six analyses were carried out in which the performance of the stuttering group 
was compared to that of the control group on the following measures:  
1. The vigilance of self-reporting (Word 3 only). 
2. The accuracy of self-reporting (Words 2 and 3). 
3. The size and direction of lexical and phonemic-similarity biases (Word 3 only). 
4. Likelihood of making an onset error of any kind (Words 2 and 3).  
5. Likelihood of making a non-contextual onset error (Words 2 and 3). 
6. Likelihood of making a word-order error (Words 2 and 3). 
133 
 
For all analyses we generated base models which included an intercept, and random 
effects representing by-participant and by-item intercept variation. Because t-tests revealed a 
marginal difference between the two participant-groups‟ mean digitspan scores, digitspan 
was controlled for by including it as a fixed effect in all analyses. We then proceeded to add 
further predictors stepwise to each model under consideration.  As in the previous 
experiments, selection of models was based on two criteria. First, using χ
2
 tests to compare 
model likelihood ratios, we assessed whether the fit of the model to the data was improved 
(as indicated by a significant decrease in the model likelihood ratio) by the addition of each 
predictor. (With the exception of digitspan, predictors were retained only if the current (best) 
model was improved). Second, where two or more predictors each significantly improved 
the current model, we selected the model which had the smallest log-likelihood. Once 
relevant predictors and their interactions had been exhaustively explored, the resulting model 
represented the „best fit‟ to the data, being a model which could not be improved by the 
addition of further predictors. 
7.3. Results 
7.3.1. Descriptive statistics 
Out of a total of 12,288 four-word tonguetwisters (48 tonguetwisters, each repeated four 
times by 64 participants) 1773 errors of any type  were transcribed by the independent rater 
from recordings of participants‟ overt speech (PWS=1176, controls=597), whereas 
participants self-reported 1230 (PWS=821, controls=409) errors in overt and 971 
(PWS=620, controls=351) in inner speech.  
Primed-for onset-phoneme substitution errors (Word 3).   
For participants who stutter (PWS), one-hundred-and-thirty of the errors transcribed 
by the independent rater from recordings of participants‟ overt speech were unambiguous 
onset-phoneme substitution errors (cases in which the onset of Word 3 was substituted with 
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that of an A word yet the coda remained unchanged). PWS self-reported 92 such errors in 
overt speech, and 54 in inner speech. Table 7-1 gives a breakdown of errors by experimental 
condition. Figure 7-1 depicts the same data, together with that from controls, collapsed (a) 
across masking and lexicality of outcome and (b) across masking and similarity of onset. 
Table 7-1. Experiment 4, PWS: Onset Substitutions on Word 3 
  Similar onsets  Dissimilar onsets 
Error outcome  Unmasked Masked (Total)  Unmasked Masked (Total) 
Self-reports  

















































For controls, fifty-two of the errors transcribed by the independent rater from 
recordings of participants‟ overt speech were unambiguous onset-phoneme substitution 
errors. Controls self-reported 35 such errors in overt speech, and 33 in inner speech. Table 
7-2 gives a breakdown of errors by experimental condition (See also Figure 7-1). 
Table 7-2 Experiment 4: Controls, Onset Substitutions on Word 3 
  Similar onsets  Dissimilar onsets 
Error outcome  Unmasked Masked (Total)  Unmasked Masked (Total) 
Self-reports  


















































     
Figure 7-1. Experiment 4: (a) Phonemic similarity and (b) Lexical biases – on Word 3 onset-substitution error outcomes.  
Columns depict raw numbers of primed-for errors in (a) the similar and dissimilar onset conditions (collapsed across masking and 
lexicality of outcome); and (b) real-word and non-word outcome conditions (collapsed across masking and similarity of onset). In each 
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7.3.2. Vigilance of self-reporting 
This analysis investigated whether the type of rater (self-rater or independent rater) 
influenced the likelihood of errors being reported, and whether there was a difference 
between the two participant groups with respect to how vigilant they were in self-reporting 
errors.  The independent rater‟s ratings were considered to constitute a stable baseline. To 
establish whether the two participant-groups differed with respect to vigilance of self-
reporting we used a (binomial) predictor: group, with values of 1 or 0 to represent 
participants who stutter and control participants respectively.  In addition to estimating 
overall vigilance, we also checked whether vigilance was affected by the addition of (a) 
masking; (b) similarity of onset phonemes: and (c) lexical status of the reported error (i.e. 
whether or not it constituted a real word). 
After controlling for digitspan, the following fixed predictors were tested (in a forward 
stepwise manner):   
 Masking, 
 Overtness, 
 Rater-type, with 2 levels (experimenter-rating or self-rating), 
 Group, with 2 levels (control or participant who stutters), 
 two and three-way interactions. 
The main interactions of interest were: group by rater-type (to clarify whether compared 
to controls, PWS self-report a greater proportion of their overt errors); and the three-way 
interactions containing group, rater-type and a third predictor (masking, lexicality or 
similarity) 
The best fitting model comparing overt self- and independent-rater ratings of onset errors 
included the effects of rater, digitspan, lexicality, similarity, group,  and the lexicality by 
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group interaction: Improvement due to addition of rater: χ
2
 (1) = 6.59, p =.010. Adding the 
rater by group interaction did not further improve the model: (χ
2
 (1) = 0.00, p =.980), neither 
did the addition of any other two or three-way interactions: all ps ≥.253.  
Details of the model coefficients are given in Table 7-3. Regarding the vigilance of self-
reporting, the coefficient for rater indicates that, after controlling for random (participant 
and item) variance and irrespective of all other factors, participants (in both groups) only 
self-reported 0.64 (e
-0.45
) times as many primed-for errors as did the independent rater. 
Amongst other things, the coefficients also reveal significant similarity biases (of similar 
magnitudes) in both participant groups‟ recitations. Interestingly, however, lexical bias was 
only present to a significant degree in the recitations of participants who stutter: more 
specifically, participants who stutter were 2.6 (e
0.95
) times more likely to make (or self-
report) errors with real-word outcomes than errors with non-word outcomes, whereas 
controls were not (reliably) more likely more likely to do so.  
Table 7-3.  Experiment 4: Vigilance of self-reporting of error biases.  
Model Coefficients and Probabilities for Best Fitting Models. (see Appendix B Section 




Std. Error p 
(coefficient = 0) 
Overt speech (participants vs. independent rater), Word 3 onset errors 




dissimilar onsets  
-5.69 0.32 <.001 *** 
Digitspan +1 -0.21 0.11 .043 * 
Rater  Self rating -0.45 0.12 <.001 *** 
Group PWS 0.85 0.34 .013 * 
Lexicality real word 0.38 0.23 .104  
Similarity similar 1.22 0.14 <.001 *** 
Group by Lexicality interaction real word & similar 0.57 0.28 .043 * 
Note. In the equivalent model containing random slopes, the Group by Lexicality 




The Lack of a significant 3-way group by rater by lexicality interaction indicates that 
this between-group difference with regard to lexicality was not due to control participants 
under-reporting their overt errors. 
7.3.3. Accuracy of self reporting  
Although the above analysis of self-reporting vigilance show that both PWS and PNS 
were around 0.64 times as likely to report primed-for onset errors as was the experimenter, 
they do not provide information on accuracy: There were, for example, some instances when 
a participant reported having made a different error from the one that was coded by the 
experimenter.  
This second set of analyses therefore focussed on the accuracy with which individual 
overt errors were reported by participants, i.e. the extent to which participants‟ self-reports 
exactly matched the experimenter‟s transcriptions from recordings. 
For this analysis we recoded all instances of onset errors that had been identified by the 
experimenter and marked each one as a „match‟ if it was identical to the participant‟s self-
report, or a „mismatch‟ if it differed or was not reported by the participant.  We also counted 
false alarms (i.e. instances where the participant self reported an error which the 
experimenter coded as correct). However, since there were only eight of these in total they 
have been disregarded. To allow for a more powerful statistical analysis, we counted all 
primed-for as well as non-contextual onset errors that occurred on Words 2 and 3. This 
analysis is directly comparable to the equivalent combined analysis of accuracy in 




Table 7-4. Experiment 4: Accuracy of participants’ coding of onset errors (words 2 and 










rater reported errors 
False alarms 

























Note: Percentages represent the percentage of experimenter reports that were also 
self-reported (in an identical manner) by participants.  
 
In addition to the predictors tested in the corresponding combined analysis of vigilance, 
an additional predictor for „total errors‟ (the total number of independent-rater reported 
errors across the four iterations of the tongue-twister sequence in which the primed-for error 
occurred) was also tested. This extra predictor, the value of which could range from zero to 
sixteen, was added to test whether participants found it more difficult to accurately recall 
their errors when the overall density of errors on a tongue-twister was higher.  
After controlling for digitspan, the best fitting model of included only total errors (the 
total number of experimenter-coded errors, of any type, in the tonguetwister) as a predictor 
of the likelihood of participants‟ ratings exactly matching the independent rater‟s ratings. 
The model was not significantly improved by the addition of masking (χ
2
 = 2.67, p = .102), 
and, most importantly, the model was not improved by adding group membership as a 
predictor (χ
2
 = 0.04, p = .837) or any of the interaction terms that include group membership 
(all ps ≥ .140). This implies that, across experimental conditions, the two groups did not 
differ with respect to the likelihood that they would accurately report errors. Model 
coefficients are shown in Table 7-5. They show that, irrespective of which group participants 
belonged to, the likelihood of their reports of primed-for errors identically matching those of 
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the experimenter diminished by a factor of 0.8 (e
-0.21
) with each additional error (of any kind) 
that occurred during the four recitations of a tonguetwister. 
Table 7-5. Experiment 4: Logistic mixed effects analyses of factors influencing the 
likelihood of participants accurately identifying onset errors.  
(See Appendix B Section 12.2, for equivalent analysis with random slopes) 
 
7.3.4. Self-reports 
 Comparisons of inner and overt speech.   
This third set of analyses investigated participants‟ self-reports in inner and overt speech. 
These analyses are equivalent to the analyses carried out in Experiments 1 to 3, and enabled 
us to compare the magnitude of the lexical and phonemic-similarity biases in inner vs. overt 
speech. They additionally tested whether the two participant groups differed with respect to 
the size and direction of the error-biases. 
The analyses of self-reported errors in inner and overt speech tested the following 
binomial predictors and interactions:  
 Group (participant who stutters or control), 
 overtness (whether or not participants were speaking aloud), 
 lexicality (whether an onset substitution would result in a real word), 
 similarity (whether the substituted phonemes differed by one feature or 
more),  
o lexicality by similarity interaction, 
Predictor Value Coefficient Std. Error p 
(coefficient = 0) 
likelihood of accurately identifying an error (onset errors) 
(Intercept) Digitspan = 7  
Total errors (across all four 
iterations tongue-twister) = 3 
0.22 0.17 .204 * 
digitspan +1 -0.10 0.11 .383 
Total errors +1 -0.20 0.08 .010 ** 
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o lexicality by group interaction, 
o similarity by group interaction, 
o lexicality by overtness by group interaction, 
o similarity by overtness by group interaction. 
The best fitting model of self-reported primed-for errors on Word 3 included effects of 
lexicality, similarity, their interaction, overtness and participant group. Improvement due to 
the addition of participant group:  χ
2
(1)= 12.80, p<.001. Adding other two or the three-way 
interactions did not further improve the model: all ps≥.635.  Table 7-6 gives the coefficients 
of the best-fitting model and the probabilities that they differ from zero.  
Table 7-6. Experiment 4: Phonemic-similarity and Lexical biases. Predictors of self-
reported errors. Model Coefficients and Probabilities for Best Fitting Models.  






(coefficient = 0) 
Inner vs. overt speech, Word 3 onset errors 
(Intercept) Digitspan=7 
nonword outcome, 
dissimilar onsets inner 
speech, 
controls 
-6.10 0.32 <.001 *** 
Digitspan +1 -0.18 0.09 .065 
Overtness overt  0.53 0.15 <.001 *** 
Group PWS 0.82 0.26 .002 ** 
Lexicality  word 0.28 0.28 .316 
Similarity similar 0.72 0.26 .006 ** 
Lexicality by similarity 
interaction* 
 0.68 0.33 .042 * 
 







-6.14 0.35 <.001 *** 
Digitspan +1 -.26 0.13 .054 
Lexicality word 0.92 0.25 <.001 *** 
Similarity similar 1.05 0.26 <.001 *** 
 
*Note. In the equivalent model containing random slopes, the Group by Lexicality 




These coefficients show that, once random variance and digitspan is accounted for, 
participants who stutter were approximately 2.3 (e
0.86
) times more likely to report errors than 
control participants. The lack of group by similarity and group by overtness interactions 
suggests that this tendency for participants who stutter to self-report more errors than control 
participants was not significantly different for errors that involved the substitution of similar 
vs. dissimilar onset phonemes; or for errors that were made in inner vs overt speech 
.Inner speech in isolation  
In the analysis of inner speech in isolation, the best fitting model included only lexicality 
and similarity (Improvement due to the addition of similarity, χ
2
(1)=19.40, p<.001, (see 
Table 7-6). The addition of the lexicality by similarity interaction only marginally further 
improved the model χ
2
(1)= 3.68, p=.055. The addition of group did not further improve the 
model χ
2
(1)=2.69, p=.101; nor did any of the two or three-way interactions involving group. 
Thus, with respect to Word 3 alone, participants who stutter did not make reliably more 
primed-for errors in inner speech than control participants. The numbers of these inner-
speech errors were, however, low (PWS: 54, controls: 33) and it is possible that the analysis 
lacked sufficient power. Therefore, in the next analysis, to increase the statistical power, all 
unambiguous onset errors (on Words 2 and 3) were included. 
All onset-phoneme substitution errors 
This fourth set of analyses constituted a further investigation of whether the speech plans 
of participants who stutter contain more errors than those of controls. It focussed, once again, 
on onset errors, but this time all onset errors on Words 2 and 3 were included, including both 
primed-for as well as non-contextual errors. Adding these extra errors meant that we could 
not investigate the effects of lexicality or similarity (and their interactions), but it brought the 
advantage of a substantial increase in statistical power.  
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For this analysis, in addition to random by-participant and by-item variation and 
digitspan, we tested the following predictors and interactions: 
 auditory masking, 
 overtness (whether or not participants were speaking aloud), 
 group (PWS or controls), 
 stuttering-like disfluencies per 100 syllables when reading aloud, 
 self-ratings of difficulty speaking fluently, 
o overtness by group interaction, 
o the two overtness by disfluency interactions. 
Two hundred and thirty four of the errors transcribed by the independent rater from 
recordings of participants‟ overt speech were unambiguous onset-phoneme substitution 
errors (cases in which the onsets of Word 2 or 3 were substituted by a primed-for or non-
contextual phoneme yet the coda remained unchanged). Participants self-reported 160 such 
errors in overt speech, and 121 in inner speech. Table 7-7 gives a breakdown of onset errors 
by experimental condition.  
Table 7-7. Experiment 4: Onset errors in inner and overt speech, stuttering and control 
participants 
  Primed-for  
onset substitutions  
on words 2 & 3 
 Non-contextual  
onset substitutions  
on words 2 & 3 
 Total onset 
substitutions on 
words 2 & 3 
  Un-
masked 
Masked Total  Un-
masked 
Masked Total   
Self-reports  


























































After accounting for random variance and digitspan, the best-fit model for all self-
reported onset errors included effects of overtness and group (improvement due to adding 
group: χ
2
 (1) = 13.87, p <.001). Once again, the group by overtness interaction did not 
improve the model, nor did any other predictors or their interactions: all ps≥ .103. Table 7-8 
gives the coefficients of the model, and the probabilities that they differ from zero.  
Table 7-8. Experiment 4: Logistic mixed effects analyses of factors influencing the 
likelihood of occurrence of all onset errors. Model coefficients and probabilities are 
given for best-fitting models. 








Inner vs. overt speech,  
All onset errors  (Words 2 & 3) 
(Intercept) digitspan=7, controls 
inner speech 
-5.49 0.21 <.001 *** 
Digitspan +1 -0.16 0.08 .041 * 
Group  PWS 0.86 0.22 <.001 *** 
Overtness overt speech 0.36 0.12 .004 ** 
 
Inner speech in isolation 
All onset errors   (Words 2 & 3) 
(Intercept) digitspan=7, controls -5.36 0.23 <.001 *** 
Digitspan +1 -0.14 0.10 .186 
Group  PWS 0.65 0.28 .020 * 
 
After controlling for random variance and for digitspan and irrespective of overtness, 
stuttering participants were 2.37 (i.e. e
0.86
) times more likely than controls to report errors. 




times more likely to 
report errors in the overt condition. An equivalent analysis of inner-speech in isolation this 
time confirmed that, compared to controls, stuttering participants were indeed significantly 
more likely to report onset errors in inner speech (improvement due to adding group:   χ
2
 (1) 
= 5.32, p=.021 (see Table 7-9 for coefficients of the model).  
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Non-contextual onset errors 
Inspection of the raw numbers of self-reported onset errors suggested that participants 
who stutter are especially prone to self-reporting non-contextual onset errors, 
disproportionately so under conditions of auditory masking (see Table 7-7). This observation 
was of interest because a number of studies by Bosshardt and his co-workers (see Bosshardt, 
2006, for a review) has led them to propose that language formulation in stutterers may not 
be sufficiently modularized and may thus be particularly susceptible to phonemic influences 
beyond those involved in formulation of the current target word.  This hypothesis motivated 
us to perform an additional analysis of factors affecting the likelihood of self-reporting non-
contextual onset errors (on Words 2 and 3 combined). Predictors tested were: (digitspan), 
overtness, masking, group, and their interactions.  
In addition to digitspan, the best-fit model for self-reported non-contextual onset errors 
included only the effect of group (improvement due to adding group: χ
2
 (1) = 9.59, p =.002). 
The coefficient for group shows that, after controlling for random (participant and item) 
variance and digitspan, irrespective of overtness, participants who stutter were 5.9 times 
more likely to self-report non-contextual errors than controls (See Table 7-9).   The addition 
of the masking by group interaction only marginally further improved the model: χ
2
 (2) = 
5.51, p =.063). Its coefficient was unreliable. 
Table 7-9. Experiment 4: Logistic mixed effects analyses of factors influencing the 
likelihood of occurrence of non-contextual onset errors. Model coefficients and 
probabilities are given for best-fitting models. 








Inner vs. overt speech,  
Non-contextual onset errors   
(Intercept) digitspan=7 
controls 
-8.99 0.66 <.001 *** 
Digitspan +1 -0.43 0.19 .025 * 





This final set of analyses investigated word-order errors. As with the analyses of onset 
errors, we built two models. The first allowed a comparison of order-error likelihoods in 
inner vs. overt speech. The second analyses inner-speech in isolation, and was constructed to 
provide confirmation of the findings with respect to inner speech.  
One hundred and fifty six of the errors transcribed by the independent rater from 
recordings of participants‟ overt speech were unambiguous word-order errors (where one of 
the four words in the tonguetwister was either uttered twice, or exchanged positions with one 
of the other four words. See Section 7.2.4 for a fuller description). Participants self-reported 
126 such errors in overt speech, and 92 in inner speech. Table 7-10 gives a breakdown of 
word-order errors by experimental condition. 
Table 7-10. Experiment 4: Word-order errors, stuttering and control participants 
  Word-order errors 
  Unmasked Masked (Total) 
Self-reports  






























 For this final analysis, in addition to random by-participant and by-item variation 
and digitspan, we tested the following predictors: 
 auditory masking,  
 overtness (whether or not participants were speaking aloud), 
 group (PWS or controls),  
 stuttering-like disfluencies per 100 syllables when reading aloud,  
 self-ratings of difficulty speaking fluently, 
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o overtness by group interaction, 
o the two overtness by disfluency interactions. 
The analysis of self-reported word-order errors revealed significant effects of digitspan, 
masking, overtness, and group (improvement due to adding group: χ2 (1) = 12.20, p <.001).   
The group by overtness interaction did not further improve the model: χ2 (1) = 2.49, p 
=.114). No other predictors or interactions significantly improved the model: all ps ≥.097.  
The model coefficients are given in  
Table 7-11.  
Table 7-11. Experiment 4: Logistic mixed effects analyses of factors influencing the 
likelihood of occurrence of word-order errors. Model coefficients and probabilities are 
given for best-fitting models.  









Inner vs. overt speech,  







-6.36 0.28 <.001 *** 
Digitspan +1 -0.26 0.10 .006 ** 
Masking masked 0.44 0.14 .002 ** 
Group  PWS 1.11 0.31 <.001 *** 
Overtness  overt speech 0.39 0.12 .006 ** 
 
Inner speech in isolation  






-6.80 0.28 <.001 *** 
Digitspan +1 -0.34 0.11 .003 ** 
Masking masked 0.70 0.23 .003 ** 
Group  PWS 1.42 0.40 <.001 *** 
 
They show a similar pattern to that observed for onset errors: Compared to controls, 
stuttering participants were 3.0 (i.e. e
1.11
) times more likely to self-report errors.  Independent 
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of group, masking or digit span, participants were more likely to report errors in the overt 
condition.  Across both participant groups, masking caused an increase in the numbers of 
self-reported word-order errors, marginally less so with respect to errors in overt speech.  
As with total onset errors, an equivalent analysis of inner-speech in isolation provided 
additional confirmation that, compared to controls, stuttering participants were significantly 
more likely to self-report word-order errors in inner speech:  χ
2
 (1) = 13.49, p <.001. 
7.4. Experiment 4: Discussion 
The most important finding of Experiment 4 is that compared to controls, participants 
who stutter self-reported significantly more errors of phonological encoding in their inner 
speech. In light of the similar levels of self-reporting vigilance in the two groups, the above 
finding provides strong support for the first tenet of the CRH: that the speech plans of 
stutterers contain abnormally high numbers of errors of phonological encoding (See Section 
7.4.1).  Moreover, the additional finding of between-group differences in the frequency of 
word-order errors suggests that language encoding in stutterers may also be impaired at other 
levels in addition to phonology.  
With respect to error biases, the finding that the strength and direction of the phonemic-
similarity bias was similar in both participant groups suggests that both participant groups 
used a similar monitoring strategy for pre-articulatory detection of errors. The finding of a 
robust phonemic similarity effect in inner speech in both participant groups suggests that 
speech plans for inner speech were not impoverished even in the absence of any intention to 
articulate. The finding of a lexicality by group interaction (whereby significant lexical bias 
was only found in the stutterers‟ error reports) is likely to be an anomaly, bearing in mind the 
consistent finding of lexical bias in the self-reports of normally-fluent speakers in 
Experiments 1 to 3.  
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Each of the above conclusions is discussed in greater detail in the corresponding sub-
sections below, as are the findings of a post-hoc analysis (to be presented in Section 7.4.3) 
which investigated correlations between the severity of participants‟ stuttering-like 
disfluencies (in everyday speech) and their inner-speech error rates.  
7.4.1. Group differences in speech error rates  
As highlighted in the previous section, the most important finding from the current 
experiment is that the stuttering group self-reported significantly more onset and word-order 
errors than the control group, both in inner as well as in overt speech.  
To establish whether the higher numbers of errors self-reported by the stuttering group 
reflected higher numbers of errors actually made by that group, we investigated whether or 
not the two groups differed with respect to the vigilance with which they reported such 
errors.  Our analyses revealed that, compared to experimenter-ratings, both participant 
groups under-reported their errors to a similar extent.  When we investigated the accuracy 
with which participants reported individual errors, there was again no difference to be found 
between stutterers and controls.  Taken together, these analyses show that the proportions of 
experimenter-coded errors self-reported by each group do not differ, a finding in line with 
previous studies that have compared the abilities of stutterers and controls to detect 
phonemes and phonemic errors in recorded speech (Postma & Kolk, 1992; Sasisekaran & De 
Nil, 2006).   
Support for the assertion that this relationship holds for inner speech can be gleaned 
from the performances of the two groups when reporting their overt errors under conditions 
of auditory masking, where self-reports can be compared to experimenter ratings. This is 
because, under conditions of auditory masking, speakers are deprived of auditory feedback 
and thus forced to rely largely on internal monitoring (i.e., monitoring through the “inner 
loop” ) to detect their overt errors in the same way that they monitor for errors in inner 
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speech.  The absence of any significant masking by group interactions in the analyses of 
overt speech suggests that the two groups are vigilant to a similar degree when monitoring 
their inner speech. Our finding therefore strongly suggest that the significantly greater 
numbers of onset-phoneme and word-order errors self-reported by the stuttering group in 
inner speech reflected the overall greater numbers of (phoneme and word-order) errors 
actually occurring in the speech plans of that participant group. They thus support the first 
tenet of the CRH. 
Non-contextual errors 
A comparison of (statistically-reliable) model coefficients reveals that, although 
participants who stutter produced greater numbers of errors of all types tested in the 
experiment, the greatest between-group difference was found in non-contextual (onset-
phoneme) errors (See Table 7-12).  
Table 7-12. Comparison of likelihood ratios for occurrence of different types of error 
across the two participant groups, ratios are from self-reports (of inner and overt 
speech combined). 
Error type likelihood of occurrence 
(stutterers/controls) 
Primed-for onset errors (self-reports) 2.4/1 
Non-contextual onset errors (self-reports) 5.9/1 
Word-order errors (self-reports) 3.0/1 
    
This suggests that the speech-plans of stutterers may be more vulnerable to interference 
from influences beyond the words/phonemes encoded in current utterance. This finding is in 
line with similar findings from a series of studies by Bosshardt and co-workers  (see 
Bosshardt, 2006, for a review) that led them to propose that language formulation in 
stutterers may not be sufficiently modularized. Furthermore, the comparison of the raw 
numbers of non-contextual onset errors across groups and experimental conditions (see 
Table 7-7) suggests that this between-group difference in the likelihood of producing non-
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contextual errors may have been in some way sensitive to the imposition of auditory 
masking, although further research is needed before attempting to draw any conclusions 
from these preliminary observations.  
7.4.2. Group differences in error biases 
With respect to error biases, the only significant difference between the two participant 
groups was the stronger lexical bias in the stuttering group‟s overt errors than in the control 
group‟s overt errors.  It is unlikely that this between-group difference can be ascribed to 
different levels of vigilance through the outer (auditory) loop, because the interaction was 
apparent in both overt self-reports as well as independent-rater‟s reports. Nevertheless, the 
lack of a corresponding 2-way group by lexicality interaction in the analysis of inner-speech 
self reports means that we cannot rule out the possibility that it may have arisen because 
participants who stutter were somewhat more successful at detecting and editing-out errors 
with non-word outcomes in their inner speech.  However, the overall numbers of errors were 
low, and it is also noteworthy that the magnitude of the stuttering participants‟ lexical bias 
was not so different from that found in the combined analysis of student participants‟ overt 
errors in Experiments 1 to 3. So, in light of these two factors, is not possible to draw any 
firm conclusions from these findings.  
The comparison of the relative strength of the phonemic-similarity biases across the two 
participant groups had the potential to reveal group differences in the extent to which 
speakers habitually specify their speech plans for inner speech to include the sub-phonemic 
level of encoding. As noted in Section 4.4, Wheeldon and Levelt (1995) have provided 
evidence that normally-fluent speakers at least sometimes monitor abstract (timeless) 
syllabified phonological representations, and it is possible that this may reflect a tendency 
(of normally-fluent speakers) to under-specify speech plans for inner speech. In contrast, 
Vasić and Wijnen‟s (2005) proposal (in their Vicious Circle Hypothesis) that stutterers are 
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excessively aware of subtle timing irregularities in speech plans, suggests that stutterers may 
have a stronger tendency to fully specify speech plans, even when it is not necessary to do 
so. If this is the case, we might have expected to find a stronger inner-speech phonemic 
similarity bias in participants who stutter than in controls. However, the two groups‟ inner-
speech similarity biases were not significantly different from one another. Indeed, the 
numeric trend was in the opposite direction (towards a stronger inner-speech similarity bias 
in controls than in stutterers).   
7.4.3. Covert error repair 
Experiment 4 was designed to minimize the potential for covert error repair activity 
through instructions to participants to give priority to speaking in time to the (visual) 
metronome rather than to maintaining a high level of accuracy. It was therefore anticipated 
that the error patterns of the two participant groups would not reflect error repair activity to 
any significant extent.  The finding that, within both participant groups, significantly more 
overt than inner-speech errors were self-reported was fully in line with our expectations in 
this respect, insofar as it suggests that errors appearing in the original speech plan were not 
repaired prior to overt articulation. 
17
 Nevertheless, if covert error repair does play a 
significant role in causing disfluency in real-life speaking situations, we might have expected 
the participants with the highest scores on the measures of disfluency relating to real-life 
speaking situations to have made the most errors during the tonguetwister experiment.  This 
was, however, not reflected in the results of our two analyses of all onset errors (See Section 




 It further suggests that a proportion of participants‟ overt errors were likely to have originated 
downstream from the speech-plan (in processes related to the generation of motor commands). 
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7.3.4) which tested for effects of two different predictors that constituted measures of 
disfluency in everyday life. More specifically, whereas group membership (i.e. whether or 
not a participant was diagnosed as a stutterer) was retained as a predictor in the two best-fit 
models of onset-error likelihood, predictors for fluency-difficulty self-ratings, percentage of 
stuttering-like disfluencies in the reading task, and relevant interactions were not.  
Because stutterers are often relatively fluent when reading, it is possible that the reading 
task did not provide an adequate test of the relationship between speech-errors and stuttering. 
It is also possible that predictors relating to disfluency were rejected from the regression 
models because they shared too much variance with other predictors already present in the 
models. To further explore these possibilities, we therefore performed three post-hoc 
analyses using the data from only the PWS group. Specifically, we plotted the stuttering 
group‟s inner and overt onset errors against their: (a) stuttering-like disfluencies per 100 
syllables in the conversation task (Figure 7-2); (b) stuttering-like disfluencies per 100 
syllables in the reading task (Figure 7-3); (c) self-ratings of difficulty speaking fluently 
(Figure 7-4).  
Only two significant correlations were revealed in these plots: stuttering participants‟ 
stuttering-like disfluencies in conversational speech were correlated to their (self-reported) 
overt onset errors (r=0.44, p=.012), and to experimenter-reported overt onset errors (r=0.43, 
p=.015).  Similar patterns were also evident in the plots of stuttering participants‟ overt onset 
errors and their self-ratings of difficulty speaking fluently (Figure 7-4); however two outliers 




Figure 7-2. Scatterplots of total onset errors by percentage stuttering-like disfluencies in conversational speech, for participants who 
stutter. 
Plots show, for each participant, total number of onset errors (x axis) plotted against stuttering-like disfluencies per 100 syllables as 
measured from the conversational speech task (y axis). From left to right, the three plots show raw numbers of onset errors in (1) inner 










Figure 7-3. Scatterplots of total onset errors by percentage stuttering-like disfluencies in a reading task, for participants who stutter. 
Plots show, for each participant, total number of onset errors (x axis) plotted against stuttering-like disfluencies per 100 syllables, as 
measured from the reading task (y axis). From left to right, the three plots show raw numbers of onset errors in (1) inner speech; (2) overt 




Figure 7-4. Scatterplots of total onset errors by self-ratings of difficulty speaking fluently, for participants who stutter. 
Plots show, for each participant, total number of onset errors (x axis) plotted against self ratings of difficulty speaking fluently in ten 
commonly occurring speaking situation (y axis).From left to right, the three plots show raw numbers of onset errors in (1) inner speech; 
(2) overt speech (self-reports); and (3) overt speech (experimenter ratings). The unbroken regression line depicts the relationship between 






The lack of any correlation between participants‟ inner-speech onset-error rates and their 
disfluency rates suggests that covert repairs of phonological encoding errors do not account 
for anything more than a minor proportion of the instances of stuttering-like disfluencies in 
their everyday speech. These findings, therefore, are not compatible with the second tenet of 
the CRH: that stuttering-like disfluencies in people who stutter are the result of covert repairs 
of large numbers of errors of phonological encoding. If stuttering does involve covert error-
repair, the errors in question must either be so subtle that participants failed to report them, 
or they must originate downstream from the speech plan, and therefore only in inner speech 
when it accompanies overt articulation (cf. Max et al., 2004).  
In Experiment 4, it was not feasible to attempt to measure whether or not the timing of 
the stuttering group‟s inner-speech tonguetwister recitations was more variable than that of 
the control group. We therefore cannot rule out the possibility that stuttering may stem from 
inappropriate covert repair of small pauses and other prosodic markers in stutterers‟ speech 
plans as posited in the Vicious Circle Hypothesis (Vasić & Wijnen, 2005; see also Lickley et 
al., 2005). Neither can we rule out the possibility that stutterers are hypervigilant towards 
such cues, although the experimental paradigm could potentially be adapted to explore these 
possibilities. However if, as Vasić and Wijnen (2005) propose, stuttering-like disfluencies in 
people who stutter are related to hyper-vigilance with respect to subtle prosodic cues, an 
explanation is needed for why our participants who stutter did not show a corresponding 
hypervigilance with respect to the phonological errors that they make in inner and overt 
speech, and why subtle prosodic cues or irregularities would lead to high levels of error-
repair activity when gross phonological encoding errors apparently do not. One possibility is 
that hypervigilant monitoring in people who stutter is „situation specific‟, insofar as it only 
occurs in situations where they perceive a need to speak with a high degree of accuracy. If 
this is the case, then the failure of the current experiment to reveal any difference in 
monitoring vigilance between stuttering and control participants may simply reflect the fact 
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that the experimental paradigm did not provide the necessary stimulus to elicit such 
hypervigilance.  
Our failure to find any correlation between the frequency of inner-speech errors and 
stuttering-like disfluencies is compatible with the EXPLAN hypothesis, and it is certainly 
possible that the higher numbers of onset and word-order errors made by stutterers were 
simply a side-effect of language encoding impairment but did not in themselves contribute to 
the production of stuttering-like disfluencies. In keeping with EXPLAN, it is also possible 
that a proportion of the perseveratory errors made by participants may have resulted from an 
established habit of repeating readily available segments or words in order to keep going 
when experiencing encoding difficulties (cf. Howell & Sackin, 2001). However, verification 
of these possibilities would require further research.  
7.4.4. The role of working memory 
Because the original intention behind the current experiment was to compare error rates 
of participants who stutter with those of matched controls, differences in participants‟ 
digitspan scores have been treated as a potential confounding variable. The main concerns 
were that participants with shorter digitspans may (a) find it more difficult to remember 
tonguetwisters and therefore make more errors, and (b) have more difficulty remembering 
their errors and therefore tend to under-report (or mis-report) them. Thus in all regression 
analyses, any variance attributable to differences in participants‟ digitspans was first co-
varied out by entering digitspan as the first predictor.  However, it has been proposed  (e.g. 
Bajaj, 2007) that impairments of (various aspects of) working memory may be directly 
implicated in stuttering. In light of such proposals it is noteworthy that digitspan was itself a 
significant predictor of self-reported error-rates; and, in line with studies that have reported 
poor non-word repetition abilities in stutterers (Anderson et al., 2006; Hakim & Bernstein 
Ratner, 2004; Ludlow et al., 1997), our current findings suggest that working-memory 
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limitations may play a role in the higher speech-error rates found in stutterers. This is 
perhaps not surprising bearing in mind the close association between working memory and 
phonological encoding, (Acheson & MacDonald, 2009a, 2009b).  
7.5. Caveats  
7.5.1. Ecological validity of the study 
A number of studies have found that signs of language impairment only become 
apparent in stutterers under conditions of increased cognitive load  (e.g. Bosshardt et al., 
2002; Weber-Fox, Spencer, Spruill III, & Smith, 2004). In light of these findings, it would 
appear that the current experimental paradigm must have been sufficiently cognitively 
demanding to reveal differences between the two participant groups. Nevertheless, the 
tonguetwister paradigm did not require participants to compose their own utterances or to 
attend to prosodic encoding, and neither did it require them to monitor whether they were 
being understood by their conversation partners or to attend to conversation partners‟ 
responses. It may thus have been less cognitively demanding than many of the speaking 
situations commonly encountered by participants in real life. It thus remains possible that 
language encoding errors may occur substantially more frequently in stutterers in the 
cognitively demanding speaking situations encountered in their everyday life than they did in 
the tonguetwister experiment.  
7.5.2. Word omissions 
Together with the instruction to speak in time to the (visual) metronome, participants 
were also instructed to skip any words they felt likely to stutter on. This was to ensure that 
their overt recitations were uttered fluently and at the correct speech rate. We presumed that 
stuttering only occurs in overt speech, so we did not expect this instruction to cause 
participants to skip words in the silent (inner-speech) condition. However, we cannot rule out 
160 
 
the possibility that, in the stuttering group, a proportion of words may have been omitted 
because they were associated with past experiences of stuttering. Had these words not been 
omitted, the inner-speech error rates of participants who stutter may have been even greater.  
7.6. Experiment 4: Conclusions 
When constrained to speaking at a fixed speech-rate, adults who stutter make more onset 
and word-order errors than do age, education and gender-matched, normally-fluent controls. 
Moreover, the majority of these errors have their origin in the speech plan, before the onset 
of articulation. These findings represent important evidence in line with the first tenet of the 
Covert Repair Hypothesis (Postma & Kolk, 1993). 
However, the lack of any correlation between the frequency of participants‟ inner-speech 
errors and the frequency of their disfluencies in real-life speaking situations suggests that 
covert repair of errors of phonological encoding  is unlikely to contribute significantly to the 
manifestation of stuttering-like disfluencies in everyday speech. These findings are thus 
incompatible with the second tenet of the Covert Repair Hypothesis.  
It is possible that the higher numbers of onset and word-order errors made by stutterers 
are a side-effect of language encoding impairment but do not in themselves contribute to the 
production of stuttering-like disfluencies. It also remains possible that, in people who stutter, 
stuttering-like disfluencies may stem from covert repair of timing or prosodic errors, as 
proposed by Vasić and Wijnen (2005), or covert repairs of errors that occur downstream 




8. Experiments 5 and 6: The Role of Anticipation of 
Communication Failure in Stuttering 
8.1. Introduction 
In Experiment 4 (described in the previous chapter), which used a tongue-twister 
paradigm to investigate phonemic error rates in inner speech, we were able to show that 
participants who stutter made significantly more such errors than a closely matched group of 
normally-fluent controls. However, despite this group difference, we found no evidence of a 
relationship between the frequency with which participants who stutter made phonemic 
errors in their inner speech and the frequency of their disfluencies in everyday life. 
Moreover, some of the (normally-fluent) control participants made more inner-speech errors 
than some of the participants who stutter.  
The extent of group overlap in inner-speech error rates, together with our failure to find 
any relationship between inner-speech errors and stuttering severity led us to conclude that 
covert error repair of errors of phonological encoding cannot adequately account for the 
majority of instances of stuttering-like disfluencies in the speech of people who stutter.   
Therefore, in the final two experiments of the thesis we consider an alternative 
possibility, namely that a mechanism similar to covert error repair may be activated simply 
by the speaker‟s perception of a need to speak more accurately. We hypothesise that 
stuttering-like disfluencies may arise in response to any stimulus that results in the speaker 
arriving at this perception. More specifically, we focus on the extent to which factors 
external to the speaker which lead to the anticipation of immanent communication failure 
can influence the likelihood of stuttering.  
To explore this issue, we employ a new experimental paradigm whereby participants 
repeatedly spoke single words into what they believed was a speech-recognition system.  
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The system was designed to give the impression that it had difficulty recognising certain 
words, thus instilling in participants the anticipation of communication failure on subsequent 
iterations of those words. 
To help put Experiments 5 and 6 into a clearer perspective, we begin by considering 
some aspects of stuttering  which production-deficit hypotheses like the Covert Repair and 
EXPLAN Hypotheses have difficulty accounting for, and we then consider whether these 
may be better explained by the alternative theoretical perspective; of stuttering as an 
anticipatory struggle response, as exemplified by the Anticipatory Struggle Hypothesis 
(Bloodstein, 1958, 1975).   
8.1.1. Stuttering as a direct consequence of a planning 
deficit  
As detailed in Section 3.5, psycholinguistic hypotheses have attempted to account for the 
occurrence of stuttering-like disfluencies, in both stutterers and normally-fluent speakers, as 
the unintended side-effects of „covert error repair‟ (Postma & Kolk, 1993; Vasić & Wijnen, 
2005), or „restart‟ (Howell & Au-Yeung, 2002) mechanisms. Under normal conditions, such 
mechanisms may serve  (with varying degrees of effectiveness) to regulate the flow of 
speech and ensure that it is relatively free of errors, thus helping the speaker to make himself 
understood and maintain his conversation turn during times of language-formulation 
difficulty.   
These repair and restart mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, and both provide 
plausible explanations for the variety of stuttering-like disfluencies that occur in both 
stutterers as well as in normally-fluent speakers. They also provide compelling explanations 
for why the likelihood of stuttering tends to decrease on subsequent iterations of previously 
spoken words (the 'Adaptation Effect';  Brutten & Dancer, 1980; Johnson & Knott, 1937), 
why stutterers are particularly likely to stutter on word onsets, why the likelihood of 
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stuttering occurring on a word is strongly influenced by its grammatical function 
(Bloodstein, 2006; Howell & Sackin, 2001), length, position in the sentence, frequency and 
predictability (Brown, 1937, 1945; Newman & Bernstein Ratner, 2007), and for why young 
children whose language and articulation skills lag behind those of their peers are more 
likely to stutter (See Section 3.5.2 for further details). 
However, the CRH and EXPLAN hypotheses are less successful at accounting for a 
number of other observations in relation to the distributions of stuttering events, such as why 
older children and adults frequently stutter on isolated, commonly occurring single words, 
and have particular difficulty uttering their names, and why stuttering is influenced so 
strongly by the characteristics of the listener and the overall dynamics of the speaking 
situation (Bloodstein, 1949, 1950a; Bloodstein & Bernstein Ratner, 2008). Furthermore, the 
Covert Repair Hypothesis fails to account for the lack of any discernable correlation between 
the frequency with which stutterers produce inner-speech errors and their stuttering severity 
in everyday speaking situations, as described in Section 7.4.3 (See also  Brocklehurst & 
Corley, 2011), or for why stuttering sometimes persists in older children and adults who no 
longer show any evidence of any underlying language or speech production impairment 
(Conture et al., 2004).   
Thus it appears that compensatory responses to underlying language production 
difficulty of one kind or another cannot adequately account for many instances of stuttering 
in older children and adults (although they may adequately account for the stuttering-like 
disfluencies of young children). An alternative possibility, investigated in the current 
experiment, is that, in adults, stuttering-like disfluencies may occur as a side-effect of a 
compensatory response to the anticipation of difficulty, and such anticipation may stem from 
memories of having experienced difficulty speaking or communicating in similar situations 
in the past. 
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8.1.2. Stuttering as an anticipatory struggle response 
As noted in Section 3.3, the term „anticipatory struggle‟ was first used by Bloodstein in 
the 1950s to describe a broad category of hypotheses, all of which share the idea that 
stutterers believe  that speaking is difficult and this belief in some way interferes with the 
smooth running of the processes that underpin fluent speech (see Bloodstein & Bernstein 
Ratner, 2008 for a review).  
The attribution of stuttering to stimuli representative of past speech failures (rather than 
to any difficulty inherent in the current formulation and execution of specific individual 
words) is supported by evidence from a number of early studies by Johnson and his co-
workers. In the first of these Johnson and Knot (1937) found that, on successive readings of 
the same passage, PWS tend to stutter on the same words (the „Consistency Effect‟). Using 
the same materials, Johnson and Millsaps (1937) found that if, on subsequent re-readings, 
previously stuttered words are crossed out and participants told to omit them, stuttering then 
occurred on words that had previously been spoken fluently, and a consistency effect became 
established on those words too. In a further, related, reading experiment, Johnson, Larson, 
and Knott (1937; Experiment 3) marked the words a participant had stuttered on, and 
additionally marked five random, unstuttered words in the same way and told the participant 
that each mark represented a previously stuttered word. They then found that, on subsequent 
re-reading of the entire passage (including the marked words), stuttering on the five marked 
words was three times more common than on five randomly selected (unmarked) control 
words. This finding suggested that cues that were perceived by the participant to be 
associated with past stuttering had the power to induce stuttering on whatever words were 
associated with them.  
Anticipatory struggle hypotheses have postulated a variety of mechanisms to account for 
how the anticipation of stuttering can lead to the production of stuttering-like disfluencies, 
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including „approach-avoidance conflict‟ (Sheehan, 1953); abnormal „preparatory sets‟ (Van 
Riper, 1973), and „tension and fragmentation‟ (Bloodstein, 1975).   
Central to Bloodstein‟s own  (1975) „Anticipatory Struggle Hypothesis‟ is the notion that 
the primary symptoms of stuttering (repetitions, prolongations and blocks) are essentially 
tensions and fragmentations in speech, which arise in response to stimuli representative of 
past speech failure, and which originally arose in response to the (normal) disfluencies of 
early childhood. Tension and fragmentation are regarded as the symptoms of “trying too 
hard”, and “taking the activity apart to do it piece by piece” (Bloodstein, 1975 p4) that 
characteristically occur when an individual wishes to execute a complex motor activity and 
yet doubts that he will be successful.   
By conceptualizing stuttering in this way, Bloodstein‟s (1975) Anticipatory Struggle 
Hypothesis provides a plausible explanation for why stuttering is more likely to occur in 
children with impaired or delayed development of linguistic skills and/or speech motor 
control. Importantly, unlike the Covert Repair and EXPLAN hypotheses, Bloodstein‟s 
hypothesis does not attribute stuttering directly to the impairment or delay. Instead, it posits 
that stuttering only arises if the underlying impairment/delay serves to instil in the child the 
belief that, in particular situations, particular sounds or words will be difficult to speak. Thus 
it allows for the possibility that the exact nature of the impairment or delay that underlies 
stuttering may differ from child to child. It also provides a parsimonious explanation for how 
stuttering may persist even after any language or speech impairment/delay has resolved, by 
postulating that a vicious circle is established whereby the anticipation itself precipitates the 
struggle that was anticipated. Further, because it identifies stuttering as a disorder of 
communication in which the responses of the listener are every bit as important as the speech 
of the speaker, it provides a seemingly parsimonious explanation for a range of common 
observations in relation to stuttering, including why stutterers rarely have difficulty speaking 
to themselves or when they don‟t care what the listener thinks of them or what they say; and 
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conversely, why they may find it so much more difficult to speak fluently to certain people, 
about certain topics and in certain social situations (Bloodstein, 1949, 1950a).  
Bloodstein conceptualized anticipatory struggle as being essentially a hypertonic 
avoidance response stemming from the desire to avoid negative listener responses (cf. 
Wischner, 1950). This conceptualization fits well with recent evidence of a strong link 
between social anxiety and stuttering (Craig, 1990; Craig, Hancock, Tran, & Craig, 2003; 
Iverach et al., 2009; Menzies, Onslow, & Packman, 1999; Messenger, Onslow, Packman, & 
Menzies, 2004) insofar as such evidence suggests that many older children and adults who 
stutter are indeed highly concerned about the negative reactions of listeners. It is also 
supported by findings of an early experimental study by Hansen (1955), outlined in Section 
8.1.3, which found that negative listener responses can have a direct impact on the likelihood 
of producing stuttering-like disfluencies. 
However, despite its appeal, Bloodstein‟s (1975) Anticipatory Struggle Hypothesis has 
two important weaknesses. Firstly, „tension and fragmentation‟  is not well specified and 
fails to provide an adequate explanation for precisely why stuttering-like disfluencies 
manifest in the variety of ways that they do (as repetitions, prolongations or blocks). 
Secondly, by defining tension and fragmentation as a hypertonic avoidance response, it fails 
to address the possibility that approach behaviour may also play an important role
18
 (cf. 
Sheehan, 1953).  




 In other words, stuttering may stem not only from avoidance of punishing stimuli, but also 
from attraction to rewarding stimuli. 
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Regarding the second of these weaknesses, the common clinical observation that 
stutterers experience relatively little difficulty speaking fluently in situations where the 
semantic or propositional content is unimportant or already known to the listener 
(Bloodstein, 1949, 1950a) suggests that the (positive) desire to convey information is more 
likely to be the key precipitating factor, although there is, as yet, only very limited 
experimental evidence to support this view. 
8.1.3. Experimental investigation of the effects of 
anticipation of communication failure 
The final two experiments of this thesis constitute an experimental investigation of the 
effects of anticipation of communication failure on speakers‟ experiences of speaking. The 
first (Experiment 5) investigates whether the experience of stuttering can be precipitated by 
the anticipation of communication failure; and, the second (Experiment 6) investigates 
whether this effect extends to normally-fluent speakers (for whom there is no reason to 
suspect any underlying language or speech-production impairment). These two experiments 
are loosely based on a paradigm developed by Hansen (1955), originally designed to test the 
effects of different valences of audience response on stuttering severity. In Hansen‟s original 
experiment, participants who stutter performed a variety of reading and photograph-
description tasks in front of an audience ranging from 12 to 25 people. The lighting was 
turned down so participants could not see the audience‟s faces. Positive or negative audience 
feedback was delivered to the speakers indirectly, by means of a series of green and red 
lights and corresponding counters, located on a table in front of the speaker. Each member of 
the audience was given a three-way switch to operate, with settings for positive, neutral and 
negative responses. The speaker and the audience were led to believe that the switches 
operated the lights and the counters summed the two types of response for the duration of 
speaking. In reality, the coloured-light activation and counter scores were regulated by the 
experimenter. Hansen found that, although overall there was a general decrease in stuttering 
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over the duration of the experiment, the rate of decrease was greater where favourable 
stimuli were delivered than where unfavourable stimuli were delivered. These trends became 
noticeable after a short time lag, and were most noticeable during spontaneous speech when 
it was easier for the speaker to focus on the audience responses.  
In our experiments (Experiments 5 & 6), instead of speaking to an audience, participants 
were instructed to speak into what they believed was speech-recognition software on a 
computer, and received automatic online feedback indicating whether or not the words they 
had spoken had been correctly recognized.  As in the Hansen experiment, the feedback was, 
in reality, determined by the experimenter, and bore no relationship to the accuracy or 
fluency with which participants spoke. We chose to mimic a speech-recognition system 
(rather than using human confederates) because it enabled us to focus on the influence of the 
desire to communicate information (rather than the desire to avoid negative listener 
responses). Specifically, the use of such a system allowed us to create a communication 
situation in which participants were unlikely to feel any need or desire to elicit a favourable 
reaction from listeners. To further avoid any possibility that participants‟ performances may 
be affected by the fear of negative evaluation by potential listeners or over-hearers, 
participants were led to believe that they were not being recorded, that nobody was listening 
to them or able to hear them speak, and that the speech-recognition process was entirely 
automatic.   
To maintain the illusion that participants‟ speech was being „recognized‟, the software 
incorporated a voice-activated switch that was sensitive to participants‟ verbal responses. To 
ensure that the feedback from the software was plausible, we employed participants whose 
overt disfluencies were relatively mild and whose utterances were most likely to closely 
approximate the target utterances.   
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Because independent-rater judgments of stuttering are unreliable with respect to single-
word utterances (many of the prosodic cues that alert listeners to stuttering in the multi-word 
utterances are absent), and because, when speaking into speech-recognition software, 
speakers frequently prolong or hyper-articulate words on purpose (Stent, Huffman, & 
Brennan, 2008), our primary analyses of stuttering were based on participants‟ self-reports. 
These primary analyses had the added benefit of enabling us to investigate directly the 
relationship between the anticipation of communication failure and the experience of „loss of 
control‟ (see Section 5.1). 
8.2. Experiment 5 
In Experiment 5, all participants were adults who stutter. Participants used a simple cue, 
displayed on a computer screen, to identify a target word from a selection of five possible 
options (also displayed on the screen), and then spoke that target word four times 
consecutively. Immediately prior to the first iteration of a word, participants self-reported 
whether or not they expected to stutter on this word. Then, immediately following each 
iteration, participants (a) self-reported whether or not they had stuttered, and then (b) 
received feedback (on the computer screen) indicating whether the word they had spoken 
had been correctly recognized by the software. Across each of the four iterations, the 
feedback consistently indicated correct or incorrect recognition of the target word. Thus, it 
became increasingly clear to participants whether the remaining iterations were likely to be 
correctly recognized by the software.  
 We hypothesized that, due to the „adaptation effect‟ (Brutten & Dancer, 1980; 
Johnson & Knott, 1937), there would be an underlying trend for self-reports of stuttering to 
decrease across iterations. If stuttered disfluencies result solely from a language or speech 
production deficit, this reduction would be unaffected by whether the software apparently 
failed, or succeeded, to recognize each word spoken, since lexical difficulty was held 
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constant across conditions.  Evidence that the feedback given to participants affected their 
performance differently in each of the conditions, however, would implicate an additional 
process. Regardless of whether or not participants who stuttered had production deficits, the 
anticipation of a struggle to communicate would make participants relatively more likely to 
produce stuttering-like disfluencies in the condition where the software apparently failed to 
recognise their productions of a particular word. We also hypothesised that these immediate 
effects would be evident over and above an underlying tendency to stutter on words that 
speakers had come to perceive as long term „problem words‟, due to difficulties encountered 
in other earlier speaking situations (as revealed by participants‟ responses to the question 
“will you stutter on this word?”).  
8.2.1. Method 
Participants 
Fourteen participants were recruited through stuttering self-help groups and through the 
University of Edinburgh student employment website.  Data from two participants was not 
analyzed because they failed to follow instructions and/or realized that they were not 
interacting with real speech recognition software.  Mean age of the remaining 12 participants 
(9 male) was 32 (range 25 to 41); mean education level was 3.8 on a scale where 1 
corresponds to General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) or equivalent, and 5 
indicates a postgraduate degree.  Two participants were university students; all others were 
in paid employment. 
All had previously been diagnosed with persistent developmental stuttering by a speech 
therapist and all considered themselves as still suffering from the condition.  SSI-4 (Riley, 
2009) stuttering severity scores were derived from video recordings of each participant 
speaking spontaneously and reading aloud.  Mean SSI-4 score was 15.7, ranging from „very 
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mild‟ (6) to „severe‟ (34). Participants produced a mean of 5.8 stuttering-like disfluencies per 
100 syllables when speaking (range 1 to 16), and 5.6 when reading aloud (range 0 to 24).  
Participants also completed Section 3a of the Overall Assessment of the Speaker‟s 
Experience of Stuttering (OASES; Yaruss & Quesal, 2006), in which respondents rate their 
current difficulty in communicating verbally on a five-point scale in each of ten commonly 
occurring situations.   These include, for example, talking with another person one to one, 
initiating conversations, speaking to strangers, and continuing to speak regardless of how 
your listener responds to you. Mean score was 28.1 out of 50 (range 21 to 38). Participants 
were also asked to rate how difficult it was to speak fluently, without stuttering or avoiding 




Apart from stuttering, participants reported no other speech, language, hearing or visual 
impairments.  
Materials 
The materials consisted of „target words‟ (that participants were required to identify and 
speak out loud), associated „option words‟, „cues‟ and „feedback words‟. The materials were 
divided into three sets, two of which were used in the two experimental conditions and the 
third of which was used as fillers. Each set contained 16 target words to be spoken out loud 
(see Table 8-1 for examples). In the two experimental sets, each target word was associated 




 For comparison, mean OASES 3a and „fluency-difficulty‟ scores for normally-fluent 




with five „option words‟, one of which was identical to the target word whereas the other 
four of which were distractors (that differed from the target word by just the onset phoneme). 
Each target word was also associated with a cue which participants used to distinguish it 
from its distractors: For example, for the target prod and the distractors plod, pod, odd, mod, 
the cue was push with a finger or stick (see Table 8-1). Each target word was also associated 
with a „feedback‟ word. In one experimental condition the feedback word was always 
„Correct‟ insofar as it was identical to the target word. In the other it was always „Incorrect‟ 
insofar as it was identical to one of the four distractor words. In the filler set, each of the 16 
target words was associated with five phonologically-different option words (four of which 
were distractors) and feedback words were always correct (i.e. identical to the target words).  
Table 8-1. Examples of cues and their associated target words, distractors and 
feedback in the two experimental conditions and fillers. 
Set 
 





 Target word Distractors  
1. correct feedback    a vital organ    heart    art cart Bart art  HEART 
2. incorrect feedback    Push with a finger or stick     prod    plod pod odd mod  PLOD 
   Fillers    Where someone is buried     grave    wick fan shrink mat  GRAVE 
Note: All filler items were followed by correct feedback. 
The feedback associated with each of the target words (i.e. the word that would be 
presented as having been „recognised‟ once the participant had spoken) was predetermined, 
insofar as it was not influenced by the participant‟s performance. For the filler set and for 
one of the experimental sets, whatever the participant said, the feedback would indicate that 
they had given the „correct‟ response to the cue.  For the other experimental set, for the first 
three iterations of each target word, feedback would always indicate that they had given an 
„incorrect‟ response, and for the fourth iteration, it would indicate that they had given the 
„incorrect‟ response 50% of the time. The inclusion of the occasional instance of „correct‟ 
feedback in the incorrect condition was to prevent participants from concluding that in the 
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incorrect condition later iterations would always be incorrectly recognised, and that it was 
therefore pointless trying to get the software to recognise their later iterations of words. The 
target words in all three sets were matched (overall) for frequency. The materials were 
counterbalanced insofar as a second version of the materials was drawn up in which the 
feedback associated with the two experimental sets was reversed. Half of the participants 
received one version and half received the other. Thus, across the entire experiment, each 
experimental target was equally likely to have been „correctly‟ or „incorrectly‟ named. 
The experiment was controlled and administered using a laptop with a 15” screen. 
Participants made spoken responses via an integral headset and microphone; manual 
responses were made via a five-button response-box. 
Procedure 
Prior to the experiment, participants completed a demographic questionnaire. The 
experiment then began with a computer-led tutorial session. During this session, participants 
were informed that the investigation concerned their ability to answer questions using 
speech-recognition software, and that the software was pre-primed with appropriate lists of 
words, from which it would select the best match. They were informed that during the 
experiment proper, nobody would be able to hear them speak and that their speech would not 
be recorded. Finally, they were told that there was a financial reward if more than 71% of 
responses were correctly recognized (since the „correctness‟ of each response was 
predetermined, each participant in fact scored 72%). These deceptions were necessary to 
minimize the likelihood that participants would be concerned about potential negative 
listener evaluations, and to maximize the likelihood that their sole motivation was to make 
the machine understand their responses.  Fully-informed consent was obtained 
retrospectively, once the experiment was complete. 
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Following the tutorial, participants underwent a two-item practice session. The 
experimenter adjusted microphone sensitivity if necessary, and encouraged the participants 
to respond promptly where cued to speak, and to speak loudly enough for the software to 
register a response. Following the practice session the experimenter left the room, and the 
experiment proper commenced. 
The procedure for each practice item, and for each of the 48 targets which followed, was 
identical, and consisted of four repetitions of a target-naming sequence.  Each repetition 
began when five words, comprising the target and its four associated distractors, were 
displayed in an arbitrary order along the top of the computer screen. Simultaneously, the cue 
phrase which identified the target was displayed below the list. Immediately below the cue 
was the question “do you think you may stammer on this word?” (See Figure 8-1). Having 
used the cue to identify the target, the participant responded to this question using one of 
three response keys, labelled “no”, “maybe”, and “yes” on the response box.  Pressing any of 
these keys caused a large hourglass to appear in the centre of the screen for 1000ms.  Once 
the hourglass disappeared, the software began recording input from the microphone. After 
another 250ms, the screen turned green, and a large mouth icon appeared, prompting the 
participant to speak.  At the same time, a voice-activated switch became potentiated. 
The sequence continued in one of two possible ways, depending on whether or not the 
voice-activated switch was triggered.  If the voice-activated switch was triggered within 
1300ms, the green screen remained for 2500ms, after which it was replaced with a black 
screen and the hourglass icon.  The hourglass disappeared after 2000ms, and was replaced 
250ms later with the question “did you stammer on this word?” Participants answered using 
the response keys labelled “no”, “maybe”, and “yes”. Pressing a response key triggered a 
feedback screen, described below. 
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The feedback screen showed the cue, followed by the list of target and distractors, 
followed by “you said...” and a preselected response (either the target, or one of the 
distractors).  If the preselected response was the target, the screen background was green, 
and below the response the participant was informed that “the word you selected was 
correct!” For distractors, the screen was red, and participants were told that their selection 
was wrong. In each case, the screen additionally showed an online update of the “percentage 
correct so far”, followed by the words “you need 71% to win”.  Below this, at the bottom, 
were the words “press any key to continue”.  Pressing any of the response keys began the 
next sequence for the current target (or the first for the next target, if this was the fourth 
sequence).  Targets were presented in a random order. 
If the voice-activated switch was not triggered, the green screen was replaced 2000ms 
after it appeared with a red screen, and the message “sorry, I couldn‟t identify what you 
said”. Immediately below this message was the question “did you stammer on this word?”  
250ms after a response, the words “please try again” appeared for 1000ms. This was 
followed by a 250ms pause, after which the sequence started again at the green screen with 
the mouth icon. If the voice-activated switch failed to trigger a second time, the red screen 
appeared once more, but following the participant‟s response to the stammering question, no 
feedback was given (the feedback screen did not appear). Instead, the iteration was 
abandoned and the next iteration was initiated. Thus participants were allowed up to two 
attempts at each of the four iterations of each target word before the sequence for the 
following target was initiated. Sound-files and response-box key presses were automatically 
recorded for all attempts, irrespective of whether or not the voice switch was successfully 
activated. (See Figure 8-1) 
Once the experiment had finished, participants were fully debriefed, in part in order to 
ascertain whether or not they had realized that they had not been engaging with real speech-
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recognition software.  Data from participants whose responses revealed that they had come 
to this conclusion were excluded from subsequent analyses.  
The debriefing interviews were video recorded, for use as a spontaneous speech sample 
from which the percentage of syllables stuttered was estimated; after the debriefing, 
participants were also recorded reading a passage aloud.  These recordings form the basis of 
the SSI-4 analyses of stuttering severity reported above. 
Coding and Analysis 
Irrespective of whether or not the voice-switch was activated, data from the first attempt 
at each iteration were included in the analyses (data from second attempts were not 
analyzed).  
Recordings of participants‟ utterances were analyzed by the experimenter, using PRAAT 
(Boersma & Weenink, 2009).  Two acoustic measures were taken: (1) Vowel onset latency
20
, 
measured from the moment the recording was activated (250ms before the screen turned 
green and the „mouth‟ icon appeared) to the onset of the first vowel sound, as determined by 
the onset of striations and associated formants on the spectrograph; and (2) word duration, 
measured from the beginning to the end of all evidence of speech-related activity on the 
spectrograph (duration measures thus included prolongations and repetitions but not silent 
blocks).  




 As stuttering-like disfluencies tend to occur prior to the vowel onset, the vowel onset provided 




Figure 8-1. Experiments 5 & 6: Sequence of on-screen instructions to participants. 
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Statistical analyses of the acoustic data (vowel onset latencies and word durations) were 
carried out using linear mixed-effects regression modelling  (Breslow & Clayton, 1993; 
DebRoy & Bates, 2004) using the lme4 package (Bates & Maechler, 2009) in R (R 
Development Core R Development Core Team, 2009). We generated base models which 
included an intercept with random by-participant and by-item variation, and then proceeded 
to add predictors stepwise to each model. For each predictor, we first added the random (by-
participant) term, to test for inequality of variance across levels, then added the 
corresponding fixed term.  The first predictor tested was „Condition‟ (with two levels: 
correct recognition and incorrect recognition); then „Iteration‟ (with four levels, one for each 
iteration), followed finally by a predictor for the Condition by Iteration interaction. Selection 
of models was based on χ
2
 tests to assess whether the fit of the model to the data was 
improved (as indicated by a significant decrease in the model likelihood ratio) by the 
addition of each (random or fixed) predictor. Predictors were retained only if the current 
(best) model was improved. Where two or more predictors each significantly improved the 
current model, we selected the model which had the smallest log-likelihood. We iterated this 
process until we found a „best fit‟ model which could not be improved by the addition of 
further predictors. Where models were selected, the t statistic, calculated from each 
estimated coefficient and its standard error, was used to determine whether the coefficients 
differed significantly from zero  (see Agresti, 2002).  
Analyses of participants‟ self-ratings of having stuttered were carried out using logistic 
mixed-effects regression modelling, using the lme4 package  (Bates & Maechler, 2009) in R 
(R Development Core R Development Core Team, 2009). This approach allowed us to 
investigate the independent contributions of predictor variables to the (log) likelihood of a 
word being self-rated as stuttered. Once again, we generated a base model which included an 
intercept, random by-participant and by-item intercept variation and then added random and 
fixed predictors stepwise to each model under consideration. The first (factorial) predictor to 
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be tested in this way was participants‟ self-ratings of “Stuttering predicted” (with separate 
levels for „no‟, „maybe‟ and „yes‟ responses to the question “do you think you will stutter on 
this word?”); then a predictor for „Condition‟; then „Iteration‟, followed finally by a 
predictor for the Condition by Iteration interaction. Model selection proceeded as for the 
linear mixed-effects models of acoustic data described in the previous paragraph.  
8.2.2. Results 
Vowel onset latencies  
In total, participants provided 1467 codable samples. Mean and standard deviations are 
provided in Figure 8-2. The best-fit model of onset latencies included „Condition‟ as a fixed 
predictor and „Iteration‟ as a random predictor (improvement due to adding „Iteration: χ
2
 (2) 
= 12.26, p <.002). 
 
Figure 8-2. Experiment 5: Vowel-onset latencies in Participants who stutter, by 
condition and iteration. 





























Adding further predictors did not improve the model (all p≥.441). Table 8-2 gives the 
coefficients of the model, and the probabilities that they could have occurred by chance. 
The model reveals that onset latencies became more variable across iterations, and that, 
irrespective of iteration, mean vowel onsets were 28ms longer in the „Incorrect‟ condition.  
Table 8-2. Vowel-onset latencies Exp6 - participants who stutter  
Coefficients for best fitting model. 



















iteration = 1 
1041 29 <.001 ***  by word 1980 44 





28 10 .007 **     
Iteration    +1     by subject 305 17 
      Residual 36826 192 
 
Word durations 
In total, participants provided 1423 codable samples. Mean durations and standard 
deviations are provided in Figure 8-3. The best-fit model of word durations included 
„Condition‟ as a random predictor and „Iteration‟ as a fixed predictor (improvement due to 
adding the „Iteration‟ predictor: χ
2
 (1) = 12.00, p <.001). Adding further predictors did not 
further improve the model (all p≥.129). Table 8-3 gives the coefficients of the model, and the 
probabilities that they could have occurred by chance. 
The model reveals that compared to the ‘Correct’ condition, durations of words uttered 
in the „Incorrect‟ condition were more variable but not reliably longer. Irrespective of 







Figure 8-3. Experiment 5: Word durations in Participants who stutter, by condition and 
iteration. 
Error bars show (global) standard deviations. 
 
Table 8-3. Word durations: Exp6 - participants who stutter  
Coefficients for best fitting model. 













DV = word durations (milliseconds.)       
 
Intercept    (by word) Iteration = 1  
correct 
feedback 
551 39 <.001 ***  by word 10717 104 





    by subject 2840 53 
Iteration    +1 11 3 <.001 ***     
      Residual  17077 131 
  
             
Self reports of stuttering 
In total, participants provided 1536 eligible self-reports (32 words, each repeated four 























possible and 128 definite) (See Figure 8-4). Prior to the first iteration, there were 131 
instances where participants predicted possible stuttering and 34 instances where they 
predicted definite stuttering.  
 
Figure 8-4. Experiment 5: Self-reports of stuttering in participants who stutter. 
Numbers of reports, across iterations, the two experimental conditions, and fillers.  
 
The best-fit model of self-reported stuttering included the random predictors: „Stutter 
predicted‟ and „Iteration‟, and the fixed predictors: „Stutter predicted‟, „Iteration‟, 
„Condition‟ and the „Iteration by Condition‟ interaction (improvement due to adding the 
Iteration by Condition interaction: χ
2
 (3) = 10.07, p =.018). Table 8-4 gives the coefficients 
of the model, and the probabilities that they could have occurred by chance.  
The model reveals that, independent of the feedback they received, once random 
variance was accounted for, participants were 9.9 times (i.e. e
2.29
) as likely to self report 


























PWS self-reports of stuttering  
Correct feedback 
Incorrect feedback 
Fillers (correct feedback) 
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would „maybe‟ stutter, and 46.5 times as likely to self report stuttering on words upon which 
they had predicted (prior to the first iteration) that they would „definitely‟ stutter. 
Independently of the above, the model also reveals that, overall, the likelihood of self-
reporting words as „stuttered‟ reduced across iterations. However, crucially, the significant 
„Condition by Iteration‟ interaction confirms that participants reported less of a decrease in 
stuttering across iterations in the „Incorrect‟ condition compared to the „correct‟ condition: 
Compared to the „Correct‟ condition, in the „Incorrect‟ condition, once random variance was 
accounted for, the likelihood that participants would self-report stuttering increased by a 
factor of 1.47 (i.e. e
0.39
) with each subsequent iteration. 
Table 8-4. Likelihood of self-reporting stuttering: Exp6 - participants who stutter 













DV = likelihood of self-reporting 
stuttering 
       
Intercept stutter not 
predicted 
Iteration = 1,  
correct feedback 
-3.57 0.78 <.001 ***  by word 0.28 0.53 
      by subject 5.57 2.36 
Stuttering predicted  maybe 2.29 0.80 .004 **  by subject 5.64 2.38 
Stuttering predicted definitely 3.84 1.17 .001 **  by subject 11.01 3.32 
Condition incorrect  -0.03 0.39 .935  by subject 0.52 0.72 
Iteration    +1 -0.33 0.12 .005 **     
Condition x 
iteration 
 0.39 0.16 .017 *     
         
 
Post-hoc analyses  
Visual inspection of Figure 8-2 – Figure 8-4 suggests some degree of correspondence 
between participants‟ mean vowel onset latencies, word durations and the pattern of their 
self reports of stuttering.   However, because participants may have purposefully prolonged 
or stressed key sounds in order make it easier for the speech-recognition software to 
recognize the target words, it is unclear to what extent these vowel-onset and duration 
differences across conditions and iterations were the result of stuttering and to what extent 
184 
 
they were strategic. To investigate this, we performed two additional linear (mixed-effects) 
regression analysis in which we tested whether participants‟ self-ratings of having stuttered 
predicted vowel onset latencies and/or word durations. The best-fit models from these two 
post-hoc analyses revealed that a positive response to the question “did you stutter” was 
associated with an increase in vowel-onset latency of 131ms (improvement due to adding 
vowel-onset latency as a fixed predictor χ
2
 (1) = 27.85, p =.036), but was not associated with 
any increase in word duration (See Table 8-5 for the model coefficients, and the probabilities 
that they could have occurred by chance).   
Table 8-5. Post-hoc analyses of vowel onset latencies and durations: Exp6 - 
participants who stutter 













DV = vowel onsets (milliseconds.)  
Post-hoc  analysis 
      
(intercept)
  
no stuttering 1011 29 <.001 ***  by word 1280 36 
      by subject 9325 97 
Stuttering (self-
reported) 
Yes 131 33 .018 **  by subject 28564 169 
      Residual 33157 182 
 
DV = word durations (milliseconds.)   
Post-hoc  analysis 
      
(intercept) no stuttering 498 27 <.001 ***  by word 10029 100 
      by subject 13449 116 
Stuttering (self-
reported) 
Yes      by subject 20351 143 
      Residual 16383 128 
         
8.2.3. Discussion 
The most important finding from Experiment 5 is that the likelihood of participants self-
reporting stuttering on a particular iteration of a word was predicted not only by their 
anticipation of upcoming difficulty prior to the first iteration of that word, but was also 
independently predicted by the nature of the feedback they had received from their 
immediately preceding iterations of that word. Moreover, the feedback participants received 
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influenced the likelihood of stuttering on subsequent iterations of that word despite the fact 
that, in this paradigm, the feedback was pre-determined independently of their actual 
performance.  
These findings support the hypothesis that the anticipation of communication failure can 
precipitate stuttering in adults who stutter (AWS). The findings also suggest that, in AWS, 
the anticipation of communication failure is influenced both by feedback from the listener 
(or software) in response to their immediately preceding utterance(s) as well as by longer-
term factors (as revealed by participants‟ responses to the question “will you stutter on this 
word?” which was posed before the first iteration). 
Together, the results from these two post-hoc analyses suggest that the finding that 
participants‟ word durations were longer in the „Incorrect‟ condition was largely the result of 
participants‟ strategic prolongations of those words, and not the result of stuttering.  In 
contrast to this, stuttering self-reports were reliably associated with longer vowel onset 
latencies. 
It is noteworthy that stuttering self-reports did not increase across the four iterations of 
the „Incorrect‟ condition. Rather, the condition by iteration interaction was entirely due to the 
lack of any decrease in stuttering self-reports across iterations in that condition. Because of 
practical limitations, it was not possible to incorporate a „no-feedback‟ condition into the 
experimental paradigm, so the paradigm does not inform us about how the likelihood of 
stuttering would have changed across iterations in the absence of any feedback whatsoever. 
However, in an earlier experimental study, in which participants read five consecutive 
iterations of each word and did not receive feedback, Brutten and Dancer (1980) found that 
stuttering decreased significantly across iterations. They attributed this „Adaptation Effect‟ to 
motor learning/rehearsal.  
186 
 
In light of Brutten and Dancer‟s findings, it seems likely that the decrease in stuttering 
across iterations in the „Correct‟ condition of the current experiment can be accounted for in 
terms of the adaptation effect (that does not require listener feedback). Thus the overall 
pattern of responses found in our current experiment most likely reflects the product of two 
simultaneous influences, such that, in the „Incorrect‟ condition, the adaptation effect and that 
would otherwise have been apparent, is prevented or cancelled out by the experience of 
repeated communication failure. This conclusion is reinforced by the finding that the 
decrease in stuttering across iterations of filler words almost exactly matched the decrease in 
the „Correct‟ condition (see Figure 8-4). 
8.3. Experiment 6  
8.3.1. Method 
In the previous experiment (Experiment 5), the two analyses of word durations 
suggested that participants who stutter consciously prolonged or emphasized key phonemes 
to assist word recognition by the software. However, their self-reports of stuttering did not 
indicate that this strategy resulted in increased stuttering, as might have been expected in 
view of Bloodstein‟s (1959, 1975) attribution of stuttering to a process of „tension and 
fragmentation‟ associated with exerting conscious control over complex fine motor tasks. It 
is possible, however, that the results were too noisy for the effect to be revealed.  
Bloodstein‟s equation of the production of stuttering-like disfluencies with tension and 
fragmentation leads to the prediction that normally-fluent speakers should also experience a 
degree of difficulty speaking fluently in situations where the repeated experience of 
communication failure leads them to exert an increased level of conscious control over their 
speech. Experiment 6 was designed to test this prediction on a group of normally-fluent 
speakers. A key advantage of using normally-fluent speakers to test the relationship between 
communication failure and fluency difficulty is that the fluency of their responses is less 
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likely to be confounded by any possible underlying language or speech production difficulty 
or by the anticipation of communication failure stemming from experiences prior to 
commencing the experiment.  
Experiment 6 is essentially the same as Experiment 5, the only difference (apart from the 
participants) being that we made changes to the instructions to ensure that they were 
meaningful to participants who do not stutter. In Experiment 6 we thus predicted that the 
repeated experience of communication failure in the „Incorrect‟ condition should lead to an 
increase, across iterations, in self-reports of difficulty speaking fluently relative to the correct 
condition, and that this increase may be associated with longer vowel onset latencies and 
durations. 
Participants 
Participants who do not stutter (PNS) were recruited through the Edinburgh University 
subject volunteer pool and student employment agency. Twelve participants (nine male) took 
part in the experiment.  All participants were native speakers of English.  Mean age of the 
participants was 36 (range 23 to 43); and mean education level was 3.50 on a scale where 1 
corresponds to General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) or equivalent, and 5 
indicates a postgraduate degree. Three participants were university students; all others were 
in paid employment. t-tests revealed that this group was closely matched to the stuttering 
group in Experiment 5 (age: t = 1.66, p = .11; education: t =0.20, p = .85). 
Mean scores for the OASES section 3a (Communication Difficulty) was 23.2 (range 13 
to 33).  Mean score for Fluency Difficulty ratings was 22.1 (range 10 to 40). SSI4 (Riley, 
2009) mean score was 6.7 (range 5 to 10).  Mean number of SLDs per hundred syllables on 
the reading task was 0.3 (range 0 to 1.1); and on the speaking task was 1.5 (range 0 to 4.6). 
Participants reported no speech, language, hearing or visual impairments that were likely 




The experimental materials were identical to those used in Experiment 5. 
Procedure  
The procedure was identical to in Experiment 5 except that instead of being asked “do 
you think you will stammer” and “did you stammer”, participants were asked “will you be 
able to say this word fluently” and then “were you able to say this word in exactly the way 
you intended”. These questions were chosen because they summed up the subjective 
experience of stuttering without mentioning the label „stuttering‟ (or „stammering‟). The 
response-button labels were also adjusted accordingly. 
Analyses  
The same analyses were carried out as in Experiment 5. 
8.3.2. Results 
Vowel onset latencies  
As in Experiment 5, only participants‟ first attempts at each of the four iterations were 
coded. In total, participants provided 1526 codable samples. Mean and standard deviations 
are provided in Figure 8-5.   
The best-fit model of onset latencies included the random predictor: „Condition‟; and the 
fixed predictors: „Condition‟, „Iteration‟, and the Condition by Iteration interaction 
(improvement due to adding Condition by Iteration interaction: χ
2
 (3) = 8.52, p < .036). 
Table 8-6 gives the coefficients of the model, and the probabilities that they could have 
occurred by chance.  
The model reveals that, irrespective of iteration, vowel onset latencies in the „Incorrect‟ 
condition were longer than in the correct condition; vowel onset latencies became more 
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variable across iterations; and furthermore, relative to the „Correct‟ condition, vowel onset 
latencies in the „Incorrect‟ condition increased by 14ms with each subsequent iteration. 
 
Figure 8-5. Experiment 6: Vowel-onset latencies in participants who do not stutter, by 
condition and iteration. 
Error bars show (global) standard deviations. 
 
Table 8-6. Vowel-onset latencies Exp7 - participants who do not stutter 
Mixed effects analysis of factors influencing vowel onset latencies. Model coefficients 
and probabilities are given for best-fitting models, as determined by Chi squared 
model comparisons. 













DV = vowel onsets (milliseconds.)        
Intercept   
  
Iteration = 1 
correct 
feedback 
916 36 <.001 ***  by word 2999 55 
       by subject 13657 117 
Condition  Incorrect 
feedback 
1 15 .513  by subject 832 29 
Iteration    +1 -5 5 .277     
Condition x iteration  14 6 .032 *     




























In total, participants provided 1526 codable samples. Mean durations and standard 
deviations are provided in Figure 8-6. The best-fit model of word durations included random 
predictors: „Iteration‟ and „Condition‟, and the fixed predictor: ‟Iteration‟ (Improvement due 
to additionally adding „Iteration‟ as a fixed predictor: χ
2
 (1) = 8.47, p <.001). Adding further 
predictors did not further improve the model (all p≥.166). Table 8-7 gives the coefficients of 
the model, and the probabilities that they could have occurred by chance. 
 
 
Figure 8-6. Experiment 6: Word durations in participants who do not stutter, by 
condition and iteration. 
Error bars show (global) standard deviations. 
 
The model reveals that word durations were more variable in the „Incorrect‟ condition 
and on later iterations. Furthermore, irrespective of condition, word durations increased by 























Table 8-7. Word durations: Exp7 - participants who do not stutter 
Mixed effects analysis of factors influencing word durations. Model coefficients and 
probabilities are given for best-fitting models, as determined by Chi squared model 
comparisons. 













DV = word durations 
(milliseconds.) 
       
 
Intercept    (by word) Iteration = 1,  
correct 
feedback 
587 34 <.001 ***  by word 13272 115 
Intercept        by subject 8413 91 
Condition  Incorrect 
feedback 
    by subject 1438 38 
Iteration   
  
+1 9 3 .001 **  by subject 18 4 
      Residual 10818 104 
 
Self-reports of difficulty speaking fluently 
 
Figure 8-7.  Experiment 6: Self-reports of difficulty speaking fluently: by participants 
who do not stutter. 
Numbers of self-reports, across iterations, the two experimental conditions, and 
fillers.  
In total, participants provided 1536 eligible self-ratings (32 words, each repeated four 
times by 12 participants) and on these, participants self-reported a total of 119 instances of 


































Prior to commencing the first iteration there were only two items for which participants 
predicted possible fluency-difficulty and no instances of predicting definite fluency-
difficulty. The corresponding predictor was therefore not entered into the model.  
The best-fit model of self-reported difficulty speaking fluently included only the random 
predictor: „Condition‟ (Improvement due to additionally adding „Condition‟ as a random 
predictor: χ
2
 (2) = 7.06, p <.029). The addition of other random predictors or fixed predictors 
representing „Condition‟, „Iteration‟ or their interaction did not further improve the model 
(all p ≥.331).Table 8-8 gives the coefficients of the model, and the probabilities that they 
could have occurred by chance.  
The model reveals that participants‟ were more variable in their self-ratings of difficulty 
speaking fluently‟ in the „Incorrect‟ than in the „Correct‟ condition. 
Table 8-8. Likelihood of self-reporting stuttering: Exp7 - participants who do not 
stutter. 
Mixed effects analysis of factors influencing the likelihood of self-reporting stuttering. 
Model coefficients and probabilities are given for best-fitting models, as determined 
by Chi squared model comparisons. 













DV = likelihood of self-reporting 
stuttering 
       
Intercept correct feedback -6.12 0.12 <.001 ***  by word 1.25 1.12 
      by subject 12.18 3.49 
Condition  Incorrect feedback     by subject 1.31 1.14 
 
Post-hoc analyses 
As in Experiment 5, we also performed two linear mixed-effects regression analyses to 
test whether participants‟ self-ratings of difficulty speaking fluently predicted vowel-onset 
latency or word duration. Across these two models, difficulty speaking fluently‟ was only 
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retained as a random predictor of word duration. (improvement over the base model 
containing only the intercept χ
2
 (2) = 27.85, p <.001). See Table 8-9 for the model 
coefficients, and the probabilities that they could have occurred by chance.  
Table 8-9. Post-hoc analyses: Experiment 6 - participants who do not stutter 
Mixed effects analysis of factors influencing vowel onset latencies and word 
durations. Model coefficients and probabilities are given for best-fitting models, as 
determined by Chi squared model comparisons. 
 














DV = vowel onsets (milliseconds.) 
Post-hoc  analysis 
       
(intercept)  917 33 <.001 ***  by word 2330 48 
     by subject 12106 110 
      Residual 18692 137 
 
DV = word durations (milliseconds.) 
Post-hoc  analysis 
       
(intercept)  no difficulty 
speaking 
fluently 
592 31 <.001 ***  by word 12046 110 
     by subject 9333 97 
Difficulty speaking 
fluently (self-reported) 
Yes     by subject 2586 51 
      Residual 10382 102 
 
The best-fit models from these two post-hoc analyses revealed that a negative response 
to the question “were you able to say this word in exactly the way you intended?” was not 
associated with any difference in vowel onset latencies. It was, however, associated with 
more variable, but not reliably longer, word durations.  
8.3.3. Discussion 
As with the stuttering group in Experiment 5, the finding that difficulty speaking fluently 
was not associated with longer word durations suggests that, in the „Incorrect‟ feedback 
condition, participants‟ longer word durations reflected an intentional strategy whereby they 
prolonged or emphasized key phonemes to aid word recognition. In contrast to the stuttering 
group, the lack of any association between self-reports of difficulty speaking fluently and 
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vowel onset latencies suggests that the relatively longer vowel onset latencies of participants 
on the later iterations of words in the incorrect condition were entirely strategic and not the 
result of difficulty.   
Also in contrast to the stuttering group, the statistical analysis of the normally-fluent 
group‟s self-reports does not show that feedback consistently indicating speech-recognition 
failure increased the likelihood of experiencing difficulty speaking fluently. However, the 
number of self-reports of difficulty did rise on the forth iteration of the „Incorrect‟ condition, 
suggesting that evidence for increased difficulty may have been found if the number of 
iterations providing feedback indicating failure had been greater. When asked about the 
impact of such feedback during the debriefing session, although participants often 
commented on it being a source of irritation, their comments did not suggest that it made 
speaking more difficult. Thus it seems that this participant group was resilient to the effects 
of incorrect feedback in a way that the stuttering group was not.  
8.4. Coding of recordings by a naive independent rater 
(PWS and PNS groups combined) 
Recordings of participants‟ utterances were coded by an independent rater who was 
naive to the differences between the two participant groups, to participant-group membership 
and to the nature and purpose of the experiment. She herself was a fluent speaker, but had 
had extensive experience of stuttering within her family (her father stuttered). Specifically, 
the independent rater was asked to identify all instances of (a) definite stuttering, and (b) 
possible stuttering, and code each of them as: „Repetitions‟, „Prolongations‟, „Blocks‟, or 
„Other‟.  
Because, in Experiments 5 and 6, the participant-groups‟ self-ratings were in response to 
slightly different questions (Did you stammer? vs. Were you able to say this word in exactly 
the way you intended?), it would have been misleading to analyze their responses together. 
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However, from a listener‟s perspective, participants‟ iterations of the target words are 
directly comparable, and so in the following independent-rater analysis of those iterations, 
we have combined the data from the two groups.  
8.4.1. Method 
Analysis 
In this combined-group analysis of the naive independent rater‟s codings of recordings, 
logistic (mixed effects) regression analyses were carried out in the same way as in 
Experiments 5 and 6, but with the addition of an extra predictor representing participant 
group (PWS or PNS). Predictors representing „voice activation, and „stutter predicted‟ were 
not tested in this analysis because, unlike the participants themselves, the independent rater‟s 
reports could not have been influenced by these factors. 
8.4.2. Results 
In total, the independent rater was able to code 3052 recordings, from which she 
identified 118 repetitions (114 in PWS), 109 prolongations (28 in PWS), 29 blocks (12 in 
PWS) and 46 other stuttering-like disfluencies (16 in PWS) (See Figure 8-8). Seventy-one 
percent (i.e. 121 out of 170) of stuttering participants‟ recordings that the naïve rater rated as 
stuttering were similarly rated by the participants themselves. Six percent (8 out of 133) of 
normally-fluent participants‟ recordings that the  naïve rater rated as stuttering were rated by 
those participants as having been difficult to speak fluently in the way intended.  
The best-fit model of independent-rater reported stuttering included random predictors: 
„Condition‟ and „Iteration‟, and the fixed predictor „Condition‟ and „Iteration‟ (improvement 
due to adding Iteration as a fixed predictor: χ
2
 (1) = 10.00, p =.001). Adding a predictor for 
the Iteration by Condition interaction did not further improve the model (χ
2
 (1) =2.23, p 
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=.135).  Table 8-10 gives the coefficients of the model, and the probabilities that they could 
have occurred by chance. 
Table 8-10. Factors influencing the naive rater’s reports of stuttering: Experiments 6 & 
7 combined. 
Mixed effects analyses with random slopes. Model coefficients and probabilities are 
given for best-fitting models.  













DV = likelihood of word being rated as 
„stuttered‟ by the independent rater 
      
Intercept   Iteration = 1,  
correct feedback 
-6.22 .88 <.001 ***  by word 0.20 0.45 





1.73 0.33 <.001 ***  by subject 1.25 1.12 
Iteration  +1 0.51 0.09 <.001 ***  by subject 0.06 0.24 
         
                  
The model reveals that, once random variance was accounted for, irrespective of group 
or iteration, words were 5.6 times as likely to be identified as stuttered in the „Incorrect‟ 
condition than in the „Correct‟ condition; and (irrespective of group or condition) each 
subsequent iteration of a word was associated with an increase by a factor of 1.7 in the 




Figure 8-8. Naive-rater's ratings of stuttering (including prolongations) in participants who stutter (PWS) and do not stutter (PNS). 
Experiments 5 and 6 combined. 
 
Figure 8-9. Naive-rater's ratings of stuttering (excluding prolongations) in participants who stutter (PWS) and who do not stutter (PNS). 












































































The naïve coder‟s ratings of stuttering reveal how difficult it can be for listeners to 
distinguish between stuttered disfluencies and intentional strategies intended to increase the 
listener‟s (or software‟s) chances of correct word recognition, especially with respect to 
prolongations, of which the naïve coder coded more instances in recordings from the PNS 
than the PWS group.  Reports of „blocks‟ were also more common in the PNS group, 
suggesting that the naïve coder probably missed many of the blocks actually made by the 
PWS group. As a result of these coding difficulties, the overall pattern of naïve ratings of 
stuttering in the two participant groups was remarkably similar, despite the large differences 
in the corresponding patterns of participants‟ self-ratings. The group differences only 
become apparent in the naïve-rater ratings when prolongations are excluded from the count 
(See Figure 8-9). 
8.5. Experiments 5 and 6: General discussion 
In Experiments 5 and 6 we set out to investigate the extent to which the experiences of 
stuttering and difficulty speaking fluently can result from the speaker‟s anticipation of his 
words being misrecognised. To do this we carried out two experiments in which people who 
stutter, and normally-fluent speakers, repeatedly spoke single words into what they believed 
was a speech-recognition system.  
Experiment 5 revealed that the likelihood of stuttering occurring on a particular iteration 
of a word was independently predicted not only by participants‟ anticipation of difficulty 
prior to the first iteration of that word, but also by the nature of the feedback they have 
received about their immediately preceding iterations of that word; and moreover, the 
feedback received by participants influenced the likelihood of stuttering on subsequent 




The latter of these two findings does not appear to be compatible with present 
formulations of the Covert Repair or EXPLAN hypotheses, both of which posit that 
stuttering arises as a side-effect of slow or impaired language encoding. It does not, however, 
rule out the possibility that language encoding deficits may sometimes play a role in the 
production of stuttering events.  
Both findings are, however, compatible with an anticipatory struggle account, that posits 
that stutterers‟ recent memories of (apparent) word misrecognition (or miscomprehension) 
impact upon the amount of „struggle‟ they engage in when attempting those words again. 
Furthermore, in light of the way the experiment was designed,  it is reasonable to conclude 
that the „anticipated struggle‟ associated with the increased likelihood of stuttering during 
the experiment was a „struggle to get words correctly recognized‟ rather than a struggle to 
avoid negative listener reactions or to avoid stuttering. This is in line with accounts that 
portray stuttering as involving elements of „approach‟ as well as „avoidance‟ (e.g. Sheehan, 
1953).  
In this particular experimental paradigm, there was no semantic component to the 
recognition process, and word recognition would have appeared to participants to be entirely 
dependent on the accuracy or clarity with which they were able to articulate key sounds. The 
findings thus suggest that stuttering may be brought on by the experience of communication 
failure at a low level, and in this respect they could potentially account for why stutterers 
have as much difficulty speaking nonsense words as meaningful words (Packman et al., 
2001).  
Prolongation as a strategy to aid word recognition 
The finding of significant random effects of „Condition‟ in the word-duration data 
reveals that both participant groups tended to vary the length of iterations when they 
anticipated that those iterations may not be correctly recognized. It thus supports earlier 
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findings by Stent et al. (2008), and extends them to people who stutter. Furthermore, the 
finding that word duration did not predict self-reports of either stuttering or difficulty 
speaking fluently indicates that prolongations were generally intentional and under volitional 
control and, as such, the study did not find any evidence suggesting that the PWS group was 
prone to interpret their own prolongations as stuttering. The extent of the mismatch between 
non-stuttering participants‟ own self-ratings and naïve-rater ratings supports Moore and 
Perkins‟ (1990) conclusion that subjective and objective reports of stuttering effectively 
measure different phenomena. They also reveal how difficult it can be for listeners to 
recognize the difference between a word that contains a stuttered disfluency and a word that 
contains an intentional prolongation.  
It is noteworthy that although participants‟ self-reports of stuttering and difficulty 
speaking fluently were not significant predictors of word duration, in the PWS group they 
were a significant predictor of vowel onset latency, such that the experience of difficulty 
with word production was reflected in longer vowel onset latencies. This finding is in line 
with the frequently-cited observation that stuttering is closely related to difficulty with the 
initiation of words (Bloodstein & Bernstein Ratner, 2008) and/or with the association of 
onsets with rimes (Wingate, 1988).  
Mechanisms that could result in disfluency as a result of anticipation of 
communication failure 
If a speaker perceives that his words are likely to be misheard, irrespective of the actual 
cause of the anticipated communication failure, he is likely also to perceive that the pressure 
is on him to in some way adjust his speaking style to rectify the situation. Bloodstein (1959) 
proposed that speakers respond to this perception by resorting to a feedback-based approach 
that enables them to break the utterance down into easily manageable fragments (see also 
Mysak‟s 1960 account of deautomaticity). Although this hypothesis provides a plausible 
account of the mechanism by which speakers might purposefully prolong syllables and/or 
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fragment them into their component sounds, the finding of the current study, that strategic 
prolongations were not associated with an increase in stuttering self-reports, does not support 
the hypothesis that tension and fragmentation associated with the deautomatization of speech 
results in the subjective experience of stuttering.  
An account of how the anticipation of communication failure could cause stuttering-like 
disfluencies to arise, that better fits the findings of the current study, is provided by the 
„Vicious Circle Hypothesis‟ (Vasić & Wijnen, 2005). This posits that past experiences of 
communication failure lead stutterers to develop a tendency to focus abnormally intensely on 
minor timing variations and infelicities in their inner (and/or overt) speech, and to set their 
thresholds for the initiation of covert error repairs at too low a level. In a similar vein, it is 
also possible that individual stimuli that remind the speaker of specific past experiences may 
lead to additional transient increases in monitoring vigilance, reductions in the error-repair 
threshold and consequently also to transient increases in error-repair activity.   
Although, compared to the CRH, Vasić and Wijnen‟s (2005) Vicious Circle Hypothesis 
is better able to account for the role of anticipation in precipitating stuttering, there are also 
two other accounts, both of which may be able to account for the variety of findings outlined 
in this paper in a more parsimonious way in that they do not require (either inner or overt) 
speech to be monitored.   
The first of these alternative hypotheses is that the anticipation of communication failure 
leads directly to cancellation and reformulation of speech plans, irrespective of whether or 
not the plans themselves are scrutinized for errors. A direct anticipation-based mechanisms 
outlined above would result in many cancellations and reformulations being carried out 
unnecessarily, and could easily account for why stuttering-like disfluencies may continue to 
be produced despite the absence of any ongoing linguistic-formulation impairment. 
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The second of these alternative hypotheses, and one that potentially fits the experimental 
data and speaker‟s subjective experiences best of all, might be described as a „Variable 
Release Threshold‟ hypothesis.  In common with the Covert Repair and EXPLAN 
Hypotheses, this hypothesis is predicated on the idea, originally stemming from Dell‟s 
(1986) interactive model of language production, that the more time available for  a speech 
planning prior to the initiation of overt articulation, the greater the probability that the 
speech-plan‟s target constituents (phonemes, words etc.) will reach levels of activation that 
are reliably higher than those of competitors, and the lower the likelihood that competing 
phonemes or words will be selected in error. A threshold mechanism that regulates the 
availability of words for overt execution has been proposed by Howell (2003, 2011b) in 
relation to the EXPLAN hypothesis. According to Howell‟s conceptualization of this 
mechanism, only plans for words that have attained an activation level above that of the 
buffer-release threshold can be executed. A logical extension to Howell‟s proposal is that the 
buffer-release threshold will rise whenever the speaker anticipates that a word will be 
misheard (or misunderstood). This rise in the buffer-release threshold would slow the rate at 
which the word(s) become available for execution and consequently maximize the likelihood 
that they will be executed clearly and accurately. In stutterers, anticipation of communication 
failure may lead to the buffer-release threshold mechanism generally being set at a relatively 
high level which would account for their longer onset latencies. It could also explain why 
stutterers may block if they are particularly concerned about the possibility of being 
misheard or misunderstood, insofar as the release-threshold may become set so high that 
some words fail to be released at all. Such a scenario might originally arise in response to 
some form of underlying language or speech production impairment and a tendency to make 
excessive phonological errors, but may then develop into a learned response that continues to 
be triggered by the anticipation of communication failure even after any underlying 
impairment has resolved. If this is the case, chances of successful communication would then 
be increased by the opposite response: i.e. by reducing the release threshold and allowing 
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oneself to potentially make more errors. This is, however, probably not be the response 
which most stutterers attempt.  
8.5.1. Caveats 
Ecological validity of the study 
Clearly, speaking single words into dummy speech-recognition software is a very 
different task to normal conversational speech. However, nowadays most speakers 
occasionally come across speech-recognition software in their daily lives, most commonly 
when providing gas or electricity readings over the telephone, or when accessing information 
over the telephone about cinema times etc. When participants were asked about their 
experiences of using such software the stuttering group consistently reported finding such 
experiences difficult and particularly likely to precipitate stuttering. It is, thus, perhaps 
surprising that the paradigm did not precipitate more stuttering than it did. A possible reason 
for the low incidence of stuttering during the paradigm was its relatively low ecological 
validity, and in particular the fact that the words they were required to utter were of no 
consequence to them in relation to their everyday lives. It seems that the £5 performance-
related reward only acted as a limited incentive. Future studies would benefit from exploring 
ways of increasing the speakers‟ motivation, as the validity of the current findings is clearly 
compromised by the low power of the experiment.     
How generalisable are the results? 
A major difficulty encountered during the piloting of the software was to make it both 
engaging and difficult enough to precipitate stuttering and yet, at the same time, convincing 
enough, so that participants believed that their words were really being recognized (or 
misrecognized) by the software. In order for it to be convincing, it was important that 
participants did not accidentally utter the wrong word, and that they did not stutter so 
severely that a substantial number of occasions resulted where they activated the voice 
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switch yet the sounds they made did not resemble the target word at all. Either of these 
scenarios would have likely resulted in the participant realizing that the software was not 
really sensitive to their utterances. Following extensive piloting, we found that only by using 
single single-syllable words and employing participants whose stuttering was relatively mild 
could we ensure that the paradigm was sufficiently convincing. However, as a result of these 
limitations we cannot be sure whether the main finding of the study (i.e. that stuttering is 
more likely to be experienced when speakers perceive that their words are not being 
recognized) applies to stutterers in general, or only to those whose overt disfluencies are 
relatively mild. Thus it is quite possible that ongoing language production difficulties and/or 
concern about negative listener reactions may play a greater role in precipitating the 
experience of stuttering in children and/or in people whose overt disfluencies are more 
severe.   
The use of self-reported data  
As noted in Section 5.1, generally speaking, stuttering researchers have tried to avoid 
reliance on self-reported data, as it is unverifiable. However, objective measures are 
unreliable, especially when single-word utterances are involved. The reliability of objective 
measures can be enhanced by the use of good quality video. But we rejected this solution 
during piloting when it became clear that the presence of a video camera (or any evidence 
made participants feel like they were being recorded) acted as a distraction that may have 
potentially confounded the results. An analogous situation is that, during telephone calls, 
stutterers often find the presence of an over-hearer strongly affects their ability to engage in 
the telephone conversation. As a compromise, participants‟ voices were recorded by a 
hidden microphone. However, this meant that only limited information was available with 
which the naïve coder could judge whether or not words were stuttered, and as a 
consequence, the naïve coder‟s judgments may have been less accurate than those of 
listeners in normal conversational situations. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, in 
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everyday life, listeners do frequently make judgments based on partial or degraded 
information, and stutterers are likely to experience most difficulty speaking fluently when 
they are aware that the listener is only receiving an impoverished signal, such as when 
speaking over the telephone. 
The effect of priming 
In Experiments 5 and 6, in the correct-feedback condition, it is possible that the 
production of the target word was primed (and therefore facilitated) by the orthographic 
feedback from prior iterations, whereas in the incorrect condition it was not. Thus, in 
addition to the covert error repair and variable release threshold mechanisms outlined above, 
it is possible that priming effects could account for the „condition by iteration‟ interaction 
found in Experiment 5 with respect to the likelihood of stuttering self-reports. Specifically, 
in the incorrect condition the orthographic feedback may have resulted in an interference 
effect because it consisted of one of the competitor option-words. Thus it is possible that in 
the correct condition, the words and phonemes may have been able to reach a higher level of 
activation more quickly than in the incorrect condition. Future studies could control for this 
potential confound by providing feedback that simply states that the participants utterance 
was „correct‟ or „incorrect‟ without providing orthographic feedback of the actual word that 
was recognized.  
8.6. Experiments 5 and 6: Conclusions 
Adults who stutter are more likely to stutter on a word when they anticipate that that 
word will be misrecognised. The anticipation that a word will be misrecognised may stem 
from a number of different sources, including not only past experiences of difficulty 
encoding and/or articulating the word but also past experiences of communication failure 
due to poor word recognition abilities of the listener (or speech-recognition software).  This 
finding is consistent with the Vicious Circle Hypothesis (Vasić & Wijnen, 2005) insofar as 
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such past experiences may lead to hypervigilant monitoring and unnecessary speech-error 
repair. However, it may potentially be more parsimoniously accounted for by the 
malfunctioning of a variable buffer-release mechanism that, under more normal 
circumstances, would serve to ensure the speaker achieves a high level of phonetic accuracy 
in situations where he believes he is likely to be misheard or misunderstood.  
Both adults who stutter and normally-fluent adults may prolong or otherwise stress 
words when they anticipate communication difficulty, and these might be mistaken for 





9. General discussion and conclusions of the thesis 
This thesis set out to investigate two key postulates of the Covert Repair Hypothesis 
(Postma & Kolk, 1993). The first is that the speech plans of people who stutter contain 
abnormally large numbers of errors of phonological encoding; the second is that the covert 
repair of such errors can account for the production of stuttering-like disfluencies. The 
results from our first four experiments led us to conclude that adults who stutter do indeed 
produce significantly more phonological encoding errors than normally-fluent speakers, but 
the covert repair of these errors cannot adequately account for the stuttering-like disfluencies 
they produce. In other words, the results support the first, but not the second tenet of the 
CRH.  
The latter of the above two conclusions led us to consider an alternative possibility, 
namely that a mechanism similar to covert error repair may be activated simply by the 
speaker‟s perception of a need to speak more accurately. We hypothesised that stuttering-like 
disfluencies may arise not only in response to speech errors, but also in response to any 
stimulus that results in the speaker arriving at such a perception.   
To test this hypothesis, our final two experiments employed a new experimental 
paradigm whereby participants repeatedly spoke single words into what they believed was a 
speech-recognition system.  The system was designed to give the impression that it had 
difficulty recognising certain words, thus instilling in participants the anticipation of 
communication failure on subsequent iterations of those words. The results from these final 
two experiments led us to conclude that, in people who stutter, the anticipation of 
communication failure has the capacity to affect the likelihood of producing stuttering-like 
disfluencies and that such anticipation need not be directly associated with any currently 
existing impairment of language or speech production.  The experiments we conducted, their 
findings, and the conclusions that we drew from them, are outlined in more detail in the 
discussion below.  
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To investigate the Covert Repair Hypothesis (Postma & Kolk, 1993), and in particular to 
determine whether the speech plans of adults who stutter contain abnormally large numbers 
of errors of phonological encoding, we adapted the Oppenheim and Dell (2008) tongue-
twister paradigm in which participants self-report the errors that they perceive in their inner 
and overt speech while reciting the tongue-twisters.  
Because the tonguetwister experiments relied on participants‟ self-reports of their own 
inner speech, our first three experiments were designed to determine to what extent such 
self-reports are reliable within the paradigm. They were carried out on three groups of 
normally-fluent participants with similar demographic profiles (all were psychology 
undergraduate students). By comparing participants‟ online self-reports of their overt 
phonemic errors with ratings made offline by an independent rater, these experiments 
provided data detailing the vigilance and accuracy of participants‟ self-reporting under a 
number of different speaking conditions. They also provided data detailing the extent of 
lexical and phonemic-similarity biases in participants‟ errors. 
 In these first three experiments, comparisons of participants‟ self-reported errors with 
those reported by an independent rater indicated that participants under-reported their overt 
errors. However, the extent of under-reporting did not vary significantly across conditions 
and it was not influenced by the imposition of auditory masking, which prevented 
participants hearing the sound of their own voices. Furthermore, the analyses of lexical and 
phonemic-similarity error biases revealed that the magnitude and direction of these biases in 
participants‟ self-ratings of inner speech errors were not significantly different to the 
(magnitude and direction of) these biases in their self-ratings of overt speech errors or in the 
corresponding independent-rater ratings. The consistency of under-reporting of errors across 
conditions, together with the stability of the error biases across raters and conditions strongly 
suggested that although participants‟ speech-error monitoring was not perfect (participants 
were generally hypo-vigilant), their self-reports were unlikely to have been distorted by 
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monitoring biases and their hypo-vigilance did not compromise the reliability of the 
paradigm.  
A further noteworthy observation arising from these preliminary experiments was that 
the patterns of error biases found in the inner-speech condition were strongly suggestive of a 
bi-directional flow of activation in the language-production system during phonological 
encoding, with feedback both from phoneme level to word level as well as from feature level 
to word level. This latter finding contrasted with the findings of Oppenheim and Dell (2008; 
2010) and with their conclusion that inner speech is under-specified at the featural level.  
Having established the reliability of the Oppenheim and Dell tongue-twister paradigm in 
Experiments 1 to 3, Experiment 4 then made use of the same paradigm to compare 
phonological encoding in stutterers and age-matched controls. The key finding from this 
experiment was that, as postulated by Postma and Kolk (1993) in the first tenet of their 
Covert Repair Hypothesis, stutterers, as a group, do indeed make significantly more 
phonological encoding errors than do normally-fluent speakers, both in inner as well as in 
overt speech. More specifically, they make more phoneme-substitution errors of all kinds, 
but in particular they make more non-contextual phoneme-substitution errors. The 
disproportionately larger numbers of non-contextual phoneme substitution errors suggest that 
their production systems are „noisy‟, insofar they are more susceptible to interference from 
phonemes that do not belong in the target utterance.  
In Experiment 4, despite the stuttering group making more errors than the control group, 
the size and direction of the phonemic similarity bias in the two groups‟ reports of inner-
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speech errors were remarkably similar
21
. This suggests that that the two groups did not differ 
with respect to the extent to which they monitored their speech plans and to the extent to 
which those speech plans were specified at sub-phonemic (featural) levels. This is a non-
trivial finding, insofar as activation-feedback from feature to phoneme level (which is 
dependent upon full featural specification) and monitoring may both potentially play key 
roles in minimizing the likelihood of phonemic errors occurring during speech production. 
The finding of comparable phonemic-similarity biases in both groups is also of interest 
because we might have expected group differences to be apparent in these biases if the two 
groups had employed different monitoring strategies. In particular, if stutterers normally 
focus more strongly on details of timing, as proposed by Vasić and Wijnen‟s (2005) Vicious 
Circle Hypothesis, we might have expected the speech plans they produced (in the inner 
speech condition) to show signs of greater sub-phonemic specification, in which case the 
similarity bias should have been stronger than for normally-fluent speakers.  
A further finding of Experiment 4 was that the frequency with which participants who 
stutter perceived errors of phonological encoding in their inner speech was not related to the 
(self-reported) severity of their stuttering or the frequency with which they produced 
stuttering-like disfluencies in their everyday speech. This finding appears to be incompatible 
with the second tenet of Postma and Kolk‟s (1993) Covert Repair Hypothesis: that stuttering-
like disfluencies are the (perceptible) side-effects of speakers‟ attempts to repair errors of 




 Although a weaker lexical bias (on overt errors) was found in the control group than in the 
stuttering group, the strength of lexical bias in the stuttering group was similar that of the groups of 
(normally-fluent) student participants in Experiments 1 to 3. This suggests that the weaker lexical bias 
in the control group was anomalous. 
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phonological encoding before they become expressed in overt speech. Rather, it suggests 
that the link between stuttering like disfluencies and the tendency to make abnormally large 
numbers of phonological encoding errors is probably much more tenuous than that posited 
by the CRH. This conclusion is supported by the finding, in Experiment 4, that, although 
overall, the stuttering group made more phonemic errors than the control group, both 
participant groups exhibited a wide range of individual differences and some members of the 
stuttering group made fewer onset errors than some of the controls.  This finding implies that 
impaired phonological encoding is neither a necessary nor a sufficient factor to account for 
stuttering in adults. It mirrors similar findings in studies that have compared the speech 
motor-control abilities of stutterers and controls (See Section 3.1).  
Together, these findings from Experiment 4 led us to reject the Covert Repair 
Hypothesis in its original form and to consider the broader possibility that a mechanism 
similar to covert error repair may be activated simply by the speaker‟s perception of a need 
to speak more accurately.   
Experiments 5 and 6 were designed to investigate this possibility. We hypothesised that 
stuttering-like disfluencies may arise not only in response to speech errors, but also in 
response to any stimulus that causes the speaker to perceive the need to speak more 
accurately. To test this hypothesis we employed a new experimental paradigm whereby 
participants repeatedly spoke single words into what they believed was a speech-recognition 
system.  The system was designed to give the impression that it had difficulty recognising 
certain words, thus instilling in participants the anticipation of communication failure on 
subsequent iterations of those words.  
Our decision to focus on anticipation of communication failure in Experiments 5 and 6 
(as opposed to anticipation of stuttering or of negative listener responses) was because 
communication failure is likely to have been a common experience for individuals with a 
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past history of impairments of language production and/or speech motor control, insofar as 
both of these impairments are likely to result in speech that is relatively difficult for listeners 
to understand.  Specifically, the paradigm was designed to instil into participants the 
anticipation that words will be misrecognised by providing them with feedback (on a 
computer screen) that informed them that their immediately preceding iterations of specific 
words had been misrecognised. Importantly, this feedback was predetermined and bore no 
relationship to the actual quality of those previous iterations, or whether or not they had 
stuttered on them.  
The results from Experiments 5 and 6 revealed that, for participants who stutter, the 
usual reduction in stuttering that occurs when words are repeated was negated when 
feedback from previous iterations of that word suggested that it had been misrecognised. 
Because the paradigm was counterbalanced, it clarified that this effect of anticipation was 
related purely to the nature of the feedback received (from the computer) and did not depend 
on the semantic, lexical, phonemic or articulatory properties (or complexity) of the 
individual words. However, regression analysis of factors contributing to the likelihood of 
stuttering also confirmed that, in participants who stutter, this feedback-related anticipatory 
effect exerted its influence alongside (and independently from) a pre-existing anticipatory 
effect that may indeed stem from more distant experiences of difficulty formulating or 
articulating specific words.  
When considered together with the more general findings of studies that have 
investigated the moments when stuttering events occur (See the review in Section 2.4), the 
findings of Experiments 5 and 6 suggest that stuttering-like disfluencies may be precipitated 
by the anticipation of communication failure, and that this may itself potentially stem from 
one or more of a number of different factors. Such factors may include a tendency to make 
more phonological (and/or word-order) encoding errors (as revealed in Experiment 4), 
and/or a tendency for articulation, and possibly fine motor control in general, to be 
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somewhat less precise (as outlined in Section 3.1). However, it is noteworthy that the 
anticipation of communication failure need not necessarily always stem from any functional 
impairment of the speaker‟s abilities to produce speech. Evidence suggesting a higher 
incidence of stuttering in bilingual families (see Van Borsel, Maes, & Foulon, 2001, for a 
review) suggests that it may sometimes stem from the limited capacity of listeners to 
understand the language spoken, and it may also result from an infelicitous speaking 
environment or negative responses of the listener, for any of a variety of reasons (cf. 
Johnson, 1942; 1959).  
9.1.1. Mechanisms that could account for the production of 
stuttering-like disfluencies 
How might the experience of communication failure lead to the production of stuttering-
like disfluencies? In the discussion of the findings of Experiments 5 and 6 (See Section 
8.4.3), a number of possible mechanisms were outlined, all of which could be activated by 
the perception of the need to speak more accurately. One possibility, that is essentially 
similar to Vasić and Wijnen‟s (2005) Vicious Circle Hypothesis (VCH), is that the 
anticipation that a word will be misunderstood leads to hypervigilant monitoring of the 
speech plan containing that word. As a result, minor, trivial phonetic irregularities in the plan 
may constitute sufficient stimuli for it to be cancelled and reformulated; the audible 
consequences of such cancellations and reformulations being repetitions, prolongations and 
blocks. It seems to us most plausible that such hyper-vigilance is momentary, insofar as it is 
may only occur at times or in situations where the speaker is concerned that his words will 
be misunderstood (Vasić & Wijnen‟s formulation of the VCH appears to suggest that 
stutterers are more generally hyper-vigilant with respect to monitoring of speech plans). 
Such transient hyper-vigilance might better explain why the occurrence of stuttering-like 
disfluencies is so dependent on speakers‟ perceptions of the demands posed by the speaking 
situation (See Section 2.4.2).  Thus, for example, our failure to find any evidence of hyper-
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vigilant monitoring in participants who stutter in the tonguetwister paradigm we used for 
Experiment 4 may have been because participants did not perceive any need for their words 
to be understood. 
 A second possible way in which the experience of communication failure could lead to 
the production of stuttering-like disfluencies, also outlined in the General Discussion of 
Experiments 5 and 6 (See Section 8.4.3), is that the mere anticipation of a word being 
misrecognised or misunderstood is in itself sufficient to lead to cancellation and 
reformulation of the speech plan. This explanation could be considered as a hybrid, 
incorporating aspects of the CRH, VCH and EXPLAN hypotheses: In common with 
EXPLAN it does not require the monitoring of speech plans, and so avoids the problem of 
how to account for very rapid repetitions; in common with the CRH and VCH, it does 
involve the cancellation and reformulation of plans.   
Although both of the mechanisms described above constitute plausible accounts of how 
stuttering-like disfluencies may arise, we would argue that neither of them is fully 
satisfactory. Stutterers generally do not report being aware of excessive numbers of errors in 
their inner speech, nor do they report perceiving their inner speech as disfluent. On the 
contrary, it appears that at least the majority of them consider their inner speech to be 
normally fluent (Netsell et al., 2010), although systematic larger scale studies are needed to 
confirm this. The apparent lack of stuttering-like disfluencies in the inner speech of stutterers 
suggests, as highlighted in the ICD9 definition of stuttering (See Section 2.1), that rather 
than being unable to formulate adequate speech plans, their main difficulty is that they are 
unable to execute the plans they have formulated at the time when they are needed.   
In the General Discussion of Experiments 5 and 6 (Section 8.4.3), we proposed a 
„variable buffer-release threshold mechanism‟ that could account for the apparent difficulty 
stutterers experience executing speech plans at an appropriate moment in time. This 
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mechanism is congruent with the findings of our own studies and with the broader literature 
on stuttering, and is also in-line with this subjective experience of people who stutter.   This 
mechanism is postulated to be responsible for determining the moment at which a speech 
plan that is stored in the articulatory buffer is released for overt execution. Specifically, we 
hypothesised that speech plans stored in the buffer have a particular level of activation, and 
they are only released when that level exceeds a particular threshold: the „release threshold‟. 
The process of execution can be initiated by the lowering of that threshold to a level that is 
lower than the level of activation of the stored plan. It could be conceptualised as being like 
a dam that functions to hold water in a reservoir, the height of which can be varied according 
to needs. It is conceivable that the variable buffer-release threshold mechanism may develop 
in childhood and that it normally also plays an important role in allowing verbal thought and 
reasoning to proceed without overt articulation (cf. Vygotsky, 1986). As such, control over 
the buffer-release threshold would constitute an important cognitive and social skill attained 
during childhood.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.3, the more highly-activated a speech plan, the 
higher the probability that it will be error-free. Therefore, in situations where the speaker 
perceives that it is important to ensure a high quality of speech, the tendency may be for the 
buffer-release threshold to be set at a higher setting. Although such a strategy should 
increase the accuracy of speech, a side-effect may be that it is then more difficult for speech 
plans to be released for execution. Potentially, if the mechanism is set too high, some speech 
plans may not be released at all – in which case the speaker will find that, although he can 
access speech plans perfectly easily in inner speech, some of these he may nevertheless find 
himself unable to execute.  
If such a threshold mechanism exists, the findings of Experiment 5 suggest that the level 
at which the threshold is set is likely to be raised by cues that are associated with past 
experiences of communication failure. The appropriateness of such a rise in the threshold is 
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dependent upon the validity of the cues in the current speaking situation.  Thus, for example, 
if the release threshold is raised in speaking situations where a high degree of accuracy is 
required, the likelihood of successful communication of the intended message may be 
increased. On the other hand, if a high degree of fluency is necessary in order to convey the 
intended message, communication may fail as a result of a rise in the setting of the release 
mechanism. Thus problems may arise if a speaker has difficulty determining which of the 
two scenarios is responsible for communication failure. As proposed by the VCH, such 
difficulty may arise because the speaker has come to interpret disfluencies as errors. 
9.1.2. The meaning of anticipation  
A common theme underlying the various formulations of anticipatory struggle 
hypothesis that have appeared over the years is that moments of stuttering occur when 
“stutterers interfere in some manner with the way they are talking because of their belief that 
speaking is difficult” (Bloodstein & Bernstein Ratner, 2008, p43). Bloodstein proposed that 
initially stutterers interfere with their speech in response to the direct experience of 
difficulty, but then as the condition progresses they start to interfere with their speech in 
response to cues that have become associated with previous experiences of difficulty. He 
equated the presence of such cues with the anticipation of upcoming difficulty, although he 
also noted that the cues may exert their influence with a minimal degree of conscious 
awareness (Bloodstein & Bernstein Ratner, 2008, pp247-248) 
According to the Variable Release Threshold Hypothesis, the presence of cues 
associated with past experiences of communication failure leads specifically to a rise in the 
activation threshold that words and phonemes have to reach before they can be released for 
execution. Importantly such cues may already lead to a rise in the release threshold of a 
planned utterance before the speaker attempts to initiate overt articulation of that utterance. 
If this is the case, overt articulation of the utterance may effectively already have been 
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rendered impossible even before the speaker attempts to initiate it. However, although 
stutterers can generally accurately predict when stuttering events will occur, it is noteworthy 
that a number of early studies have shown that they nevertheless sometimes find themselves 
blocking on words quite unexpectedly without any prior premonitions, and they also 
sometimes wrongly anticipate that they will stutter (Knott et al., 1937; Milisen, 1938; 
Silverman & Williams, 1972).  
Together, such observations suggest that the conscious anticipation that one is about to 
block does not stem directly from an awareness of the level at which the variable buffer 
release mechanism is set. Rather, they suggest that conscious anticipation of stuttering most 
likely involves a form of forward modelling whereby the speaker draws on past experiences 
to calculate the probable impact of cues associated with past instances of stuttering on his 
current ability to utter a specific word in a specific speaking situation. It would make sense 
that the speaker‟s level of skill at performing such forward modelling increases with age and 
experience, and it is likely that such forward modelling constitutes the underlying 
mechanism behind the development of avoidance behaviours that are particularly 
characteristic of persistent stuttering in older children and adults. The gradual increase in 
avoidance behaviours with age that is characteristic of developmental stuttering is fully in 
line with the finding that school-age children who stutter are able to accurately predict less 
than half of their instances of stuttering (Silverman & Williams, 1972), whereas adults who 
stutter are able to accurately predict about 95% of such instances (Knott et al., 1937). 
In summary, it seems likely that anticipation influences stuttering behaviour in two 
ways: Firstly through an unconscious automatic process whereby cues associated with past 
experiences of communication failure lead to a rise in the release threshold for speech plans; 
and secondly, through a more conscious process of forward modelling whereby stutterers 
learn to anticipate the situations in which the release threshold will rise to the point where 
blocking will occur. 
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A further question that arises in relation to the nature of the cues that become associated 
with experiences of stuttering or communication failure is – What determines how much 
impact specific cues can have? Bearing in mind that some cues are likely to be more reliable 
than others and some are more readily available than others, it would perhaps not be 
surprising to find that some cues have a stronger impact on stuttering than others. As 
discussed in Section 2.4.1, it has long been known that stuttering is strongly influenced by 
the quality and availability of auditory feedback and that its severity is greatly reduced when 
auditory feedback is masked or distorted (for example, by delay of frequency shift) to the 
point where it no longer provides useful information (Kalinowski et al., 1993; Soderberg, 
1969; Wingate, 1970). This would suggest that many of the cues that stutterers come to 
associate with communication failure are perceived as a result of monitoring of auditory 
feedback.  However, this cannot be the whole story because, although auditory masking (and 
other forms of altered auditory feedback) can greatly reduce the severity of stuttering, they 
do not always have such an effect, and sometimes severe stuttering continues to occur in the 
complete absence of auditory feedback (e.g. Lincoln, Packman, Onslow, & Jones, 2010). In 
light of these observations it seems likely that speakers attend to whatever cues to the 
likelihood of communication failure are likely to be most reliable and most readily available. 
For the majority of stutterers most of the time, auditory feedback provides a source of cues 
that is readily available and reasonably reliable. Occasionally, however, visual or other forms 
of feedback may provide a more reliable indication of the likelihood of communication 
failure, in which case they may take priority.  
9.1.3. The anticipation of communication failure 
Previous researchers have proposed that moments of stuttering occur in response to the 
anticipation of: (a) negative listener reactions; (b) stuttering; (c) difficulty speaking; and (d) 
difficulty verbally conveying propositional content (Bloodstein, 1958, 1975, 1997; Johnson, 
1942, 1959). Each of these proposals is supported by evidence both from stutterers own self-
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reports (e.g. Bloodstein, 1950a; Bloodstein, 1950b) as well as from experimental studies (see 
Bloodstein & Bernstein Ratner, 2008 Chapter 10, for a review). A key question that needs to 
be answered is – What do these various forms of anticipation have in common with each 
other?  
In this thesis, we have argued that the common thread that connects the above forms of 
anticipation is that they are all manifestations of an underlying anticipation of 
communication failure. However, we have avoided explicitly stating what exactly we mean 
communication failure. A possible operational definition of it is: „failure (of the recipient) to 
apprehend the main illocutionary force of an utterance‟. Thus communication failure may 
occur on a variety of levels, depending on the nature of the message.  Although the 
illocutionary force may sometimes be adequately conveyed simply through correct 
recognition of the words spoken, in many speaking situations correct interpretation of the 
intended message depends on the subtle nuances of prosody and timing with which the 
words are spoken. In such situations the correct selection of phonemes may be relatively 
unimportant. In light of the specific role that variable release threshold and covert error 
repair mechanisms are likely to play in regulating the phonetic accuracy of executed 
utterances, if people who stutter have developed a tendency to adjust the settings of these 
mechanisms whenever they anticipate communication failure of any kind, many of the 
adjustments they make will be inappropriate, especially if a side-effect of such adjustments 
is a reduction in fluency and a reduced control over prosody and timing of utterances. 
9.1.4. False beliefs 
Irrespective of whether stuttering stems from the maladaptive settings of a variable 
buffer release mechanism or an excessive tendency towards cancellation and reformulation 
of speech plans, either way the findings from our Experiments 5 and 6 suggest that the 
anticipation of communication failure and the associated desire to speak more accurately 
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both play key roles in the disorder.  As previously noted, anticipation of communication 
failure may arise because of underlying difficulty with the speaker‟s language or speech-
production abilities, or because of an infelicitous speaking environment, or it may arise due 
to some sort of difficulty on the part of the listener. Whatever the cause, some of the time, 
the likelihood of successful communication can be increased by making more effort to speak 
accurately.  However, in some situations, speaking more accurately will not help, and the 
belief that it will help constitutes a false belief. It is in such situations, where the speaker 
fails to recognise that speaking more accurately will not increase successful communication, 
that excessive error repairs or a maladaptive raising of the buffer-release threshold would be 
most likely to occur. The failure to recognise such situations may then lead the system to 
become hypersensitive generally, such that speech may become disfluent whenever the 
speaker perceives even a slight possibility of communication failure.  Moreover, because 
disfluency can itself lead to communication failure, such hypersensitivity is likely to become 
self-sustaining; in which case, as Conture et al. (2004) suggested in their „Gone but not 
Forgotten Hypothesis‟, stuttering may persist, even though the initial reasons for it may long 
since have disappeared.  
9.1.5. The stuttering ‘block’ 
 In Chapter 2 we discussed how difficult it is to differentiate between what constitutes 
the underlying disorder of persistent stuttering, what symptoms arise directly from it, and 
what symptoms arise indirectly as a result of the speaker‟s attempts to adapt to it. Although 
most researchers would agree that we do not yet know what the underlying disorder is, few 
would question the traditional belief that repetitions, prolongations and blocks – the so-called 
„primary‟ symptoms of stuttering – are symptoms that arise directly from it, whereas 
concomitant movements and avoidance of words, people, and situations – the so-called 
„secondary‟ symptoms – arise indirectly, from the speaker‟s attempts to adapt to the disorder.  
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An alternative view, discussed in Section 2.3, is that the stuttering „block‟ is the only 
primary symptom of persistent stuttering, whereas prolongations and repetitions are 
secondary symptoms of adaptation to the block. Although this latter view has rarely been 
considered, it nevertheless is the view that fits best with the Variable Release Mechanism 
Hypothesis insofar as the stuttering block is the only direct symptom of the speaker‟s 
inability to release a stored plan for execution. According to this alternative view, repetitions 
and prolongations may represent learned responses that  help the speaker maintain the 
attention of the listener and maintain his conversation turn (cf. Blackmer & Mitton, 1991; 
Howell & Au-Yeung, 2002). Thus, according to the Variable Release Mechanism 
hypothesis, the speaker only finds himself unable to initiate execution of the specific units 
(phonemes, syllables or words) that fail to achieve a level of activation above the threshold 
required for their release, whereas the units preceding (and also following) them can be 
executed without difficulty. It is likely that the release threshold is set differently for each 
unit, depending on the speaker‟s perceptions (based on prior experiences) of how important 
it is to ensure error-free selection of that unit in order to avoid communication failure. Units 
that are perceived as essential for successful communication are likely to be assigned the 
highest release thresholds and may thus be the most difficult to initiate articulation of. In 
contrast, non-essential units, including function words and unstressed units would be 
assigned lower release thresholds and can therefore be initiated without difficulty; hence 
their availability for use as fillers. 
The above conceptualization of repetitions and prolongations as secondary to blocks 
does not, however, fit well with the pattern of symptoms normally associated with incipient 
stuttering of early childhood, which is characterised by little, if any, evidence of blocking 
(Bloodstein, 2001, 2006). The lack of blocking in incipient stuttering, together with the 
stronger evidence of an association between incipient stuttering and weak or delayed 
development of syntactic formulation skills (Bernstein Ratner, 1997) suggest that the 
222 
 
Variable Buffer-Release Mechanism Hypothesis may only account well for the symptoms of 
persistent stuttering (i.e. stuttering in older children and adults). In contrast, the symptoms of 
incipient stuttering of early childhood may be more in line with the standard EXPLAN 
account (Howell & Au-Yeung, 2002), whereby the stuttering-like disfluencies of young 
children who stutter arise on occasions when the speech plan is simply not sufficiently 
complete at the point of time where the child attempts to initiate its execution. An 
incomplete speech plan may account for why incipient stuttering is rarely accompanied by 
blocking and signs of struggle. Thus it could be that „stalling behaviours‟ are characteristic 
of incipient stuttering because the child has not yet accessed the full form of the word he 
wants to say and effectively needs to stall for time. „Advancing behaviours‟, on the other 
hand, may be characteristic of persistent stuttering because the stutterer knows exactly the 
word he wants to say, but is unable to execute it. His instinctive response, therefore, is to try 
to use force to push the word out, rather than to stall.   
9.2. Conclusions and future directions 
Through a series of tongue-twister studies investigating inner-speech errors in adults 
who do and do not stutter, we were able to show that adults who stutter make more errors of 
phonological encoding and also more word-order errors than normally-fluent speakers. 
However, the rate with which individual participants made such errors was not correlated 
with the severity of their stuttering, and some participants who stutter make fewer 
phonological encoding errors than some normally-fluent speakers. We therefore concluded 
that impaired phonological encoding constitutes, at most, only one out of a number of 
underlying factors that may predispose speakers to persistent stuttering.  
Our experiments that involved inducing the anticipation that words will misrecognised 
provided preliminary evidence suggesting that the experience of stuttering may be associated 
with stutterers‟ inappropriate attempts to reduce their speech errors and/or to speak more 
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accurately. In this thesis we have proposed a number of mechanisms that could account for 
how the perception of the need to speak more accurately may result in the production of 
stuttering-like disfluencies. These include two variants of the Vicious Circle Hypothesis 
(both of which involve cancellation and reformulation of speech plans), and a third model in 
which the perception of a need for increased accuracy results in a slower release of words 
from the articulatory buffer. We have posited that any of these mechanisms could potentially 
cause stuttering if they are inappropriately engaged by speakers, such as in situations where 
successful communication is not dependent on how accurately or clearly the speaker speaks.  
9.2.1. Future research 
Although our word-misrecognition experiments provided evidence in support of the role 
of anticipation of communication failure in the production of stuttering-like disfluencies, it 
was not possible within the time frame of the thesis to design and run experiments to provide 
detailed evidence for either of the posited mechanisms through which this might occur.  
Future research could investigate the above-mentioned mechanisms further through an in-
depth analysis of how stutterers perceive their speech plans in inner speech, and in particular 
whether or not they perceive them to accurately represent exactly what they wish to say, 
whether they perceive any differences in speech plans that are followed by stuttering 
compared to speech plans that are followed by fluent speech, and whether the experience of 
stuttering is associated with difficulty formulating adequate plans or difficulty releasing 
formulated plans for execution.  
Insofar as any of these posited mechanisms account for the production of stuttering-like 
disfluencies, they lead to two important questions, both of which have a direct relevance to 
therapy: (1) To what extent do stutterers try to speak more accurately than they need to? And 
(2) to what extent do they have the capacity to vary how accurately they try to speak? 
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Future research could investigate these issues by examining (and comparing) how 
stutterers and normally-fluent speakers perceive the relative importance of accuracy and 
fluency in situations where they anticipate communication failure, and by examining 
whether they have more difficulty than normally-fluent speakers in discriminating between 
situations where efforts to adjust one‟s speech are likely to improve the chances of 
successful communication and situations where they are not.  
In light of the findings of the current thesis, it seems likely that, for people who stutter, 
an improved level of communication effectiveness may be achievable through a more 
adaptive awareness of the relative importance of accuracy and fluency in specific speaking 
situations. Therefore, from a clinical perspective it would be beneficial for researchers to 
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11. Appendix A 
Materials for Experiment 1 
Outcome and similarity for word 3 onset substitution 
word, similar nonword, similar word, dissimilar nonword, dissimilar 
fan van vat fad fan van valve fad man van vat mad man van valve mad 
pole coast cope poke pole coast comb poke soul coast cope soak soul coast comb soak 
till kid kin tinge till kid kiln tinge bill kid kin binge bill kid kiln binge 
seep heath heel scene seep heath heave scene keep heath heel keen keep heath heave keen 
rig link limb rip rig link limp rip dig link limb dip dig link limp dip 
pat cap catch pad pat cap cab pad bat cap catch bad bat cap cab bad 
busk Puff puck bunk busk puff pub bunk musk puff puck monk musk puff pub monk 
cob Golf gone cot cob golf goth cot yob golf gone yacht yob golf goth yacht 
finch Ship shin fill finch ship shift fill pinch ship shin pill pinch ship shift pill 
meal bead beak mean meal bead beach mean weal bead beak wean weal bead beach wean 
dove Gulf gull dump dove gulf gut dump love gulf gull lump love gulf gut lump 
wail range rake waist wail range race waist tale range rake taste tale range race taste 
pink bid bit pick pink bid bib pick kink bid bit kick kink bid bib kick 
come tut tub cuff come tut tuck cuff hum tut tub huff hum tut tuck hufi 
conk toss top cog conk toss tongs cog honk toss top hog honk toss tongs hog 
reap leap leach reef reap leap leash reef beep leap leach beef beep leap leash beef 
dock tod tot dodge dock tod tom dodge lock tod tot lodge lock tod tom lodge 
peck ketch keg pet peck ketch kelp pet beck ketch keg bet beck ketch kelp bet 
gust cusp cut gum gust cusp cup gum rust cusp cut rum rust cusp cup rum 
face vein vale feign face vein vague feign race vein vale cane race vein vague cane 
pang tank tack patch pang tank tap patch hang tank tack hatch hang tank tap hatch 
hunk thump thug hump hunk thump thud hump junk thump thug jump junk thump thud jump 
rot watt wad rob rot watt was rob not watt wad knob not watt was knob 
tape pain pale take tape pain paid take nape pain pale knave nape pain paid knave 
tut done duck tug tut done dove tug mutt done duck mug mutt done dove mug 
dock knock knot dodge dock knock notch dodge lock knock knot lodge lock knock notch lodge 
sill tick tip sick sill tick tint sick chill tick tip chick chill tick tint chick 
deck wreck wren dead deck wreck realm dead tech wreck wren ted tech wreck realm ted 
run duck dub rum run duck dud rum son duck dub some son duck dud some 
wench wreck red well wench wreck rev well bench wreck red bell bench wreck rev bell 
kale gauge gape cake kale gauge gait cake shale gauge gape shake shale gauge gait shake 
bag dad dash back bag dad damp back sag dad dash sack sag dad damp sack 
mull buff buck much mull buff bulge much dull buff buck dutch dull buff bulge dutch 
roam lone lope role roam lone loaf role dome lone lope dole dome lone loaf dole 
wade range reign wait wade range wraith wait maid range reign mate maid range wraith mate 
sit zing zip sick sit zing zinc sick knit zing zip nick knit zing zinc nick 
puff buff bunch punk puff buff bulge punk huff buff bunch hunk huff buff bulge hunk 
rip width witch rim rip width wish rim hip width witch hymn hip width wish hymn 
dock toss tot dosh dock toss top dosh wok toss tot wash wok toss top wash 
delve wreck ref dead delve wreck realm dead shelve wreck ref shed shelve wreck realm shed 
wreck wet west wren wreck wet wedge wren peck wet west pen peck wet wedge pen 
fame safe sail fade fame safe sage fade maim safe sail maid maim safe sage maid 
bell peg pet beck bell peg pep beck knell peg pet neck knell peg pep neck 
pad tank tack patch pad tank tab patch mad tank tack match mad tank tab match 
teem seep seek teach teem seep siege teach beam seep seek beach beam seep siege beach 
hub thump thug hush hub thump thud hush rub thump thug rush rub thump thud rush 
jug chuck chump just jug chuck chub just lug chuck chump must lug chuck chub must 




12. Appendix B. Combined analyses with random 
slopes 
12.1. Experiments 1 to 3  
Vigilance of self-reporting 













Overt speech (participants vs. independent rater), Word 3 
onset errors 
     
 
Intercept    (by word) nonword outcomes, 
dissimilar onsets,  
independent rater 
-10.73 1.50 <.001 ***  by tongue-
twister 
1.32 1.15 
       by participant 31.89 5.65 
Lexicality real word outcomes 5.32 1.51 <.001 ***  by participant 33.20 5.76 




 -4.41 1.53 .004 **  by participant 34.70 5.89 
Rater Self-ratings -0.45 0.12 <.001 ***     
 
 
Accuracy of self-reporting  
Insufficient data for the number of degrees of freedom. 
Inner vs. overt speech 













Inner vs. overt speech, Word 3 onset errors      
 
Intercept      (Iteration 1,  
correct feedback) 
-6.86 0.36 <.001 ***  by tongue-
twister 
0.52 0.72 
       by participant 1.77 1.32 
Lexicality real word 
outcomes 
1.94 0.34 <.001 ***  by participant 0.07 0.26 









Inner speech only 














Inner speech only, Word 3 onset 
errors 





-7.49 0.62 <.001 ***  by tongue-
twister 
0.18 0.42 
      by participant 3.10 1.76 
Lexicality real word 
outcomes 
2.42 0.62 <.001 ***  by participant 1.65 0.41 









12.2. Experiment 4: Lexical bias and phonemic 
similarity 
Vigilance of self-reporting 













Overt speech (participants vs. independent rater), Word 
3 onset errors 
     
 




dissimilar onsets,  
-6.29 0.40 <.001 ***  by tongue-
twister 
1.05 1.03 
       by participant 2.83 1.68 
digitspan +1 0.00 0.05 .963     
Rater Self-ratings -0.46 0.13 <.001 ***     
Group PWS 1.06 0.41 .010 **     
Lexicality real word outcomes 0.40 0.35 .259  by participant 1.47 1.21 




 0.72 0.44 .102  by participant   
 
Inner vs. overt speech 













Inner vs. overt speech (participants vs. independent rater),  
Word 3 onset errors 
    
 





dissimilar onsets,  
-5.58 0.35 <.001 ***  by tongue-
twister 
0.72 0.85 
      by participant 1.75 1.32 
Digitspan 
  
+1 -0.17 0.09 .063     
Overtness  overt speech 0.54 0.18 .003 **  by participant 0.48 0.69 
Group PWS 0.10 0.26 .010 **     
Lexicality real word 
outcomes 
0.56 0.30 .058  by participant 0.27 0.52 




 0.58 0.34 .091     
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Inner speech only 













Inner speech only, Word 3 onset errors      
 
Intercept    (by word) Digitspan=7, 
nonword 
outcomes, 
dissimilar onsets,  
-6.16 0.35 <.001 ***  by tongue-
twister 
0.87 0.93 
      by participant 0.83 0.91 
Digitspan +1 -0.26 0.13 .054     
Lexicality real word 
outcomes 
0.92 0.25 <.001 ***     
Similarity similar onsets 1.04 0.26 <.001 ***     
12.3. Experiment 4 – all onset errors and word-order 
errors 
Vigilance of self-reporting 













Overt speech (participants vs. independent rater), 
Onset errors 
     
 
Intercept      digitspan=7, 
independent rater, 
controls 





     by participant 0.59 0.77 
digitspan +1 -0.18 0.09 .018 *     
rater Self rating -0.47 0.11 <.001 ***  by participant 0.00 0.05 
group PWS 1.04 0.25 <.001 ***     
 
Overt speech (participants vs. independent rater), 
Word-order errors 






-5.71 0.30 <.001 ***  by tongue-
twister 
0.77 0.88 
      by participant 1.55 1.25 
digitspan +1 -0.19 0.12 .115     
rater Self rating -0.27 0.12 .032 *     
group PWS 1.03 0.37 .005 **     
 
Accuracy of self-reporting 
Insufficient data for the number of degrees of freedom. 
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Inner vs. overt speech 






















     by participant 0.47 0.68 
Digitspan +1 -0.16 0.08 .038 *     
Group  PWS 0.87 0.22 <.001 ***     
Overtness overt speech 0.37 0.14 .006 ** 
 
 by participant 0.13 0.36 





-.899 0.66 <.001 ***  by tongue-
twister 
1.56 1.25 
      by participant 0.76 0.87 
digitspan +1 -0.43 0.19 .025 *     










-6.45 0.28 <.001 ***  by tongue-
twister 
0.35 0.59 
      by participant 0.80 0.89 
Digitspan +1 -0.29 0.09 .002 **     
Masking masked 0.52 0.17 .003 **  by participant 0.35 0.59 
Group  PWS 1.19 0.30 <.001 ***     
Overtness  overt speech 0.24 0.17 .197   by participant 0.53 0.73 
 
 
Inner speech only 
Predictors Value Fixed effects  Random effects 















-5.36 0.23 <.001 ***  by tongue-
twister 
0.44 0.66 
      by participant 0.44 0.66 
digitspan +1 -0.14 0.10 .186  by participant   
group PWS 0.65 0.28 .20 *  by participant   
 
Word order errors   





-7.05 0.41 <.001 ***  by tongue-
twister 
0.26 0.51 
      by participant 1.54 1.24 
digitspan +1 -0.34 0.11 .003 **  by participant 0.93 0.96 
masking masked 0.10 0.30 <.001 ***     
group PWS 1.38 0.39 <.001 ***     
251 
 
13. Appendix C Publications 
 
